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SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to examine the corporate governance , of firms quoted on
the stock market. An important contribution of the thesis is the derivation of the
conceptual framework for analysing corporate governance which places conduct at the
centre of the understanding of corporate governance. I propose a conceptual
framework by extending the concept of incomplete contracts to include expost
observability/verifiability of the contracts between shareholders and managers.
Strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers is only feasible in the
procedural justice mode. Deliberation between the contracting parties is identified as
the centre piece of corporate governance. Managerial decision behaviour is shown to
be endogenous to the corporate governance framework.
A number of empirical issues emerge from the conceptual framework. We examine
two of these using panel data techniques and data on 218 manufacturing firms and the
complete list of 44 authorised financial institutions observed over a six year period,
1987-88 to 1994-95. I examine whether there is a case for deliberation in a corporate
governance framework given that the procedural justice mode is the only basis of
strategic co-operation. The second issue that was evaluated relates to the implications
of the adoption of a dominant strategy by shareholders given that the UK corporate
governance framework places a primary reliance on the market for corporate control.
My evidence shows that firm-specific factors are important in control changes as
measured by top management turnover. Thus the crucial recommendation of the
procedural justice based corporate governance framework, that deliberation will have
to be an integral component of the corporate governance framework, has been
validated by the empirical analysis. In the absence of strategic co-operation based on
procedural justice mode the conceptual framework proposed envisages the adoption of
dominant strategy by shareholders. The consequence of this will be an emphasis on
power relations in the top management team in a bid to minimise their human capital
risk. There will be ambiguity in the control changes as reflected by top management
turnover. I also find evidence that demonstrates the role of power in control changes.
Control changes as reflected by turnover of all directors and executive directors, in all
the estimates, are found to be consistently related to CEO changes. Financial
performance indicators are consistently inversely related to directors turnover in the
manufacturing sector but their impact on directors as reflected by elasticity measures
are very low. The effect of financial performance on the likelihood of CEO change is
not sgnificant for all the measures used in the study. Thus the evidence shows that
there is little accountability in the processes of corporate governance as reflected in
the top management turnover.
The conceptual framework proposed is not in conflict with the principal and agents
framework. The empirical results have also been used to evaluate the significance of
individual variables and compare and contrast with the findings of the existing
literature on top management turnover.
Analysis of the regulatory arrangement for authorised financial institutions has shown
that the central banks act as the centrepiece of the control structure in the financial
services sector. The role of the central banks in terms of corporate governance,
however, has been to replace the conventional governance goal of shareholder wealth
maximisation with concerns for depositors security and the stability of the financial
system. There are very few studies on the functioning of corporate governance
mechanisms in banks. Researchers are also increasingly interested in how corporate
governance mechanisms in general, vary in different legal and regulatory
environments. The study of the manufacturing and financial services sectors of the
same country provides valuable evidence for this comparison of corporate governance
under differing legal and regulatory arrangements.
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CHAPTER 1
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
1.1 Introduction
The purpose of this study is to examine the corporate governance of quoted firms in
the United Kingdom. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) in a survey define corporate
governance as... 'the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations ensure
themselves of getting a return on their investment'. Managerial accountability is an
issue in shareholder management relationships. In the property rights view of the firm,
the separation of ownership from control as first identified by the study of US firms
(Berle and Means, 1932), is seen as a potential source of reduction in the value of
corporate assets owned by shareholders. Thus the identification of separation of
ownership from control is the genesis of the interest in corporate governance.
The principal and agents framework has been the primary basis for the
conceptualisation of corporate governance issues. In the context of property rights this
is a valid framework for representing shareholder management relationships.
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However, the principal and agents framework is an abbreviated view of the
relationship between shareholders and management. There is little attempt to
understand the conduct of corporate governance. This is significant; as governance by
definition is a process. Important issues like the design of the corporate control
structure is unexplored even when there is an empirical recognition of the
complementarity and interdependence of the various corporate governance
mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Zajac and Westphal, 1995).
The implications of the abbreviated characterisation of corporate governance in terms
of principals and agents are apparent in the analytical and empirical literature. For
example, the role of corporate governance in managerial decision behaviour (e.g. short
termism) remains an analytical enigma (Laverty, 1996, Morris, 1998). At the
empirical level there is a preoccupation with structure and performance studies at
increasingly disaggregated levels. A Meta analytic review of studies on board
composition, leadership structure and financial performance shows that there is little
evidence of systematic relationship between governance structure and company
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998). The meta analysis
demonstrates that we lack an understanding of corporate governance.
The original aim of the study was to present empirical evidence on the corporate
governance of manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom. This is relevant as it is
noted that in discussions on corporate governance, 'opinion has drowned fact' (Mayer,
1997). There is also an empirical bias in the literature as much of the evidence is
based on US firm data (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Specifically, an important line of
2
enquiry in corporate governance is directed towards investigating factor, which
explain top management turnover. As Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 shows the evidence on
British management turnover is limited. The UK corporate control environment is
unique in terms of the strong mediating role of the stock market (Jenkinson and
Mayer, 1994; Franks and Mayer, 1996). The concomitant threat of hostile take-overs
that the stock market presents to managerial human capital provides in the UK
governance environment an accentuated empirical opportunity for the evaluation of
top management turnover.
The thesis however, goes beyond a presentation of the UK evidence on managerial
turnover. With the progress of the empirical work and a greater awareness of the
literature the conception of corporate governance has broadened from '...the ways in
which suppliers of finance assure themselves of getting a return on their investment'
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), to how it provides a decision-making context for top
management. Corporate governance is important as an institutional device not only for
correcting the imbalance of power between shareholders and managers resulting from
the separation of ownership from control but also as an aid to the decision-making
process (Pound, 1995). Corporate governance is significant not only for ensuring
shareholder wealth maximisation but also because it provides the context for top
management decisions. The existing literature lacks a conceptual framework that
accounts for both the agency concerns and the competitiveness implications of
corporate governance. In this thesis in Chapter 3 a conceptual framework of corporate
governance which accounts for such agency and competitiveness concerns is
proposed.
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The empirical work presented in Chapters 5 and 6 represent first steps in converting
conceptual explorations to empirical claims. Chapter 3 emphasises the role of conduct
in corporate governance. We follow an eclectic approach in constructing the
conceptual framework as economics provides only a limited view of incomplete
contracts and opportunism in strategically dependent relationships.
The empirical work presented in Chapter 5 provides an assessment of the role of
governance structure in ensuring top management accountability. Although the work
includes variables used in existing empirical work the interpretation of the empirical
work is not restricted to the conventional principal agents evaluation of the impact of
the corporate governance structure. The conceptual framework of Chapter 3 provides
our basis for interpreting some of the empirical findings. This framework emphasises
the role of conduct in the form of unstructured communication in corporate
governance and the econometric evaluation using panel data techniques provides a
limited assessment of the potential for unstructured communication in corporate
governance. A direct assessment of the role of unstructured communication in
ensuring managerial accountability and in providing an appropriate context for top
management decisions will have to be based on primary data which is part of the
agenda for future work.
1.2 The Conceptual Framework
The literature on corporate governance has attempted to enhance the understanding of
shareholder management relationship by:
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a. Questioning the property rights view of the firm (Davis, Schoorman anq
Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson and Preston, 1995);
b. Exploring the nature of contracts between shareholders and managers (Hart, 1995).
Given the pre-eminence of the right to property as the basis of economic interaction,
further explorations of the nature of contracts between shareholders and managers are
justified within the property rights view of the firm. This route offers an opportunity
for understanding the existing nature of relationships between shareholders and
managers and its implications for managerial decision behaviour. The questioning of
the property rights view of the firm has much wider connotations in terms of re-
evaluating the basic premises that form the basis for economic interactions.
Hart (1995) considers the contracts between shareholders and managers as
incomplete. This provides the theoretical justification for corporate governance as an
institutional device for mediating the relationship between shareholders and managers.
The corporate governance structure is comprised of mechanisms for 'channels of
communication'. However, the conception of incomplete contracts is limited to
observable but not verifiable contracts (Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini1998). This is
the conventional interpretation of incomplete contracts in Economics (Schwartz,
1992). The limited value of this theoretical framework is reflected in the second part
of the paper. There is little insight offered by the framework on the design of the
corporate governance structure and the complementarity/interdependence of the
various corporate governance mechanisms. The familiar 'Chicago School' argument
that 'the market knows best' is invoked. This does not reflect a reason-based
conclusion but is a reflection of a lack of understanding.
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In Chapter 3 a conceptual framework for analysing corporate governance between
shareholders and managers is proposed. There are two characteristies of the contracts
between shareholders and managers that make them distinctive:
a. The contracts between shareholders and managers are not discrete in time.
b. Shareholders have multiple and varying expectations from the contracts.
In addition to the factors identified by Hart (1995) 'unforeseen contingencies' (Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini, 1998) or 'strong non-contractability' (Schwartz, 1992) are
important reasons for contractual incompleteness between shareholders and managers.
Given the nature of incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers, a
corporate governance framework will have to be devised such that it encourages
strategic co-operation in the procedural justice mode. Strategic co-operation can only
be sustained in the procedural justice mode. The critical requirement of the procedural
justice mode of strategic co-operation is equality in the opportunity and influence of
messages even if the outcome of such co-operation is unfavourable to one of the
contracting parties. Thus the critical element of procedural justice mode will be
communication and the structure of communication between shareholders and
managers. This is the principal recommendation, which has to be incorporated in the
design of a corporate governance structure.
It is interesting that we find elements of this conceptual framework in the latest
committee to look into corporate governance in the United Kingdom (Hampel, 1998).
The recommendations of the Hampel committee are significant in the context of the
6
framework for analysing corporate governance proposed in Chapter 3. The Committee
recommends that shareholders should take into account `...the diversity of
circumstances and experience among companies....,' in their interpretation of matters
relating to corporate governance (Section 1.13). The Committee argues that good
governance needs to be agreed between companies and their shareholders on a case by
case basis, 'shareholders and others should show flexibility in the interpretation of the
code and should listen to directors' explanations and judge them on their merit...'
(Section 1.11). The Committee is also in favour of greater communication when it
proposes the inclusion of a narrative statement in the company annual report (Section
2.1). It also recommends that departing directors go public and explain why they left
the board and that the terms of their contract termination are published along with
their original employment contract. However, in the absence of a clear understanding
of why there is no participation by institutional shareholders the recommendations of
the committee are in effect statements of good intentions, Tut we urge trustees to
encourage the investment managers to take a long view' (Section 5.6).
1.3 Empirical Issues
There are two sets of empirical issues, which emerge from the conceptual framework
proposed in Chapter 3. The first set of issues relates to the need for deliberation or
direct communication between shareholders and managers for effective corporate
goyernance. In corporate governance we can identify two channels of communication
between shareholders and managers. The first channel is comprised of the 'focal
points' or financial performance indicators. This form of communication is
standardised and simplified to be universally understood and is independent of firm
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specific norms and practices (Kreps, 1988). The second form of communication is the
corporate board. The corporate board represents a channel for the communication of
unstructured information between the shareholders and the managers. The board
attributes like board duality, directors block shareholdings, board size etc., reflect the
volume of unstructured communication between shareholders and managers. A board
characterised by duality reflects greater concentration of power at the apex of the
organisation and the top management will have a reduced inclination to communicate
to the board. Board size has also been associated with control. Jensen (1993) considers
large boards as dysfunctional and easier to control. Hence larger boards can be
hypothesised to have a lower volume of unstructured information flow. Large block
shareholdings by directors reduces the separation of ownership from control and
information asymmetry. Large directors' block shareholding implies a larger volume
of unstructured information available to shareholders. A larger proportion of non-
executive directors on the board may increase the flow of unstructured information
depending upon their affiliation. Similarly, institutional block shareholdings may take
a direct interest in their shareholdings and induce greater information flow. However,
it is possible that regulatory provisions like insider laws may prevent a direct
involvement. Greater information flows may then be induced by insistence on
separation of the posts of chairman and the CEO or a greater
representation/effectiveness of non-executive directors on the board.
The relevance of the two types of communication can be evaluated for top-
management accountability, which is a key concern in corporate governance. Top
management accountability can be proxied by top management turnover. We can
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examine the role of financial performance indicators (structured information) and
board configuration (unstructured information) for 'disciplinary' top management
turnover. If we use panel data some additional assessment of the relevance of
unstructured information for top management accountability can be obtained.
Panel data techniques allow for the identification of firm-specific heterogeneity as
group effects. Large group effects will suggest that the unidentified variables have
systematic variation with governance changes. The use of dummies in panel data
estimates to allow for firm-specific and sample period-related variation does not allow
for the identification of the causes that lead to a shift in the regression lines. However,
the existence of fixed effects show that the firm specific heterogeneity is correlated
with the explanatory variables (Kmenta, 1986, Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1998). It is
possible that some form of this firm-specific heterogeneity will be resolved through
deliberation.
The second set of empirical issues relates to the implication for corporate governance
of the adoption of a dominant strategy by shareholders. The second set of issues has
also been evaluated in the conventional principal and agents framework. The
difference is that even within the property rights view of the firm the conceptual
framework proposed in Chapter 3 does not consider opportunism and the adversarial
shareholder management relationship as given but as an outcome partly endogenous to
the corporate governance process. In the decentralised mode shareholders will prefer
to adopt a dominant strategy and a breakdown in strategic co-operation with managers
will ensue. The evidence on the role of power relations in governance changes
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presented in the thesis has to be interpreted as symptomatic of the process of
governance not a given phenomenon which has to be configured to maximise goals
such as shareholder wealth maximisation. As shown in Chapter 2 the UK corporate
governance framework places a primary reliance on the market for corporate control.
The consequence of the adoption of a dominant strategy is that there will be
opportunistic behaviour manifested in the processes of the corporate governance
framework. Power relations will have a role in corporate governance.
The firms in the samples are drawn from two sectors, viz., the manufacturing sector
and the financial services sector. The data-set comprises 218 UK controlled quoted
manufacturing enterprises listed in The Times 1000 for the year 1987-88 and the
complete list of 44 quoted and UK controlled authorised financial institutions (AFIs)
listed in the February, 1989 issue of the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Data on
financial performance has been collected for the years 1987-88 to 1994-95. Data on
corporate governance has been gathered for the period 1989-90 to 1994-95.
The empirical investigation of the manufacturing sector shows that financial
performance indicators are significant but have a marginal impact on 'disciplinary'
top management turnover. Directors' block shareholdings have a positive and
significant influence on top management turnover. The literature is of the view that
directors are in possession of firm specific information (Fama and Jensen 1983) and
'expert knowledge' (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997). Greater levels of insider block
shareholdings indicate a close alignment of shareholder and management interests
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A positive association of directors block shareholdings
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with CEO turnover shows that firm specific information or unstructured information
has an important role in top management accountability. Firm-specific factors or the
group effects in the fixed effects model are substantial and explain more of the
variation in governance changes than the financial performance variables and the
board attributes. It is possible that some of the firm specific variation in top
management turnover is thus related to organisation specific norms and customs. The
findings suggest that unstructured information exchange and an understanding of firm
specific variation associated with governance changes will be important in furthering
our understanding of corporate governance. Board attributes reflecting the role of
power relations in top management turnover also emerge as significant.
The structure of deliberation that will conform to the requirements of strategic co-
operation in the procedural justice mode will comprise the agenda for further work.
Evaluation of the structure of deliberation, will have to be based on primary data
obtained through questionnaires and interviews of top management. Similar
investigation of the procedural justice mode have been carried out in the context of
entrepreneur-investor interactions, the management of innovation teams and
headquarters-subsidiary relations in strategic decision-making (Sapienza and
Korsgaard, 1996; Kim and Mauborgne, 1993; Korine, 1997). Section 7.4 in Chapter 7
provides a brief description of the research design that can be used to identify what
constitutes procedural justice in shareholder management relationship.
In the absence of strategic co-operation based on procedural justice mode the
conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3 envisages the adoption of a dominant
11
strategy by shareholders. The consequence of this will be an emphasis on power
relations in the top management team in a bid to minimise their human capital risk.
We find evidence, which demonstrates the role of power in control changes. Several
board attributes emerge as having a significant influence of top management.
The interest in the financial services firms or what are termed, as 'authorised
institutions' in the UK is an outcome of the conceptual framework developed in
Chapter 3. An important conclusion of the conceptual framework is that in the
presence of an active market for corporate control, shareholders will lack the incentive
to give credible commitments in the contracting relationship and the managers,
fearing the risk to their human capital, will engage in opportunistic behaviour. Thus
opportunism, instead of being controlled by the corporate governance structure will be
endogenous to the corporate governance arrangement. Our initial understanding based
on the public pronouncements of the Bank of England was that the Bank discouraged
hostile take-overs. Further, there are only two referrals of financial services firms on
take-overs in banks to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission since 1966. Thus the
authorised institutions sector represents a control sector where the market for
corporate control as a disciplining device is not a readily available option for the
exercise of corporate control.
Analysis of the regulatory arrangement in Chapter 6 shows that the central banks act
as the centrepiece of the control structure in the financial services sector. The role of
the central banks in terms of corporate governance, however, has been to replace the
conventional governance goal of shareholder wealth maximisation with concerns for
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depositors security and the stability of the financial system. Thus the mere absence of
hostile take-overs will not result in the shareholders giving credible commitments and
starting to engage in deliberative corporate governance, hi effect the study of
authorised financial institutions does not serve as a control case for testing the
hypotheses arising out of the conceptual framework proposed in Chapter 3. In this
light the hypotheses set up in section two of Chapter 4 have been appropriately
modified in section 6.3 of Chapter 6. There are very few studies on the functioning of
corporate governance mechanisms in banks (Roncaglia, 1997). Researchers are also
increasingly interested in how corporate governance mechanisms in general, vary in
different legal and regulatory environments (Prowse, 1997b). The comparative study
of the manufacturing and financial services sectors within the same country provides
valuable evidence for this comparison of corporate governance under differing legal
and regulatory arrangements.
1.4 Overview of the Chapters
Chapter 2 is a selective review of the literature on corporate governance. The focus of
the literature review is on the implications of corporate governance for managerial
decision-making. The chapter is divided into four sections. In the second section we
review the theoretical and empirical literature on corporate governance and
managerial decisions. The third section highlights the differentiating characteristics of
. the UK corporate governance environment. The fourth section concludes the chapter.
The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that our insight into the role of corporate
governance in managerial decision behaviour is limited. The discussion is further
augmented by a summary of the empirical studies on top management turnover
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presented in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. The principal and agents literature does not
provide an analytical framework which shows how rights of ownership have to be re-
negotiated given that effective day to day control has passed into the hands of
managers. In the absence of such a framework for re-negotiation the literature has
come to be dominated by empiricism. The differentiation between studies is large
with dissimilar data sets drawn from different countries. The studies in this area are
characteristically dominated by a focus on structural attributes like board
characteristics and their impact on performance, measured by financial performance
indicators, or control changes, such as board turnover, or through the market for
corporate control. The conduct of corporate governance has been ignored.
A conceptual framework of corporate governance within the institutional framework
of property rights is proposed in Chapter 3. Justification for corporate governance
mechanisms has been provided in terms of incomplete contracts (Hart, 1995;
Schwartz, 1992). Section two of Chapter 3 examines the nature of the incomplete
contract between shareholders and managers. The analysis shows that a learning
mechanism has to be incorporated in the corporate governance structure because of
the incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers. The third section
discusses the relevance of various modes of co-operation. In the fourth section we
identify the pure procedural justice mode as the basis for strategic co-operation
between shareholders and managers. In section five we show that a primary reliance
on the market for corporate control (MCC) implies that strategic co-operation based
on pure procedural justice cannot be the basis of interaction between shareholders and
managers. Shareholders will adopt a dominant strategy and deliberation, a critical
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component of strategic co-operation based on pure procedural justice, will be minimal
and of poor quality. Opportunistic behaviour by managers will become endogenous to
the system of corporate governance. Finally, the sixth section summarises this
analysis of corporate governance.
In Chapter 4 we discuss the methodology of the empirical evaluation. The Chapter is
divided into five sections. In the second section we identify the hypotheses which we
evaluate in the following two chapters. These hypotheses are based on the conceptual
framework of corporate governance proposed in Chapter 3. In the third section we
discuss the methodology of panel data analysis. The method of panel data is helpful
for evaluating the principle hypotheses. The discussion provides the basis for model
specification. In the fourth section, the variables to be used in the study are identified
on the basis of relevant literature in this area. This section also defines the variables
used and the data sources. The fifth and the final section concludes the chapter.
Chapter 5 discusses the panel data estimates of the factors affecting control changes in
large manufacturing firms in UK. The justification for the use of panel data techniques
and the variable definitions has been provided in Chapter 4. The major hypotheses to
be evaluated in light of the empirical estimates have been specified in section 4.2 of
Chapter 4. This chapter is divided into five sections. Section two lists the steps
involved in the estimation process and the empirical specification of the models to be
estimated. In sections three and four we discuss data characteristics and evaluate
hypotheses in light of the estimated models. The fifth section summarises the
principal conclusions of the chapter.
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In Chapter 6, we examine control changes in financial institutions which are
authorised by the Bank of England (BOE) and are hence under its regulatory control.
It has been argued that the legal and regulatory framework in which the banks operate
renders external control mechanism such as hostile take-overs ineffective as a method
of corporate control (Prowse, 1997a). Thus, control issues in banks have to be
discussed in an environment where the management has a considerably reduced threat
perception from the MCC. The analysis of the financial services sector is important to
our discussion of corporate governance in several respects. There are very few studies,
which examine corporate governance in the financial services sector (Roncaglia,
1997; Prowse, 1997b). The existence of a regulatory regime which to a certain extent
replaces the MCC and which does not subscribe to the goal of shareholder wealth
maximisation, makes the analysis interesting in its own right. In addition the
evaluation of the financial services sector provides supplementary evidence on the
issues examined in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 is divided into six sections. In the second section we examine the regulatory
framework and its implications for the corporate governance of authorised financial
institutions (AFIs). It emerges from the evaluation of the regulatory framework that
the corporate governance of AFIs differs not only in terms of the role of the MCC but
also in the very basis for which governance is undertaken. In the next two sections we
discuss the panel data estimates of the factors affecting control changes in the AFIs in
UK. In the third and fourth sections we discuss the data characteristics and evaluate
the hypotheses in light of the estimated models. The justification for the use of panel
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data techniques and the variable definitions has been provided in Chapter 4. The steps
involved in the estimation process and the empirical specification of the models to be
estimated are the same as specified in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5. The fifth section
compares the results for the AFIs with the findings relating to the manufacturing
sector presented in Chapter 5. The sixth section summarises the principal conclusions
of the chapter.
We bring together the conclusions of Chapters 2-6 to advance a consistent
understanding of corporate governance and its implications for managerial decision
behaviour in Chapter 7. We also discuss in section 7.4 a research design, which might
be used in future research to identify the components of procedural justice in
shareholder management relationships.
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CHAPTER 2 ,
TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER AND
MANAGERIAL DECISIONS
A Review of Literature
2.1 Introduction
The relationship between shareholders, the owners of the firm's assets, and the
managers of those assets is the subject matter of corporate governance. The Berle and
Means classic study (1932) evoked a keen interest in corporate governance. The study
identified 88 of their sample of 200 US companies, to be 'management controlled'.
The findings were and continue to be significant in the context of the property rights
view of the firm. This view of the firm is the dominant view of the business firm in
competitive capitalism. The firm in the property rights view is an institutional device
where various factors of production participate for the production of value. The
rewards to the various factors of production are determined in markets external to the
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firm. The shareholders by virtue of being owners of the firm's assets are claimants of
all residual income after the factors of production have been compensated for their
role in the creation of value. The emergence of the management as a controlling group
in a large number of firms significantly altered the shareholders' expectations
regarding the value of the firm's assets. It represented a constraint on the economic
options of the shareholder. A critical component of property rights is the right of
ownership. The right of ownership of an asset comprises:
(a) The right to use the asset
(b) The right to appropriate the returns from the asset; and
(c) The right to change the form, substance and location of the asset
(Furubotn and Richter, 1992).
The emergence of management control may have the effect of reducing the value of
the assets for the owner. Managerial actions regarding the utilisation of the firm's
assets may be motivated by their self-interest. Thus the empirical findings of the Berle
and Means (1932) study were instrumental in focusing interest on corporate
governance.
In this chapter we review the literature on top management turnover and its
implications for corporate governance. As a background to the empirical analysis in
chapter 5 certain aspects of the UK corporate control environment are also discussed.
Jensen (1993) provides a typology of governance mechanisms that can be used to
protect the rights of shareholders. The typology classifies the corporate governance
environment in terms of:
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a. Capital market
b. Legal/Political regulatory systems
c. Product and factor markets	 ,
d. Internal governance systems headed by the board of directors
The capital market functions as a governance mechanism through the market for
corporate control or the incidence of hostile takeovers. The regulatory framework can
also influence the corporate governance of firms. An example of this is the impact of
the Bank of England on the corporate governance of banks in the United Kingdom.
We have examined this in great detail in Chapter 6. The product and factor market can
also have a corporate governance role. Different product and factor market forms will
have different implications for corporate governance. The internal governance
mechanisms will also have implications for corporate governance behaviour by
providing implicit incentives and constraints for top management behaviour (Clarke,
Conyon and Peck, 1998). Examples of these internal mechanisms are the structure of
the board, block shareholders, debt structure of the board and the use of executive
compensation to align managerial motivations with shareholder objectives. There are
several good surveys of the literature on corporate governance such as those by
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and John and Senbet (1998). Examples of more focused
surveys of individual governance mechanisms are Conyon and Peck (1998a) on
executive compensation and (Morris, 1998; O'Sullivan, 1997) on takeovers.
The scope and aim.
 of this chapter is to provide a survey of the literature on top
management turnover and to understand its significance for corporate governance and
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managerial decision behaviour. Much of the literature on corporate governance refers
to the effectiveness of governance in ensuring the returns to the providers of capital
who have been dissociated from day to day control of the assets. As stated in Chapter
1 corporate governance is an institutional arrangement for not only correcting the
imbalance of power between shareholders and managers brought about by the
separation of ownership from control but also an institutional arrangement which
provides the context for top management decision-making. The literature lacks a
framework that accounts for both the agency concerns and the implications of
corporate governance for the competitiveness of the firm. In Chapter 3 we propose a
framework for the analysis of corporate governance that accounts for both the agency
and competitiveness implications. This literature review provides an assessment of the
current understanding on corporate governance and managerial decision behaviour
and the specific context of corporate governance in the United Kingdom. Thus it lays
down the background for the discussion undertaken in the subsequent chapters. The
chapter is divided into four sections. In the second section we review the theoretical
and empirical literature on corporate governance and managerial decisions. The third
section highlights the differentiating characteristics of the UK corporate governance
environment. The fourth section concludes the chapter. The literature review provides
the basis for the development of the conceptual framework in Chapter 3.
2.2 Corporate Governance and Managerial Decision Behaviour
The empirical findings of Berle and Means (1932) study led to a keen interest in
corporate governance. The emergence of managers as a controlling group in a
significant manner represented changes in the expectations of the shareholders
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regarding the economic value of their assets. The dominant property rights view of the
firm looks at shareholders as the claimants to all residual income. The separation of
ownership from control, a consequence of managers emerging as the controlling
group, was perceived as a possible source of reduction in the value of the
shareholders' assets. Shareholders' fears were based on the information asymmetry
between themselves and the managers and the apparent freedom managers had to
pursue their own agenda. Over a period of time two possible avenues emerged to
overcome the problem posed by information asymmetry. Internal control structures
represented by various board attributes like block shareholdings, non-executive
directors, etc. were identified as one set of control devices which the shareholders
could make use of to reduce the information asymmetry. A second route, which
tackled the problem, was based on the market for the right to manage corporate assets.
This obviated the need to overcome the problem of information asymmetry. This
market is visualised, as one where alternative management teams compete with each
other for the right to manage a corporate asset owned by the shareholders. The team
which attaches the highest value to the corporate asset, in other words, promises the
highest returns to shareholders and takes over the right to manage the asset until it is
replaced by another management team which attributes greater value to the corporate
asset, that is, promises greater returns to the shareholders. This process continues
independent of the volition or consultation of the current management team (Jensen,
. 1988). The market for corporate control represents a simple method of countering the
threat posed to shareholder wealth by the emergence of managers as a controlling
group.
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Different countries have evolved corporate control structures that have placed
different emphases on internal control devices and on the market for corporate control
in their design of corporate control structures. In the US and the UK the control
structure primarily relies on the market for corporate control and internal control
devices are relatively neglected. The corporate control environments of Japan and
Germany on the other hand are characterised by a near total reliance on internal
control devices and the market for corporate control is nearly absent in their corporate
environments (Prowse, 1994). The primary concern in the evolution of both types of
corporate governance structures has been to safeguard shareholders interests.
However, their historical development is based on the expectations that flow from the
right of ownership and are determined by the legal, economic, social and cultural
norms/customs of each country. Thus the design and emphasis in the corporate
governance structure has been in several ways, unique to each country.
Growing activity in the market for corporate control in the US and UK in the 1980s,
coincided with a decline in competitiveness of these countries relative to Japan and
Germany. Anxiety over US and UK firms' ability to compete induced rethinking in a
number of areas. The nature of the corporate governance environment and its
implications for firm competitiveness has over the last decade been keenly rethought
and investigated. Demirag (1994), Ezzamel, Wilmott and Liley (1992), Grinyer,
Russell and Collison (1998) provide evidence that managers believe that the corporate
governance structure has a role in shortening their decision horizons. However, the
analytical basis for this 'managerial belief in short-termism is not clear (Laverty,
1996; Morris, 1998).
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In the absence of a clear understanding of the link between managerial decision
behaviour and the corporate governance structure, empirical differences in the two
types of governance structures have formed the basis of several hypotheses on their
implications for competitiveness. Thus, for example, in the literature there is
extensive discussion of the capability of the signalling mechanism (the stock market)
and the signals (of financial information flows) to allow for managerial decisions
which are based on inter-temporal concerns (see Morris, 1998). The role of the stock
market expressed through the working of the market for corporate control is the most
apparent difference between the corporate governance structures of the US and the
UK on the one hand and Germany and Japan on the other. Thus the focus of the
discussion has been on the institutional robustness of the stock market in
incorporating intertemporal decisions and not on the institutional robustness of the
corporate governance structure in bridging the information asymmetry between the
shareholders and managers.
The corporate governance environment in the US and the UK is primarily based on
the MCC and the governance structures in Germany and Japan lay emphasis on
internal governance devices. The use of hostile takeovers in the MCC subsumes the
working of the governance structure into the working of a larger institution, the stock
market. Given this distinguishing role of the stock market, shareholder behaviour has
become an important factor for explaining the differing trends in corporate
competitiveness in the two types of governance environment. The declining
competitiveness of the US and UK economies has been attributed to the shareholder
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concern for short-term gains. As a consequence it is argued managers have been
prevented, by the threat of a take-over, from taking long-term decisions to promote
competitiveness. This is an ambitious assertion and shifts the focus of the discussion
from the institutional robustness of the corporate governance mechanism to the
institutional efficiency of the stock market and, in particular, to an evaluation of the
stock market's ability to decompose financial signals into those reflecting returns
from previous investments and those reflecting future returns. There is anecdotal
evidence to support this argument. Surveys of the behaviour of analysts in UK have
found a strong preference for 'fundamentals' (key financial ratios) in the decision to
'buy' and 'sell' (Arnold and Moizer, 1984; Pike Meerjanssen and Chadwick, 1993).
Financial information in the form of financial ratios plays an important role in the
investment analyst's decision to purchase or dispose of a shareholding. This suggests
that long-term investments, which will reduce current earnings and involving new and
innovative opportunities will not be properly evaluated. The verdict of the literature
on the efficiency of the stock market is that some weak form of the efficient market
hypothesis holds (Blair, 1995). Event studies have shown that the stock market reacts
favourably to the announcements of R&D expenditures (Griliches, 1984). In the
absence of a clear consensus on whether a short-term decision bias is induced by the
stock market it has been suggested that it is possible that the stock market fails to
value long-term investment in intangibles like organisational human capital (Sheard,
1989). Although, there is extensive discussion on the relevance of human capital for
the competitiveness of Japanese industry, there is no evidence that the stock market is
unable to value investment in human capital (Odagiri, 1992).
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At another level, in an attempt to establish the link between the decision bias of
managers and the functioning of the stock market, it has been suggested that the
decision environment in the market for corporate control ,emphasises financial
information flows. The exercise of managerial discretion with regard to forms of
investment will be motivated by the desire to bridge the information gap between
managers and shareholders. Risk-averse managers will want to take decisions, which
build their reputation. These efforts can be broadly classified in terms of:
(a) Visibility biases — the incentive to make short-term indicators look better.
(b) Resolution preference — the incentive to advance the arrival of good news and
delay the receipt of bad news and
(c) Mimicry and avoidance — the incentive to take actions that better managers are
seen to take and avoid the actions of bad managers (Hirshleifer and Yoon, 1992).
The above characterisation of managerial effort faced with information asymmetry
shows that it is for shareholders to interpret managers' intent. For example, a decision
having a long resolution period may well turn out to be the top management's attempt
to delay bad news or postpone the discovery of bad decisions. A consequence of such
a decision environment is that financial information, e.g., earnings and dividends, will
constitute the basic input for the interpretation of managerial action by shareholders.
The problem with financial information is that it induces managers to short change
long-term decisions and emphasise current earnings and dividends. Even if
shareholders do recognise the existence of visibility bias in managerial decisions,
managerial behaviour will not necessarily change, for managers are caught in a
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situation similar to the prisoner's dilemma. Only if all managers co-ordinate their
activities so that no manager tried to cut back on long-term expenditures, can there be
an avoidance of myopic behaviour. However, if one manager was to act alone he
would be perceived to be a bad manager because shareholders have no way of
distinguishing his behaviour from the rest of the managers who could be distorting
dividends and earnings signals. So shareholders are likely to view any signals
indicating shortfalls in earnings and dividends as occurring in spite of the visibility
bias and not as a consequence of long-term expenditure decisions. It is therefore
argued that investors do infer the correct position by allowing for equilibrium
distortion but managers nonetheless will forgo long-term decisions to prevent a drop
in share prices (Stein 1988).
Tendencies towards herd behaviour in managerial decisions will have implications for
the firm's competitiveness. The competitiveness of a firm is dependent on its ability
to carry out adjustments in the light of changes in costs, technological opportunities
and demand changes. Measures of competitiveness, in very general terms, can be
viewed as ratios — the numerator of which comprises the development of new
competencies and new product concepts - that is, visualising and realising new
opportunities. The denominator, on the other hand, involves attributes, which enhance
cost competitiveness (Hamel and Prahalad, 1994). Cost competitiveness could be
realised by disposing/acquiring units or downsizing/restructuring in the context of
current demand. If the top management is under pressure to show performance in
terms of earnings and dividend announcements on a year-to-year basis, managerial
behaviour will emphasise the denominator component of competitiveness.
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Managerial behaviour, which emphasises the numerator of competitiveness, will be
possible only in a corporate governance environment where the penalties of late entry
far outweigh those of errors of judgement and building ahead of demand. If the
corporate environment allows for hostile take-overs then there will be a negative
inducement for innovative behaviour. Firms will be unwilling to build ahead of
demand or build competencies in new product areas where costs are high (e.g., when
the products/processes are in the initial stages of the learning curve). Late entrants can
establish presence by acquiring an already established firm after the opportunities
have become reasonably identifiable for the insiders in the industry. This will not,
however, be the best strategy when the firm is open to international competition.
There is evidence to support the view that managers in the UK use mergers and
acquisitions as a strategic tool. It has been found that mergers and acquisitions are
ranked by senior management as among the top three events in the list of strategic
decisions, along with investing in new locations and expansion of existing sites
(Marginson et al, 1993). From the survey data it appears that large companies use
acquisitions and divestments as directional tools for achieving strategic focus.
However, it is not clear whether the desire for strategic focus involves structural
adjustments of the enterprise's activities in terms of demand, or technological
opportunities, or is primarily motivated by financial considerations.
The centrality of financial information flows to the relationship between shareholders
and managers in the US and UK, as compared to Japan and Germany, is identified as
an important distinguishing feature in the decision environment of managers. It is
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pointed out that a special feature of corporate financing in Japan is the practice of
mutual shareholdings or stable shareholdings among firms and financial institutions.
Shareholdings are based on implicit self-enforcing agreements to hold shares as
'friendly insiders'. Inter-corporate relationships are strengthened by inter-locking
directorates among non-competing companies and are deepened by exchanges of
personnel at most levels. As large corporate interests have access to most of the
information they need to assess the prospects of their investments, financial
statements of companies, profit and dividend fluctuations have lesser significance as
indicators of performance of Japanese enterprises. This, it is believed, has allowed
Japanese enterprises to focus on long run profit growth and market-share (OECD
Economic Survey of Japan, 1991; Hoshi, 1994; Sheard, 1994).
The belief that financial information is not of primary, or of much, significance in the
decision environments of corporations in Japan and Germany, compared to the US
and UK is largely based on anecdotal evidence. Thus from Table 2.1 we get the
impression that stock prices are not a significant consideration for Japanese managers.
Several studies have examined the relevance of financial performance for corporate
governance. The accountability of top management has been the principal concern in
the literature on corporate governance. This is because the emergence of management
control may have the effect of reducing the value of the assets for the owner. The
divorce between ownership and control suggests that managerial actions regarding the
utilisation of the firms' assets may be motivated by their own self-interest. Top
management accountability can be proxied by top management turnover (Jensen and
Murphy, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). This is because managerial human capital is firm
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specific. Hence increases in managerial turnover because of shareholder dis-
satisfaction with corporate performance will have the effect of reducing the value of
this managerial human capital. The role of financial performance indicators and board
configuration for top management turnover can be examined to assess the
effectiveness of corporate governance.
Table 2.1
Management Goals in Japanese and US business Corporations
Management Goals United States Japan
Return on investment 2.43 1.24
Higher stock price 1.14 0.02
Market share 0.73 1.43
Improved product portfolio 0.50 0.68
Streamlined production and distribution 0.46 0.71
Higher ratio of net worth 0.38 0.59
Higher ratio of new products 0.21 1.06
Improving image of company 0.05 0.09
Improving working conditions 0.04 0.09
Figures are averages based on top three choices.
Source: Economic Survey of Japan 1989-1990
Table 2.2 summarises the existing evidence on top management turnover. Our specific
interest is in the comparative relevance of financial performance for top management
turnover in different corporate governance environments. Is it that financial
performance is less relevant in explaining top management turnover in Japan and
Germany where the MCC is weak? Recent large sample studies show that short-term
financial performance indicators are critical in the assessment of managerial effort by
financial stakeholders in Japanese and German corporations (Kaplan, 1994a; 1994b;
Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; and Kaplan and Minton, 1994). These studies show that
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financial performance indicators have similar implications for managerial human
capital in countries where the market for corporate control is not the basis of the
corporate governance. Kaplan (1994a, 1994b) examines the relationship between top
management turnover and financial performance of companies in Japan and Germany.
In his study of German management Kaplan (1994a), examines the relationship
between financial performance indicators of the firm and executive turnover for
management and supervisory board members in German firms. The sample comprises
the 42 German firms listed in the Fortune 500 list of non-US firms in 1980. Turnover
of the management board increases significantly with a decline in stock prices and
with negative earnings but is unrelated to sales and earning growth. However,
turnover of supervisory board members is not consistently related to any measure of
performance. Kaplan (1994b) is an important contribution to the literature on
comparative corporate governance, as it compares the relationship between
managerial turnover and financial performance for the largest corporations in Japan
and the US. The study covers 119 of the largest Japanese corporations in the Fortune
500 list of non-US firms ranked by sales in 1980. The US sample is also drawn from
the Fortune 500 list of the largest US corporation ranked by sales in the year 1980.
The study covers the period 1980-1988. Two conclusions are drawn from the findings
of the study. First, the relations between turnover and financial performance in Japan
and the US are the same. In the regression results virtually all the coefficients on the
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performance variables have the same signs and most do not differ statistically. The
second finding to emerge from the study is that low earnings are consistently and
significantly related to, and explain, more variation in Board turnover in Japan than in
the US. This second result is not consistent with the commonly held perception that
Japanese managers are able to ignore short-term earnings or cash flows. The earnings
results do not support the perception that Japanese managers are more able to invest in
projects, which do not payoff in the short run.
Kaplan and Minton (1994) examine the relationship between the appointment of
outside directors and the financial performance of Japanese companies. The study is
an extension of the study cited earlier (Kaplan, 1994b) and covers the same Japanese
companies. The major finding of the study is that outside interventions at the board
level are related to the firm's stock performance and to low earnings in the current and
in the previous year.
In Japan it is very rare for firms to have outside directors. All the directors in the
median firm are in the employ of the firm. So the appointment of outside directors
represents a major intervention from outside. A MITI (1985) study cited by Ballon
and Tomito (1988) found that 43.5% of the manufacturing companies listed on the
Tokyo Stock Exchange did not have outside directors. Between 1981 and 1989 of the
119 firms in the sample 44 had bank-nominated directors appointed to their board and
31 had directors appointed by other non-financial companies with large shareholdings.
The study found that banks had appointed directors when stock performance was poor
and companies were expected to have difficulty in meeting their financial obligations
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(due to a large debt to asset ratio). The corporate shareholders on the other hand
stepped in when earnings were low and the firm appeared to have problems, which
were temporary and reversible. Further, the banks and the corporate interests rarely
appointed outside directors in the same year (the reasons behind their respective
appointments were different). However, interventions by banks and other corporations
are driven most strikingly by poor stock performance in the current and previous year.
Outside intervention by banks and corporate interests can be either for the insurance
function or for the disciplinary function. As an insurance function appointment of
outside directors is a signal to suppliers, customers and workers that the financial
institutions will continue to support the functioning of the firm, It is also possible that
the appointment of outside directors is effected to discipline the managers. The two
functions are not mutually exclusive. If the empirical evidence is that the appointment
of outside directors does not lead to a statistically significant turnover of top managers
then it is possible that the appointment of outside directors does not lead to the
disciplining of managers, at least not in terms of their continuance as members of the
top management team. However the finding (Kaplan and Minton, 1994) is that the
appointment of outside directors does lead to disciplining of managers in terms of a
termination of their relationship with the firm. Given the nature of employment
relationships in Japan where most members of the top management team come
through the internal hierarchy of the firm, it represents a severe threat to managers.
These results are probably an understatement of the phenomenon in Japan as the firms
represent the largest non-financial firms in Japan. The position of banks and outside
corporate interests can be expected to be even stronger in relation to smaller firms.
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Thus financial information flows are of similar relevance in governance structures
dominated by the market for corporate control and in control environments
emphasising internal mechanisms.
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine the association between the non-routine
turnover of top executives and industry adjusted financial performance indicators. The
sample covers 270 Japanese firms listed in Moody's International Reports. The study
covers the period 1985-1990. The results are consistent with the findings of Kaplan
(1994b) though it does not give us the comparative picture vis-a-vis the top
management teams in alternative corporate governance relationships. There is a
negative relation between the likelihood of turnover and earnings and stock price
performance.
Corporate governance structure has a degree of specificity to each country. To be able
to place the discussion in the following chapters in the context of the country's
governance environment we next take a closer look at the corporate governance
environment in the UK.
2.3 Corporate Governance in UK
Some of the important differentiating characteristics of the UK corporate governance
environment are discussed in the following paragraphs.
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A. Strong mediating role of the stock market: 
Table 2.3 shows market capitalisation in four OECD countries. The percentage figures
indicates the extent to which the dynamics of the owner management relationship is
mediated through the stock market. From Table 2.3 it is clear that the mediation of the
stock market is greater in the UK than in US, the other country having a similar
corporate governance environment. It would be inappropriate to compare the market
capitalisation rate in the UK with that of Japan. In the years after the war there was a
deliberate attempt to introduce a US style corporate governance environment in Japan.
However, the market for corporate control did not have a significant role in the
governance structure as Japanese companies devised a system of stable shareholdings
and cross share holdings (OECD, 1991; Odaigiri, 1992). Thus companies developed
share interests in each other and refused to trade in them on the stock market (for
examples of behaviour where shares were not traded even when their prices rose
multifold see Miwa, 1995). This illustrates the point that the system of property rights
and the right of ownership evolves within the context of each country's social and
cultural norms and influences the corporate governance structure.
By 1993, in the UK, the market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP was nearly
double that of the US. Market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP stood at 120% for
UK in comparison to 66% for the US (unadjusted figures, Datastream and World
Tables, 1993). This implies that the size of the UK quoted sector and the market for
corporate control is proportionately larger in the UK than in the US. Another feature
of the UK corporate governance environment is that the ownership concentration is
relatively lower than in the US, Japan and Germany (Prowse, 1994). The shares are
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also widely dispersed. Thus a survey found that that out of 170 UK companies
examined, 84% were widely held in the UK. A widely-held company being defined as
a company in which there is not a single shareholder who owns more than 25% of the
equity of the firm (Mayer, 1994). The proportionately larger market capitalisation in
conjunction with the pattern of ownership in the
Table 2.3
Market Capitalisation as a percentage of GNP (Current Prices; 1985)
Country Unadjusted Adjusted
USA 51 48
UK 90 81
Germany 37 29
Japan 71 14
Note: Adjusted figures are corrected for double counting of shares associated with
inter corporate shareholdings and relate to 1985.
Source: Bodo 1990
UK suggests that ownership changes will be more frequent in UK companies.
Diffused share ownership reinforces the separation of ownership from control as it
encourages impersonal share ownership (Scott, 1986). The tendency towards frequent
changes in ownership is further reinforced by the role of institutional investors.
B. Institutional Shareholders: 
• As is evident from Table 2.4, between 1963 and 1992 there has been a rise in the
share of equity held by institutional investors. Institutional shareholders now have a
decisive presence in corporate equity holdings. Institutional investor interest in equity
holdings increased significantly in the 1970s. In the first stage the institutional
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investors' interest in their equity holdings was essentially passive. There was a pliant
belief in the efficient market hypothesis and the stock market was buoyant. A well-
Table 2.4
Percentage of total equity owned by institutional investors, (UK)
1963 1969 1975 1981 1989 1990 1991 1992
a.	 Pension
Funds
6.4 9.0 16.8 26.7 30.5 31.4 31.1 34.7
a.	 Insurance
cos.
10.0 12.2 15.9 20.5 18.5 20.4 20.7 16.5
c. Unit Trusts 1.3 2.9 4.1 3.6 5.9 6.1 5.7 6.2
a+b+c 17.7 24.1 36.8 50.8 54.9 57.9 57.5 57.4
Individuals 54.0 47.4 37.5 28.2 20.6 20.3 19.8 21.3
Banks 1.3 1.7 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.4
Others 27 26.8 25 20.7 23.8 21.1 22.5 20.9
Source: CSO; Share Register Survey, 1992.
diversified portfolio was a reasonable assurance for a rate of return higher than the
bank rate of interest. Even today around 25% of the shares owned by the pension
funds are indexed (Economist, January 29, 1994). Portfolio strategy was based on
'indexing'. This meant that in principle if an investor owned 1% of the stock market
his portfolio would comprise 1% of every stock traded in the stock market. Such
investors have no interest in the performance of any particular stock. Two
developments have changed the behaviour of institutional investors in UK over the
years:
a. Lowering of expectations with regard to returns from the stock market
b. Maturing of pension funds with the shift in the demographic profile resulting in
pensions being paid out of investment income rather than cash flow from new
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contributions (see Table 2.5). These two factors have the effect of greater emphasis on
dividend income by the shareholders.
,
Table 2.5
Pension Funds; Contributions and Payments (£ million: UK)
Years Contributions net of
Refunds
Payments to members
and their Dependants
1986 9922 8328
1987 9420 9684
1988 9604 10427
1989 10440 12098
1990 9753 13212
1991 9268 15208
Source: CSO; Institutional Investments, 1991 and 1993
Most institutional investors today delegate the management of equity to separate and
specialist fund managers (Davies, 1993). These intermediaries compete with each
other for the funds of institutional investors. Among other aggressive policies the fund
managers and institutional investors are aware that there are substantial bid premiums
to be realised by putting a company into 'play' that is as a target for take-overs. The
evidence shows that the stockholders of target firms tend to gain from a take-over bid
(Jensen and Ruback, 1983; Franks and Mayer, 1996). The SEC has estimated that US
hostile take-overs during the period 1981-1986 created $167 bn in stockholder wealth
(Corporate Growth, July/ August, 1990).
. C. Hostile Takeovers 
The incidence of hostile takeovers as a percentage of all takeovers is significantly
higher in the UK than in the US. Thus in the governance environment in the UK a
greater percentage of takeovers have been used to exercise corporate governance
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rather than for purposes of diversification and other synergistic reasons. Traditionally
the literature tends to interpret hostile takeovers as the exercise of control and friendly
takeovers as taking place for synergistic reasons (Davis and Stout, 1992). There were
only three instances of hostile takeovers in Germany since the Second World War
until 1990 (Prowse, 1994). Of the three one failed and in another the bidder though
successful in cornering the majority of the shares could not exercise control, because
Table 2.6
Hostile Takeovers as a percentage of all attempted transactions 1985-89
UK US Rest of Europe
37.1 17.8 9.6
Source: Prowse 1994
of voting right restrictions (Mayer, 1994). The number of unfriendly take-overs is
about the same in Japan. There have been only three market tender offers between
1971-90; OECD Economic Survey, Japan, 1991.)
D. Take-over Defence: 
Faced with a hostile bid, target companies in the UK largely adopt defence strategies
based on financial announcements like updated forecasts, disposal or revaluation of
assets or finding a white knight. While target companies employ multiple defence
strategies, it was found in the case of 42 hostile take-over bids that took place between
January 1989 and March 1990, 81% employed dividend and profit announcements as
defence strategies. In contrast, the defence strategies available to US companies are
quite extensive (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1994). Defences are available in the form of
42
charter amendments, poison pills, greenmail and litigation. One possible reason for
the growth of the proactive institutional shareholders in the US is the decline in the
market for corporate control, the management having ensconced themselves with
various legal and statutory provisions in the corporate legal framework (Jenkinson and
Mayer, 1994).
From the above discussion it emerges that compared to the US (the other country
having a stock market based governance structure) the UK has a relatively more active
market for corporate control. Market capitalisation is the highest among four
countries, the percentage of hostile takeovers is greater and ownership is more
diffused. Thus the UK corporate governance environment represents an opportunity to
assess the working of a governance structure based primarily on the market for
corporate control.
2.4 Conclusion: Implications for Managers
The discussion in section 2.3 shows that financial information flows have similar
relevance in all governance structures irrespective of whether they rely on the market
for corporate control or on the internal governance devices like the board. Despite the
identical role of financial information flows in all governance environments, the belief
that the market for corporate control produces short-termism persists. Short-termism
implies the preoccupation with current financial returns, of managers functioning
within the purview of the market for corporate control. This restricts their decision
horizons to short-term goals as opposed to intertemporal choices. Similar pressures
are presumed to be absent in governance structures which do not place primary
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reliance on the market for corporate control but make use of internal governance
devices. In a recent study it was found that the emphasis on short-termism is viewed
as being among the four major changes in managerial work of the top management in
the UK in the 1980s. Respondents (top management teams) were asked to select five
from a list of 18 items in order of importance, which they perceived to describe the
ways in which the work of management has changed during the 1980s, and pressure
to incorporate short-term objectives in their decision criteria figured prominently
(Ezzamel, Willmott and Liley, 1992). Similarly another study has found that R &D
managers in UK felt that they frequently experienced pressure for short-term financial
returns from their owners and therefore sometimes cancelled projects that ought to
have been undertaken in the long-term interest of the firm. Most respondents also felt
that analysts and major shareholders are not in a position to make decisions based on
technically informed analysis of quality and value of the R&D undertaken. The study
also found that R&D managers and directors felt that institutional investors, analysts
and major shareholders often exhibited a strong bias against high risk long-term
research in favour of lower risk short-term product development (Demirag, 1994).
Thus short-term decision horizons are perceived as a constraint on managerial
behaviour. We have seen in section 2.2 that there is no reason to believe that this is a
consequence of the working of the signalling mechanism (the stock market) or the
signals (financial information). In Chapter 3 we propose a conceptual framework of
corporate governance which will help us understand the effects of the governance
structure for managerial decisions/perceptions. An understanding of short-term
decision horizons in managerial decision behaviour has to be sought in the
44
perceptions of managers and not in the behaviour of shareholders. The approach
adopted by the literature on management strategy and in the study of organisation
behaviour becomes relevant here. Managerial perceptions will influence the choice of
competitive actions and organisational design (Spulber, 1993; 1994).
Two sets of attributes will have important roles in framing managerial perceptions.
The first set of influences follows from the incomplete specification of the
expectations and obligations (the incomplete contract) between shareholders and the
managers. The problem posed by information asymmetry between shareholders and
managers can be resolved if it is possible completely ex-ante to specify the
expectations and obligations between the two parties (a complete contract). There is
substantive literature in the principal agent framework, which has attempted to design
incentive contracts to ensure that management effort is directed towards the
maximisation of shareholder wealth. The problem with these complete contract
models is that they do not take into account the transaction costs associated with the
drawing up of these contracts. In the light of high transaction costs, contracts will
have to be incompletely specified. We will undertake a detailed characterisation of the
incomplete contracts between managers and shareholders and its implications in
Chapter 3. The framework highlights the role of conduct in corporate governance.
The second factor having an important influence in the formation of managerial
perceptions is the market for corporate control itself. The market represents an
arrangement where shareholders have the option of terminating the ownership of the
firm's resources at will without any loss of reputation or credibility. The stock market
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also allows shareholders to diversify the risk associated with investment in the firm's
resources by allowing them to hold the shares of several companies simultaneously.
On the other hand managers suffer a loss in reputation and credibility if shareholders
divest the shares of the companies they manage on a significant scale. This puts the
returns on their human capital at risk. Human capital is the asset which managers
utilise to manage the firm's resources. When managers take decisions they put their
human capital at risk. The managers' futures, and their current income through
executive compensation contracts, are dependent upon the success or failure of such
decisions. The evidence on the influence of corporate performance on executive
income is not clear though a weak positive association is discernible (Conyon and
Peck, 1998a). A recent study of executive compensation in the UK, however, does
find that the relationship between top management pay and corporate governance is
much stronger in firms with boards, which are dominated by outside directors and
have remuneration committees (Conyon and Peck 1998b). The managers are also
constrained by their inability to diversify this human capital risk. They are not
normally expected to manage several companies simultaneously. Evidence suggests
that in corporate governance systems strongly mediated by the market for corporate
control, the position of the senior management team is vulnerable. There are several
studies, which show a high rate of management turnover subsequent to a take-over —
friendly or hostile (see Walsh, 1988 for studies using US firm data). In the UK a
similar pattern in turnover of top management subsequent to a merger or an
acquisition has been noted (Franks and Mayer, 1996).
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Table 2.7 shows that 50% of all executive and non-executive directors at the senior
level resigned subsequent to a friendly take-over. In the aftermath of a successful
hostile bid 90% of all directors resigned. For the sample of firms for which the hostile
bid was unsuccessful the corresponding figure was 39%. These findings have
important implications for managerial behaviour. Thus, in effect, decisions will be
motivated by not only their potential for returns to risk neutral shareholders but also
by their potential effects for firm specific managerial human capital. As we have seen
in section 2.4 the market for corporate control is relatively more active in the UK than
Table 2.7
Proportion of directors who resigned in the targets of accepted and hostile bids
(Size of sample in parentheses)
Panel 1
Friendly Successful; Hostile Unsuccessful;
Hostile
Executive and 50% 90% 39%
non-executive
directors
(n=34) (n=31) (n=23)
Executives 50% 88% 36%
only (n=26) (n=26) (n=22)
Panel 2
t-statistic (difference in proportions)
Executive and non-
executive
Executive
Successful hostile versus
accepted
3.52 3.00
Unsuccessful hostile
versus hostile
-4.01 -3.76
Source: Franks and Mayer, 1996
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in any other country. Hostile take-overs are proportionately more frequent in the UK
than in the US, the other comparative corporate governance environment. The UK
corporate governance environment is characterised by the absence of legal defences
for managers against a hostile take-over. The UK market works on self-regulatory
code of conduct and the employment of financial defence strategies. In contrast the
US market for corporate control has been severely constrained by the legal defences
available to managers. Finally, the increasing use of executive compensation schemes
such as one year revolving employment contracts have the potential of adding to the
sense of insecurity among top management teams. This will further induce defensive
opportunistic behaviour from the top management. The working of the market for
corporate control has an important influence on managerial perceptions. Incomplete
contracts and the inability to diversify risks represent serious threats to the human
capital of managers. The implications of the incomplete contracts and the working of
the market for corporate control for managerial decision behaviour are analysed in
Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
THE GOVERNED CORPORATION AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
A Conceptual Framework for Analysing Corporate Governance
3.1. Introduction
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as the '....ways in which
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their
investment' However, the corporate governance framework also has implications for
the decisions of the top management. Demirag (1994), Ezzamel, Wilmott and Liley
(1992), Grinyer, Russell and Collison (1998) provide evidence that managers believe
that the corporate governance structure has a role in shortening their decision
' horizons. The analytical basis for this 'managerial belief' in short-termism is not clear
(Laverty, 1996; Morris, 1998). This chapter proposes a conceptual framework that
shows how corporate governance provides the decision context for the top
management. The conventional frame of reference of corporate governance as
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outlined by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is nested in the analysis. Following Pound
(1995), the corporate governance framework is visualised not only as an institutional
device for correcting the imbalance of power between shareholders and managers due
to the separation of ownership from control but also as an aid to the decision making
process. The objective of the proposed corporate governance framework is to identify
a basis for strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers such that the
agency problem is reduced and a decision context is provided to promote the
competitiveness of the firm. The emphasis in the framework is on what Herbert
Simon (1976) defines as procedural rationality'. The need for research that combines
the contextual and processual analysis of top management behaviour has been
suggested in the study of managerial elites and strategic decision processes
(Pettigrew, 1992; Rajagopalan, Rasheed and Datta, 1993). The conceptual framework
proposed provides the basis for such an exploration in corporate governance.
The more standard conceptualisation of corporate governance in terms of principal
and agents represents an abbreviated understanding of the structure and processes of
corporate governance. It ignores the transaction costs of specifying the incentive
contracts between shareholders and managers. A complete specification of the
incentive contracts will require a full listing of the expectations and obligations
between the contracting parties. The cost of such an exercise will be prohibitive. The
'Simon (1976:130-32) makes a distinction between procedural rationality and substantive rationality.
Behaviour is procedurally rational when it is the outcome of appropriate deliberation. Procedural
rationality is usually studied in problem situations in which the subject must gather information of
various kinds and process it in different ways in order to arrive at a reasonable course of action, a
solution to the problem. Behaviour is substantially rational when it is appropriate to the achievement of
given goals within the limits imposed by given conditions and constraints. In the corporate governance
context substantive rationality is encapsulated in goals like shareholder wealth maximisation.
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principal and agents framework also ignores the institutional context that will
determine the willingness of the contracting parties to engage in specifying their
respective obligations and expectations. For example, shareholders may be unwilling
to specify their expectations and commitments as this may restrict their rights of
ownership (e.g. share premiums in hostile takeovers).
The emphasis in the principals and agents framework is on substantive rationality.
The abbreviated representation of the relationship between shareholders and managers
by the principal and agents framework ignores the role of conduct in the analysis of
corporate governance. In the empirical analysis the focus is on gathering evidence at
increasingly disaggregated levels on the hypothesised incentive effects of the
individual mechanisms for managerial performance (for a survey of the literature see
John and Senbet, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and
Johnson (1998) in their meta analytic review of studies on board composition,
leadership structure and financial performance find that there is little evidence in the
empirical literature of a systematic relationship between governance structure and
firm performance relationship). This meta analysis demonstrates that we lack an
understanding of corporate governance. 2 There is also a need for an overall conception
of the corporate governance structure that accounts for the interdependence and
complementarity of individual mechanisms like block shareholdings, non-executive
directors, takeovers, etc. Studies show that there is complementarity and
Procedural rationality on the other hand will involve identification of processes that will reduce
opportunism in shareholder management relationship.
The article concludes that future research will have to concentrate on the role of subcommittees and
that managerial motivations will have to be at the heart of the debate regarding suggested board
configurations and leadership structure (1998:285). How it arrives to the latter conclusion is not clear.
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interdependence of the individual corporate governance mechanisms (Kang and
Shivdasani, 1995; Rediker and Seth, 1995; Weisbach, 1988; Zajac and Westphal,
1995).
This emphasis has also deflected the enquiry into the possible links between corporate
governance and top management decision behaviour to an enquiry into the robustness
of related institutions like the stock market and its ability to account for intertemporal
decisions. As discussed in Chapter 2, large sample studies of Japanese, German and
US firms, however, suggest that share prices have a similar and in Japan greater
relevance in bringing about governance changes (Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Kaplan,
1994b; Kaplan and Minton 1994). Moreover, there is little evidence in the corporate
finance literature, to support the hypothesis that the stock market is unable to make a
distinction between short-term decisions to promote current profitability and long
term decisions. In the literature evaluating the efficiency of the stock market the
understanding is that some weak form of the efficient market hypothesis holds
(Copeland and Weston, 1992; Blair, 1995). Event studies have also shown that the
stock market reacts favourably to the announcements of research and development
expenditures (Griliches, 1984).
The link between the market for corporate control and competitiveness has also been
explained by questioning the property rights view of the firm. Alternative theories of
the firm have been proposed. These theories argue that the shareholders are not the
only constituent of the firm. Top management decisions should not be guided by
shareholder objectives alone (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson
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and Preston, 1995). Exclusive concern for shareholder wealth maximisation will lead
to a neglect of the other constituents of the firm and constrain the ability of the firm to
compete. The analysis of corporate governance in this chapter is located within the
property rights view of the firm. Short of a revolutionary revision of property rights in
the society, a consistent framework for corporate governance has to be located within
this view of the firm and should aim to reduce the agency problem while also
providing the basis for superior managerial decision-making.
The framework proposed in this chapter is based on the premise that an evaluation of
the links between corporate governance and managerial decision behaviour has to be
conducted in terms of the institutional robustness of the corporate governance
structure itself The evaluation of the institutional efficiency of the stock market will
only be meaningful if the institutional basis for the corporate governance structure has
been identified. To identify the institutional basis for a corporate governance structure
we examine the nature of contracts between shareholders and managers. The analysis
shows that a learning mechanism is necessary in the corporate governance structure
because of the incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers. Employing
the distinction made by Ghoshal and Moran (1996) between opportunism as an
attitude and opportunism as behaviour we show that managerial decision behaviour
will be a function of the learning mechanism.
To identify the learning mechanism we consider the three modes of strategic co-
operation identified in the literature, viz., the direct agreement mode, the justice mode
and the decentralised mode. The learning mechanism of these modes cannot be the
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basis for strategic co-operation given the incomplete contracts between shareholders
and managers and given the endogeniety of managerial decision behaviour. A mixed
mode called the procedural justice mode is identified as a valid basis for strategic co-
operation. The procedural justice mode emphasises greater communication between
the shareholders and managers. Procedural justice provides not only the context for
superior decisions but also achieves the agency goal of reducing managerial
opportunism. In arriving at this conclusion we make use of two different strands of
literature on the role of procedures in decision-making. One strand emphasises the
importance of procedures as the basis for strategic co-operation between two
interdependent economic agents characterised by bounded rationality (Dekel, Lipman
and Rustichini1998; Moulin, 1995; Salmon 1995; Simon, 1976). The other body of
literature emphasises the role of procedures in strategic decision-making (Kim and
Mauborgne, 1998; Korine, 1997; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). Finally we show
that if there is a primary emphasis on the market for corporate control in corporate
governance, shareholders will be unwilling to engage in communication and the
corporate governance structure will employ a learning mechanism as implied in the
decentralised mode. Shareholders will adopt a dominant strategy and managers will
respond with increased opportunism, This will exacerbate the agency problem and
mitigate against competitiveness. In conclusion we discuss how an empirical
validation of the framework can be attempted in research.
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3.2 Nature of contracts and opportunism
3.2.1 Nature of contracts
Hart (1995) provides a theoretical basis for the corporate governance mechanisms in
terms of incomplete contracts. He lists three reasons why the contracts between
shareholders and managers will be incomplete (Hart, 1995):
a. cost of thinking and planning all the different eventualities
b. cost of negotiation
c. cost of writing down the contract
Incomplete contracts between managers and shareholders require the use of corporate
governance mechanisms to bridge the gaps in contracts. The mechanisms comprising
the corporate governance structure provide the institutional basis for the interpretation
of the unspecified component of the contract. They are channels for the
communication of the expectations and obligations of the shareholders and the
managers on a continuing basis. Wiggins (1990) in his evaluation of long term
contracts also concludes that firms will use governance structures when they cannot
use contracts. While the rationale by Hart (1995) for the use of corporate governance
mechanisms in terms of incomplete contracts is correct there is little insight provided
into the design of the corporate governance structure. The corporate governance
structure is viewed as a collection of mechanisms. The relative emphasis on different
mechanisms is the outcome of the market forces (Hart, 1995).
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We get a limited insight into the design of the corporate governance structure because
the incomplete contracts are underidentified. Schwartz (1992) lists five causes for
contractual incompleteness. These are:
a. vague wording of the contract
b. failure to contract an issue
c. prohibitive cost of writing a complete contract
d. asymmetric information between the contracting parties. The asymmetric
information can be observable and verifiable expost. A contract will be weakly
non-contractible if the information can be observed but cannot be verified expost.
A contract will be strongly non-contractible if the information can be neither
observed nor verified expost.
e. heterogeneity one side of the market. A complete contract will condition on each
pooling type. The uninformed type can screen the informed type. Screening
equilibra are usually separating. Contracts will be incomplete when screening is
not feasible or when the informed party cannot disclose its type credibly
(Schwartz, 1992).
A comparison of the factors leading to contractual incompleteness shows that Hart in
his specification does not account for strong non-contractability and heterogeneity on
one side of the market. Deekel, Lipman and Rustichini (1998) also make similar
observations in their assessment of Hart's incomplete contracts models.
"This approach assumes that some of the variables which are relevant to the
contracting parties are observed by them but cannot be 'shown' in the court (1998:
538)".
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They also make an important distinction between unforeseen contingencies and
'standard' uncertainty.
"....By the latter we mean those models, such as nonadditive probability which are
intended to represent an agent who knows the state space but not the appropriate
probabilities and behaves 'conservatively' because of the lack of knowledge.
Conceptually, atleast there is a difference between this and not knowing the state
space and behaving 'conservatively' as a result" (1998)
Strong non-contractability and heterogeneity on one side of the market are important
reasons for contractual incompleteness in shareholder management relationship. The
shareholder management contracts are not discrete in time. It is not possible to specify
a finite time span of the contract at the time of its commencement. The length or the
period of the contract is a function of the expectations and obligations implied in the
contract. Termination is a sanction - an indication that one of the parties failed to fulfil
its expectation or felt that the other party did not fulfil its obligations. Thus the
shareholder management contract is neither discrete nor repetitive but an ongoing
contract. Observability, let alone verification, cannot be based on exogenous objective
criteria but will be a function of subjective interpretation of the interests of the parties
involved. It would be a simplification to presume that these expectations and
obligations are completely identified at the time of the commencement of the contract
and remain unaltered during the contract. At any point of time, the shareholder gets
some information on the extent of fulfilment of the contract and receives information
that allows him or her to form expectations regarding the possibilities of the
remaining obligations being fulfilled in the future. Also new expectations are being
added to the relationship. Thus the degree of observability and verifiability is
endogenous to the incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers.
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The subject of exchange between shareholders and managers is incompletely
identified. Different shareholders will interpret shareholder wealth maximisation
differently. Only some of the constituents of which contribute to shareholder wealth
maximisation can be identified on a common basis. The weights to be attached to the
different interpretations is implicit in the transaction but unobservable for the top
management, the other party in the transaction. For example, Holland (1996)
identifies three types of investment policy employed by financial institutions viz.,
relationships with large stakes, long investment horizons and little trading; stable
holdings with some regular trading around a stable target stake; and short-term,
transient, arms-length investing. The financial institutions attach different weights to
the different emphasises in their investment policies. The weights are frequently
changed and for strategic reasons not revealed.
In addition to the factors identified by Hart (1995) `unforseen contingencies' (Dekel,
Lipman and Rustichini, 1998) or 'strong non-contractability' (Schwartz, 1992) are
important reasons for contractual incompleteness between shareholders and managers.
In such a contract environment learning becomes critical to the conduct of their
relationship. It becomes important to understand how the two parties construct their
expectations and obligations in matters relating to the contract. The existing literature
on corporate governance lacks a theory of learning. In fact this gap is attributed to the
wider body of literature on expectation formation in economics. (Dekel, Lipman and
Rustichini, 1998; Hodgson, 1998; Salmon, 1995; Shull, Debecq and Cummins, 1970).
Hodgson (1998) defines learning as more than the gathering of information. It is the
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development of new means and modes of cognition, calculation and assessment. It is
about 'procedural rationality' (Simon, 1976). Thus learning is about how information
is accrued and how it is processed. The environment and the agent's approximation of
that environment play a critical role in both aspects (Salmon, 1995).
In the principals and agents framework of corporate governance there is no role for
learning in the interaction between shareholders and managers. The information
asymmetry is bridged by a system of incentives to align managerial motivations with
shareholder objectives. In his incomplete contract justification Hart (1995) does
recognise the role of governance mechanisms as 'channels of communication'.
Learning is however, limited to the gathering of information by the observable but not
verifiable specification of incomplete contracts. The emphasis in the learning
mechanism is left to market forces (Hart, 1995) or 'natural selection'. The scope for
interdependence between the shareholders/managers and the environment for the
process of learning itself is not recognised. However, as we have seen, shareholder
management contracts are strongly non-contractible and also display heterogeneity in
the motivations of the shareholders. Incomplete contracts incorporating 'unforeseen
contingencies' and 'strong non-contractability' will have to be based on a learning
process, which leads to the identification of the ongoing and evolving of the
expectations and obligations in the shareholders and management contract. This
learning process will be based on a symbiotic relationship between the individual and
the environment in the construction of the 'state space' (Salmon, 1995; Hodgson,
1998). The significance of this symbiotic relationship is emphasised by the distinction
between opportunism as an attitude and opportunism as behaviour.
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3.2.2 Opportunistic Attitude and Opportunistic Behaviour
The relationship between shareholders and managers- is one of strategic
interdependence. The separation of ownership from control and the firm-specific
nature of managerial human capital imply that neither shareholders nor managers can
hope to pursue rational behaviour alone. Co-operation between the two parties,
characterised by the pursuit of selfish interest, is the only way to maximise the total
surplus available for distribution. The role of opportunism is an important
consideration in the conduct of the strategic interaction. Opportunism is distinct from
self-interest. The assumption of self-interest visualises individual behaviour motivated
by own preferences. However, the individual will candidly disclose all pertinent
information on enquiry and meet all obligations expected of him or her from the
transaction. Opportunism is pursuit of self-interest with guile. The individual is not
expected to disclose all the truth and fulfil all obligations under the contract
(Williamson, 1993). Individual behaviour can be based on 'influence activities'
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1988).3
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) draw a distinction between two types of opportunism, viz.,
opportunism as an attitude and opportunism as behaviour. The former is a product of
the human condition and the latter a product of institutions and technology.
'Most information is not innocent and suffers from misrepresentation as it is gathered and
communicated in the context of conflict of interest and with consciousness of decision consequences.
Milgrom and Roberts (1988) term such information manipulation and activities as 'influence
activities'. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny, (1995) provide evidence on the manipulation of earnings
information by managers with the objective of inducing shareholders to take decisions favourable to
managers. This is an example of managerial influence activity Studies also show managerial bias for
investments and mergers and acquisitions that enhance the significance of the incumbent management
team (Amihud and Lev, 1981; Shleifer and Vishny, 1989; Stiglitz and Edlin, 1992).
60
Opportunism as an attitude is the proclivity or inclination of the individual to act
opportunistically. Opportunism as behaviour is positively related to the expected
benefits and is negatively related to safeguards and controls. Thus opportunism as
behaviour can be a variable of the institutional context. Two factors will have an
influence on opportunism as behaviour. First, opportunism as behaviour will be a
function of 'prior conditioning'. For example, the 'prior conditioning' of the
shareholder management relationship is a derivative of property rights. Secondly,
opportunistic behaviour is a function of the 'feeling for the entity'. This perception
emerges from the contracting parties' assessment of each other. A positive perception
will reduce opportunism while a negative assessment will exacerbate opportunism.
The goal of the corporate governance structure is to reduce opportunism. Corporate
governance mechanisms are employed to reduce opportunism. The market will not be
able to make a distinction between opportunism as an attitude and opportunism as
behaviour. It will not incorporate the role of opportunistic behaviour in the design of
the corporate governance structure. This distinction becomes even more difficult
given the incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers. The design of the
corporate governance structure has to be a policy choice. The conceptual framework
that is proposed in this chapter treats 'prior conditioning' as the outcome of the
property rights framework. The operational objective of the corporate governance
structure is to minimise the possibility of opportunism as an attitude. However, in the
design of the corporate governance structure there has to be an explicit recognition of
the possible links between the institutional arrangement and opportunism as
behaviour. It is possible that a corporate governance structure attempting to curb
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opportunism as an attitude may reduce the 'feeling for the entity' and induce
opportunistic behaviour. Opportunistic behaviour and consequently opportunism can
be endogenous to the corporate governance structure. The implications of the
corporate governance structure for the 'feeling for the entity' will depend upon the
choice of the learning mechanism. The market cannot distinguish between the two
types of opportunism; the choice of the learning mechanism will have to be a policy
choice.
Three modes of strategic co-operation between strategically interdependent agents
motivated by self interest is identified in the economics literature (Moulin, 1995).
Each of the three modes incorporates a learning mechanism for the formation of
expectations in the co-operative relationship. Next we examine the appropriateness of
the learning mechanism of each of the three modes of strategic co-operation in the
context of the incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers and the
endogeniety of managerial decision behaviour as identified in the distinction between
opportunism as a behaviour and opportunism as an attitude.
3.3 Modes of Strategic Co-operation and Learning
3.3.1 Direct agreement mode
The direct agreement mode is independent of any institutional context as the agents
engage in free and face-to-face transaction. This mode is unsuitable for co-operation
given the separation of ownership from control and the incomplete contracts between
shareholders and managers. The learning mechanism requires that shareholders
replicate all managerial functions in the direct agreement mode.
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3.3.2 Justice mode
The justice mode is also inappropriate for strategic co-operation. in the incomplete
contract environment. In the justice mode the judge decides on an equitable
distribution of the surplus generated by the strategic co-operation among the
concerned agents. There are two requirements for the justice mode to work. The judge
or the arbitrator will have to be equitable. The second requirement for the justice
mode is that the judge will have to be omniscient. There is no role for bounded
rationality in this process. The formula for a fair and just assessment of expectations
and obligations has to measure all aspects of similarities and differences in
expectations and obligations, across shareholders and managers. This will require
detailed information. It is difficult to imagine an indivisible collective authority
representing all shareholders given their different and varying motives for holding
shares. Without a benevolent and omniscient dictator the only option in the justice
mode is to devise mechanical rules. An example of a mechanical rule is the business
judgement rule used by courts in the evaluation of franchise contracts. This however,
goes against the essence of the decision context for which co-operation is being
sought. Mechanical rules cannot be the basis for the conduct of the strategic
relationship between shareholders and managers based on contractual incompleteness.
There is also the issue of acceptability of decisions. The acceptability of decisions will
depend on whether the parties involved understand the decision process.
3.3.3 Decentralised mode
In the decentralised mode decision-making power is distributed among individual
agents. Co-operation takes place as strategic interactions based on conjectures
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regarding each other's expectation formation. The basic framework of expectation
formation in the shareholder management interactions is the property rights view of
the firm. Shareholders as owners of the firm's assets can choose institutional
structures that allow them freedom to pursue their objectives. Shareholders can, for
example, choose a corporate governance structure where co-operation is based on the
shareholders adopting a dominant strategy. In a two person game, strategy L by a
player A is a dominant strategy if, no matter how the other player B plays, strategy L
will maximise A's pay off over his or her strategic choices. Thus strategy L is
unambiguously the best strategy for player A even if he or she does not have the
slightest idea of how the other player will act. Thus A's behaviour will be insensitive
to the amount of information possessed on the other player's preferences. The market
for corporate control mechanism implies the adoption of a dominant strategy by
shareholders vis-à-vis the firm's management. The learning mechanism in the
dominant strategy is that shareholders provide information through the sale and
purchase of shares and inflict sanction on the management through the market for
corporate control. By the provision of information and sanctions in this form,
shareholders establish expectations. This is expected to elicit co-operation from
managers such that shareholder returns are maximised.
The adoption of a dominant strategy as implied in hostile takeover-bids however,
makes it difficult for managers to form expectations about shareholder behaviour.
Shareholders are a group, constituents of which have individual preferences. Firms
have a mix of shareholders in their equity base and every investor will have an
investment portfolio, which has some distribution of motives. Games with mixed
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strategies (shareholders having a range of motives for holding shares) have multiple
equilibra (Knight, 1992). The social and public choice literature also shows that given
the diversity in preferences of shareholders, voting will not display a transitive
ordering of preferences even when individual shareholders' preferences are transitive.
Majority voting is arbitrary and a function of the institutional matrix (Shepsle, 1992).
Factors like the distribution of the preferences, composition of the coalition that
constitutes the majority, who controls the agenda and what procedures are followed in
the sale and purchase of shares, in the process of a takeover, become important in
deciding the outcome of the majority decision rule. As we have seen one of the factors
which increases the contractual incompleteness between shareholders and managers is
the heterogeneity on one side of the market (that is heterogeneity in the motivations of
the shareholders). The decentralised mode increases the contractual incompleteness
by allowing the shareholders not to disclose credible information about their
motivations.
Corporate governance structures primarily based on the market for corporate control
will elicit a response from managers keen to reduce their human capital risk. Hostile
takeovers lead to large-scale replacement of the top management (Franks and Mayer,
1996; Walsh, 1988). A study of the psychoanalytic response of managers shows that
hostile takeovers evoke images of unfairness, subjectivism and irrationality about the
event (Schneider and Dunbar, 1992; Shleifer and Summers, 1988). Managers will
have a significantly reduced 'feeling for the entity'. This increases the demands on the
corporate governance structure. Thus a significant component of managerial
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opportunism may be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Opportunistic behaviour will be an
endogenous variable and a function of the corporate governance structure.
The corporate governance structure with a primary reliance on the market for
corporate control will fail in its goal of reducing managerial opportunism. The
adoption of a dominant strategy reflected in the emphasis on the market for corporate
control will lead to ambiguity and lack of accountability in the corporate governance
process. Managers will respond to shareholders' emphasis on the market for corporate
control by taking recourse to opportunistic behaviour in their bid to minimise their
human capital risk. The adoption of dominant strategy will therefore lead to a break
down in strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers
The three conventional modes of strategic co-operation cannot provide the basis for
learning and the narrowing of contractual incompleteness. A learning mechanism has
to be an integral part of the corporate governance structure because of the incomplete
contracts. Given the endogeniety of managerial decision behaviour the learning
mechanism has to emphasise the 'feeling for the entity' if the scope for opportunism
in shareholder management relationship is to be reduced. The learning mechanism in
the direct agreement mode and the justice mode are ideal for reducing opportunism
but cannot be implemented given the nature of contracts between shareholders and
managers. The learning mechanism of the decentralised mode of strategic co-
operation will reduce the 'feeling of entity' and exacerbate the problem of
opportunism in shareholder management relations.
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In discussions on economic behaviour in a bounded rationality context the role of
procedural learning has been emphasised (Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini, 1998).
Procedural learning views learning as a process in which individuals construct
approximate models of the environment which is updated as more information
becomes available (Salmon, 1995). A procedural learning mechanism can enhance the
'feeling for the entity' and minimise the scope for opportunism as an attitude as well
as behaviour. However, this will depend upon how the learning mechanism is
specified. In Economics procedural learning is incorporated using statistical
algorithms like the Bayes's rule. This is not procedurally rational in the bounded
rationality context. Procedural rationality emphasises the decision-makers perception
of the environment as it shapes their cognition and the choice of decision outcomes.
Learning under procedural rationality is the outcome of the interaction between the
individual and the decision environment and is not a statistical artefact. In the
shareholder management relationship a procedure that promotes the 'feeling for the
entity' is important. A procedural learning mechanism that not only reduces the
contractual incompleteness but also encourages the 'feeling for the entity' has been
termed as procedural justice (Folger, 1993; Kim and Mauborgne, 1998; Moulin, 1995;
Thibaut and Walker, 1978; Tyler and Lind, 1990).4
4. Moulin (1995) identifies procedural justice as a mixed mode for strategic co-operation in a bounded
rationality context. Kim and Mauborgne, (1998) promote this concept as a valid decision making
procedure for strategic decisions. Both identify this concept independently, however, both
acknowledge the antecedents of procedural justice in the legal and justice literature. For a survey of the
procedural justice literature and its applications in law see Bayles, (1990), Rohl and Machura (1997).
We find the implications of procedural justice in the context of strategic co-operation (Moulin, 1995)
and in the context of strategic decision procedures (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998) complementary. It
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3.4 Procedural Justice Mode
The procedural justice mode combines the justice and decentralised modes (Moulin,
1995). Procedural justice will involve designing a mechanism to elicit information
from individual agents about their relevant characteristics and choosing the outcome
from the information provided. We now examine the relevance of the procedural
justice as a mode of learning, which will promote 'the feeling for the entity'.
Unstructured deliberation or deliberation is identified as the critical requirement for
learning in the procedural justice mode. We develop two further propositions. First,
the use of financial performance indicators as 'fire alarms' will be the most
economical way for engaging in deliberation. Second, deliberation will not be a
feature of corporate governance structure if the market for corporate control is the
preferred mechanism of corporate governance.
Rawls (1971) distinguishes between pure, perfect and imperfect procedural justice.
Pure procedural justice emphasises justice of the procedure independent of the
outcome. Perfect and imperfect procedural justice requires independent criteria of the
justice of particular outcome. Perfect procedural justice implies that the procedures
always give just outcomes. Given the incomplete contracts between shareholders and
managers only the pure procedural justice can be a mode of strategic co-operation
between shareholders and managers. Under pure procedural justice the interacting
parties have equal opportunities to exchange messages and there is equal influence of
everyone's message. The outcome chosen is from the decentralised mode. The option
chosen can even involve dismissal of top management or shareholders agreeing to a
provides a unique learning mechanism for reducing the agency problem and a positive decision context
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hostile takeover. Such decision environments are treated as just, independent of the
outcome.
,
The emphasis of the pure procedural justice mode of strategic co-operation is on the
decision processes. Procedures can be an end in itself, irrespective of the outcome.
Procedures can be seen as the best guarantee, for the realisation of 'self interest'
(Thibaut and Walker, 1978), as the indicator of 'group value' (Tyler and Lind, 1990),
in the perception of 'dual obligation' (Folger, 1993) or in the 'emotional and
intellectual recognition' (Kim and Mauborgne, 1998). Procedures will contribute to
the perception of equality, which is critical for pure procedural justice. It will also
promote the 'feeling of entity' which Ghoshal and Moran (1996) point out reduces the
scope for opportunism as behaviour.
3.4.1 Pure Procedural Justice and Communication Behaviour
Strategic co-operation between shareholders under pure procedural justice requires
equal opportunity and influence in the exchange of messages. The outcome chosen
from the decentralised behaviour of contracting parties is considered as just even if it
has adverse consequences for one party. Several studies on procedural justice have
found a positive association between communication behaviour and perceptions of
procedural justice (Greenberg 1994; Korosgaard, Scweiger and Sapienza, 1995, Miles
and King, 1997; Sapienza and Korosgaard, 1996)5 . Thus the operative part of the pure
for voluntary co-operation in an environment characterised by incomplete contracts.
5 In the analysis of relationships that cannot be fully specified or controlled in advance of their
execution and where underlying expectations can vacillate in unforeseeable ways, the legal literature
draws similar conclusions. For the management of such relationships it is concluded that a
communication infrastructure that simply does not engage the parties to process information but
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procedural justice mode is that there has to be equality in opportunity and influence of
messages. Procedural justice requires a learning mechanism with extensive
information processing capabilities. This is also relevant for the iijcomplete contracts
between shareholders and managers.
Kim and Mauborgne (1998) list three requirements for procedural justice in strategic
decision procedures, viz., explanation, engagement and clarity of expectations. The
pattern of communication will require decisions on the mix of structured and
unstructured exchange of information and the periodicity and intensity of exchanges
of information. Structured information is through formally identified channels like
company financial reports. Unstructured information exchange can be through general
body meetings of shareholders, board meetings, board committees, social exchanges,
professional gatherings, etc. We term unstructured information exchange between
shareholders and managers as deliberation. The argument advanced regarding the
communication behaviour between shareholders and managers is in two steps. First,
deliberation will have to be the centrepiece of strategic co-operation, under pure
procedural justice. Second, the use of company financial information as 'fire alarms'
will be the most cost-effective way of engaging in deliberation.
3.4.2 Deliberation
Deliberation is important in the context of the incomplete contract between
shareholders and managers. Decision deliberation is a cognitive process in which the
decision-maker engages as the decision is framed, as goals and plans are adopted or
promotes sustained engagement is needed. Such sustained engagement will depend on relational assets
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rejected and as implementation is monitored and plans and goals are retained or
replaced in light of progress. This conception of learning identifies the sources of
deliberation as the decision-makers own knowledge of the organisation; suggestions
of support persons; examples offered by outsiders; and existing rules and regulations
(Beach, Mitchell, Paluchowski and van Zee, 1992).
Managers will have more information on the mixed and variable motives of their
shareholders. A decision-making environment based on unstructured information
exchange will not only reduce the agency problem but also improve the quality of
decisions, as it will provide the basis for voluntary co-operation. Voluntary co-
operation implies going beyond the call of duty wherein individuals exert effort,
energy and initiative to the best of their abilities on behalf of the organisation (Kim
and Mauborgne, 1998). Such co-operative behaviour is essential for a knowledge-
based firm. The decision frame will also improve because there will be a greater flow
of firm-specific idiosyncratic information and a knowledge based firm has also been
conceptualised as a distributed knowledge system (Tsoukas, 1996).
3.4.3 Fire Alarms
Company accounts have been the traditional structured channel of communication
used by managers in their strategic co-operation with shareholders. Such forms of
information have to be simple and standardised to be understood and interpreted by
all concerned. Such standardised information is termed 'focal point' (Kreps, 1988).
There are two possible uses of 'focal points' by the shareholders, if they are not
like favourable prior belief, trust and goodwill (Salbu, 1995).
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ignored. Shareholders can use 'focal points' to follow a dominant strategy or, they
could be used as 'fire alarms'. It is not advisable to ignore focal points. The gathering
and communication of information serves a ritualistic purposç indicating to the
contracting parties that a proper attitude about decision-making exists (Feldman and
March 1981). Information is not simply a basis for action but a representation of
competence. Thus, the gathering of simple and universal information is a reflection of
credible decisions and will contribute positively towards perceptions of procedural
justice.
The use of 'focal points' as 'triggers' to buy and sell ownership will be contrary to the
requirements of the pure procedural justice mode of strategic co-operation.
Shareholders will in effect adopt a dominant strategy. There is no reciprocity in the
exchange of messages. Shareholders will not need to communicate with managers
except through the sale and purchase of shares. As pointed out earlier, the pursuit of a
dominant strategy leads to greater ambiguity as shareholders have mixed and varying
motives for sale and purchase of shares. Such use of focal points will lead to a strong
perception of unfairness and a lack of faith in the authority of the shareholder. Healy
and Palepu (1995) examined investor communication in the case of a marketing firm
and found that it was difficult to convince investors through financial reports. Investor
communication through financial reports led to stock mis-valuation over an extended
period.
Deliberation or unstructured information exchange is a costly exercise. High intensity
deliberation cannot be sustained for long. Conceptually it will amount to the adoption
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of the direct agreement mode of strategic co-operation described above. A cost-
effective alternative will be the use of focal points as 'fire alarms' as signals for
initiating deliberation (McCubbins and Schwartz 1987). Should deliberation be
initiated only when 'fire alarms' are sounded, that is when the focal points suggest
poor performance? The monitoring authority in our case is the shareholders. Given
incomplete contracts the characteristics of the messages and their interpretation
cannot be identified in advance. Contracting parties will need to gather information
that may not have any immediate consequences. The varying and implicit nature of
expectations and obligations imply that there is need to scan the environment for
gathering what is termed as 'gossip' (Feldman and March 1981). Focal points can
function as 'fire alarms' only when shareholders have some deliberation on a
continuous basis. The level of these deliberations need not be intensive but there is a
need for continuous communication.
There is also the issue of reliability of information. The evidence that financial
reporting will be susceptible to Milgrom and Roberts' 'influence activities' (1988), is
provided by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeny (1995). A low-key continuous deliberation
also helps in quick response to 'fire-alarms'. Outside intervention at the board level
can be quickly effected with a steep learning curve if there is a 'live' database
available from continuous low key deliberation. Therefore the framework for
information exchange proposed is one of low key continuous deliberation with 'focal
points' as 'fire alarms' signalling the need for more intensive deliberation. This
framework is illustrated using the example of Japanese governance in manufacturing.
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The presidents' meetings of the corporate group in Japan serve this very function.
There seems to be some misunderstanding about the role of these meetings because of
their informal nature. Miwa (1995) contends that given the deg, financial interests
involved, these meetings should serve as the headquarters or the central office of the
corporate group. This is not a correct representation of presidents' meetings. These
meetings represent a low key, continuous deliberation. There are no rules and
regulations laid down on an ex ante basis, the violation of which is identified by the
regular monthly gathering. This is in the spirit of the incomplete contracts that govern
the shareholder management relationship. These deliberations represent the passive
collection of information and a tactical advantage like fire stations or hydrants
distributed over an inhabited area. This allows for a quick response when the 'fire
alarm' is sounded.
In Japan, poor financial performance leads to the appointment or activation of outside
directors to the board. The outside directors are the existing employees of the firm just
below the board level. They have established links or previous association with the
banks or companies having cross shareholding interests. The outside directors then go
about bringing changes in the top management on a selective basis by firing some and
promoting others from within the board. At the end of the intervention when the
changes in the top management are complete they withdraw from the board (Kaplan
• and Minton, 1994). The understanding of Japanese and German corporate governance
structures as relationship based have been interpreted to mean a 'patrol car' oversight.
An example of 'patrol car' oversight, in public governance, is the Public Accounts
Committee. The Public Accounts Committee continuously samples the expenditure
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behaviour of various government departments to ascertain whether they fulfil the
criteria of legislative intent (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1987). This is a
misrepresentation of the Japanese and German corporate governance structures.
Shareholders in Japan and Germany do not engage in sustained overt monitoring or in
'patrol car' oversight of the management. Deliberation between the controlling group
and the managers is stepped up by the sounding of 'fire alarms'. Financial
performance indicators are the means to effective corporate governance. It is the
signal to gather more information, not the trigger to abdicate from the relationship.
Fire alarm oversight is less centralised and requires less active and direct intervention
than the 'patrol car' mode and thus is an economical way of gathering information. A
corporate governance structure should use 'focal points' as 'fire alarms' and
deliberation in the pure procedural justice mode of strategic co-operation between
shareholders and managers.
It is interesting that we find elements of a deliberative framework of corporate
governance in the latest committee that examined corporate governance in the United
Kingdom (Hampel, 1998). The recommendations of the Hampel Committee are
significant in the context of the framework proposed here. The Committee
recommends that shareholders should take into account `...the diversity of
circumstances and experience among companies....,' in their interpretation of matters
relating to corporate governance (Section 1.13). The Committee believes that good
governance needs to be agreed between companies and their shareholders on a case by
case basis, 'shareholders and others should show flexibility in the interpretation of the
code and should listen to directors' explanations and judge them on their merit...'
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(Section 1.11). The Committee is also in favour of greater communication when it
proposes the inclusion of a narrative statement in the company annual report (Section
2.1). It also recommends that departing directors go public and explain why they left
the board and that the terms of their contract termination be published along with their
original employment contract. However, not having a clear understanding of why
there is no participation by institutional shareholders the recommendations of the
committee are in effect statements of good intentions, Tut we urge trustees to
encourage the investment managers to take a long view' (Section 5.6).
3.5 Deliberation and the Market for Corporate Control
Deliberation cannot be an attribute of the corporate governance structure if the market
for corporate control is the preferred mode of interaction between shareholders and
managers. This will be the case for two reasons. First, shareholders will be unwilling
to engage in deliberation if they have a ready recourse to the market for corporate
control. Second, it will be difficult to give credible commitments to sustain
meaningful deliberation and opportunistic behaviour will be endogenous to the
corporate governance structure.
The possibility of opportunism is recognised by shareholders and managers. To
sustain strategic co-operation there will be a need for credible commitments. Only in
the presence of credible commitments will it be possible to make superior transactions
that will enhance the volume of the surplus available for redistribution. However, a
calculated response for superior outcomes requiring the addition of commitments to
contracts will only be undertaken if such additions are cost-effective. A far-sighted
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solution to the problem will create a bilateral dependency and support it with
contractual safeguards but only to the point where the benefits exceed costs. For
example, this is the basis of cartel formation in oligopoly markets. Incorporation of
credible commitments in the contract between the shareholders and managers will
depend on the perception of costs and the relative asymmetry in the degree of
incompleteness of the contracts between the two parties.
In a corporate governance structure based primarily on the market for corporate
control, the shareholders will lack the incentive to engage in deliberation.
Shareholders will consider it in their strategic interests to keep their contracts terms
ambiguous and by adopting a dominant strategy. They will be unwilling to give
commitments that limit their freedom of strategic behaviour as such limitations can
translate into costs for shareholders like loss of share premiums subsequent to a
hostile bid. The extent of the ambiguity will depend on the cost involved in reducing
the ambiguity. The perception of costs will be specific to the corporate governance
environment of each country, as each country will have its own social, cultural and
legal norms for interpreting its property rights.
The shareholders are unwilling to reduce ambiguity and provide credible
commitments as they are not constrained by reputational considerations in a market
for corporate control. Shareholders can function under anonymity. Reputation is
associated with an identity that is stable over time. The composition of shareholders is
not stable in the market for corporate control. The shareholders as a group may be
stable but the identity of individual members can keep on changing. The individual
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shareholder's behaviour will not be constrained by reputational concerns. The
managers, however, face the risk to their firm-specific human capital in the event of a
hostile takeover (Franks and Mayer, 1996; Walsh, 1988). Unlike in franchise
contracts reputational concerns are reversed. Instead of the franchiser (shareholder)
having the reputational concern it is the franchisee (manager) that is apprehensive of
the reputational effects of the termination of the contract. The consequence is that
there is a lack of credibility in the exchange of information and deliberation will be
non-existent or at the most of a very low quality. This will have the effect of making
the incomplete contract between shareholders and managers even more incomplete
and less sensitive to details than justified by the costs of making the contracts less
incomplete.
Incomplete contracts need not be symmetrically incomplete for the contracting parties
(Al-Najjar, 1995). The degree of incompleteness will differ from the point of view of
managers and shareholders. The contracts will be less complete in specifying the
obligations of the party with access to flexible instruments of governance. In
comparison the party with poorer access to such instruments will have its obligations
specified in greater detail. Shareholders have the power in their relationship with
managers as they have the residual rights of control and the ultimate option of
resorting to the market for corporate control. They can make their part of the
.obligations even more ambiguous than necessitated by the incomplete contracts.
Managers on the other hand do not have the same degree of freedom given the highly
firm-specific nature of their human capital. A good example of this is the growing
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complexity of executive compensation contracts in spite of a poor correspondence
between executive pay and performance as noted by Conyon and Peck (1998b).
There is evidence in support of the argument that deliberation will form the basis of
interaction if the market for corporate control is not readily available to shareholders.
In the US, the growing intensity of shareholder activism is a consequence of the
decline in the market for corporate control in the US (Bratton and McCahery, 1995).
The working of Federal politics has led to the empowerment of the managers. The
opportunism of the 1980s made possible by the active market for corporate control
was countered by State legislation in favour of the managers (Roe, 1994). The
behaviour of the States is explained by the theory of collective action in the presence
of interests groups (Oslon, 1965). The argument is that focused groups will prevail in
the determination of outcomes over dispersed groups or disorganised groups.
Consider a State, the managers of whose industries are threatened by takeovers. Given
their human capital risk and the possible consequences for their employees in terms of
restructuring etc., they will be more focused and organised in lobbying their
legislators to pass legislation against takeovers in comparison to the raiders for whom
such a move will not be so critical to their activities. The legislation in question is
being enacted in only one of the 50 States. The raiders are more dispersed and less
intensely motivated than the targets in the States. The politicians will also be more
inclined to listen to them than the raiders from outside the States. The raiders from
within the States will also be less motivated because they consider targets from all
over the country and not only the companies from within the State for acquisition.
The interests of the raiders and targets in obtaining or resisting changes in the
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legislation through Congress legislation will be symmetrical. However, the targets
have one advantage. The President of the United States is the only nationally elected
politician on Capitol Hill.
The relative unattractiveness of the MCC may also have come about by the rise in
institutional shareholdings. Growing concentration of ownership makes it difficult to
use the stock market for share returns. Large-scale transfer of shares will have the
effect of bringing the share prices down. Relationship based governance structures as
in Japan and Germany are characterised by concentrated ownership (Mayer, 1997).
The 1990s have seen the evolution of rules and procedures in the US, which have had
the effect of generating a more credible basis for deliberation between managers and
shareholders (Szeremet, 1993; Sharara and Hoke-Witherspoon, 1993; Bratton and
McCahery, 1995). The rule changes have helped in the development of a better
information environment with companies keen to provide related information for a
better assessment of financial information.
Japan and Germany have only three instances of hostile tender offers until recently
(Prowse, 1994). In Japan the equity capital of most large firms is in the hands of a few
shareholders. These large shareholders are other corporations, financial institutions
and trade partners. These shareholders maintain the right as large shareholders under
corporate law and legal system to deprive the management of its leadership. However,
there is little evidence of large shareholdings responding to the stock market. The
position of large shareholders remains stable. Of the 10 largest institutional investors
in 1990 firms in various sectors, on an average, seven to eight were also on the top 10
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list in 1980. The large shareholders remain stable even in the face of windfall gains.
Even when share prices go up ten times there is little change in the shareholdings of
the large shareholders (Miwa, 1995). The absence of the option of abdicating
ownership is because of 'hostages' or commitments given through cross
shareholdings and trade relations. It is also the outcome of legal, social and cultural
norms used to interpret the property rights in the Japanese corporate environment.
Recent developments in the Japanese economy especially in the financial services
sector suggest that the near absence of a market for corporate control is also not
helpful for good corporate governance. These developments however, cannot be a
negative justification for the primacy of the market for corporate control in the
corporate governance structure. The design of the corporate governance structure
identified in this chapter is based on positive analysis of the nature of contracts, the
objective of corporate governance and the modes of strategic co-operation available to
shareholders and managers. Emphasis on the market for corporate control, different
from Japanese and German corporate governance can be visualised. An example is the
idea of voluntary dissolution (McGinty, 1996). In voluntary dissolution shareholders
holding a specified portion of the stock can initiate a vote to dissolve the corporation
and would require the board to obtain the highest value by auctioning the corporation.
The advantage of voluntary dissolution by shareholders is that shareholders will take
recourse to it only when they genuinely want to force an auction. As the process has
to be initiated through the board it will ensure that there is sufficient opportunity for
deliberation. Such innovative ideas need further analysis.
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3.6 Conclusion
The relationship between shareholders and managers is one of strategic
interdependence. In the proposed framework there can be two possible modes of
strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers. These two modes are the
decentralised mode where the shareholders pursue a dominant strategy and the
procedural justice mode in which unstructured communication or deliberation will be
the basis for corporate governance. In the conventional analysis of corporate
governance typified by the principals and agents literature on corporate governance
this choice has been represented in terms of 'exit' and 'voice' options before the
shareholders. For example, shareholders can express their dissatisfaction with
managerial performance either by voting with their feet and relinquishing their
ownership of the company's shares (the market for corporate control) or by
expressing their displeasure through the internal control mechanisms like the
company board and getting the top management removed. The choice between the
two options for the expression of shareholders assessment of the top management is
visualised as a function of the liquidity of the stock market. Voice is perceived as a
costly alternative and will not be the preferred behaviour of shareholders if they
operate in a liquid stock market: Thus the emphasis found in the corporate governance
structure will be a derivative of the capital market.
The framework proposed in this Chapter show that the choice between the two modes
of strategic co-operation has implications for corporate governance itself. The aim of
corporate governance is to reduce managerial opportunism and provide a decision
context for top management. The incidence of managerial opportunism is shown to be
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endogenous to the mode of strategic co-operation. The decentralised mode will not
reduce the scope for opportunism in shareholder management relationship as
shareholders will adopt a dominant strategy and managers will attempt to protect their
human capital. Pure procedural justice will be the desirable basis for strategic co-
operation between shareholders and managers. The pure procedural justice mode
incorporates a learning mechanism that is appropriate to the incomplete contracts
between shareholders and managers. The learning mechanism reduces opportunism as
behaviour by promoting 'a feeling for the entity'. Pure procedural justice requires
equality in the opportunity and influence of messages. Communication between
shareholders and managers will be the cornerstone of strategic co-operation. In the
context of incomplete contracts unstructured communication or deliberation will be a
key requirement for strategic co-operation.
There are two sets of empirical issues, which emerge from the conceptual framework
proposed. The first set of issues relates to the implications of the adoption of a
dominant strategy by shareholders. As shown in Chapter 2 the UK corporate
governance framework places a primary reliance on the market for corporate control.
This implies the adoption of a dominant strategy by shareholders. The consequence of
the adoption of dominant strategy is that there will be opportunistic behaviour and
ambiguity in control changes manifested in the processes of the corporate governance
framework.
The second set of issues relates to the need for deliberation or effective and direct
communication between shareholders and managers under the procedural justice
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mode of strategic co-operation. The issue can be further disaggregated in the
following terms. First, is there a case for deliberation in corporate governance based
on the procedural justice mode? Second, if there is evidence in support of a
deliberation in corporate governance what is the form of unstructured communication
that will induce co-operation in the procedural justice mode? The empirical evaluation
of the second question will only be necessary if there is evidence in support of
deliberation as an integral component of the corporate governance framework.
Deliberation will be necessary to give substance and credibility to the use of financial
performance indicators as the basis of control changes if there is a systematic and
unobservable variation in control changes. This systematic and unexplained variation
reflects the 'corporate culture' of the firm. Corporate culture refers to the organisation
specific norms and customs (Kreps, 1988). Ignoring unstructured communication in
control changes and relying exclusivly on financial performance indicators by
shareholders in deciding on control changes will not conform to the requirements of a
corporate governance structure based on the procedural justice mode.
We turn to the empirical formulation of these issues in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL HYPOTHESES, DATA AND
VARIABLES
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into five sections. In the section two we identify the
hypotheses which we evaluate in the following chapters. These hypotheses are based
on the conceptual framework of corporate governance proposed in Chapter 3. In
section three we discuss the methodology of panel data analysis. Panel data
. techniques have been employed for the evaluation of the empirical hypotheses. The
discussion provides the basis for model specification. In the fourth section, the
variables to be used in the study are identified on the basis of relevant literature in this
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area. This section also defines the variables used and the data sources. The fifth and
the final section concludes the chapter.
4.2 Hypotheses
Chapter 3 identifies the decentralised mode and the procedural justice mode as the
two possible modes of strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers. The
consequence of the adoption of the decentralised mode is that in a property rights
framework, shareholders will pursue a dominant strategy. Shareholders will use focal
points like financial performance indicators as the basis for their decisions regarding
share ownership. The adoption of dominant strategy will not lead to the narrowing of
contractual incompleteness and managers will be unable to form expectations about
shareholders motives. The threat to their human capital perceived by the management
will lead to greater opportunism as managers will respond to the adoption of dominant
strategy by shareholders. The consequence of this will be an exacerbation of the
corporate governance problem. Shareholder management relations will be based on
opportunism and there will be breakdown in strategic co-operation. The procedural
justice mode can be the other basis for strategic co-operation in the property rights
view of the firm. This mode of strategic co-operation between shareholders and
managers can have the effect of reducing opportunism in shareholder management
relationship. A critical requirement of the procedural justice mode given the
incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers will be unstructured
communication between shareholders and managers. The conceptual framework
discussed in Chapter 3 generates two sets of empirical issues. The first set of issues
relates to the use of procedural justice as a mode of strategic co-operation between
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shareholders and managers. The second set of empirical issues relates to the existence
and consequence of the adoption of dominant strategy for corporate governance.
The balance of the thesis is concerned with the empirical exploration of these issues
by studying the corporate governance in the United Kingdom. In the discussion that
follows the dependent variable is identified. The UK corporate governance
environment is a valid testing ground for these issues. We have noted in Chapter 2
that there is a greater emphasis on the MCC in the corporate governance of firms in
UK as compared to the US, Japan and Germany (Borio, 1990; Jenkinson and Mayer
1994). Surveys of the behaviour of analysts in UK have found a strong preference for
'fundamentals' (key financial ratios) in the decision to 'buy' and 'sell' (Arnold and
Moizer, 1984; Pike, Meerjanssen and Chadwick, 1993). By 1993, in the UK, the
market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP was nearly double that of the US.
Market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP stood at 120% for UK in comparison to
66% for the US (unadjusted figures, Datastream and World Tables, 1993). This
implies that the size of the UK quoted sector and the MCC is proportionately larger
than in the US. Another feature of the UK corporate governance environment is that
the ownership concentration is relatively lower than in the US, Japan and Germany
(Prowse, 1994). The shares are also widely dispersed. Thus a survey found that out of
170 UK companies examined, 84% were widely held. A widely-held company being
defined as a company in which there is not a single shareholder who owns more than
25% of the equity of the firm (Mayer, 1994). The proportionately larger market
capitalisation in conjunction with the pattern of ownership in UK suggests that
ownership changes will be more frequent in UK companies. Diffused share ownership
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reinforces the separation of ownership from control as it encourages impersonal share
ownership (Scott, 1986). The UK corporate governance environment represents an
accentuated opportunity to examine the consequences of a dominant strategy adopted
by shareholders.
The case for the use of procedural justice as a mode for strategic co-operation can be
examined in two stages. In the first stage we can evaluate whether unstructured
communication is a significant issue in shareholder management relationship. As
shown in Chapter 3 unstructured communication is central to this mode of strategic
co-operation. In the second stage we can examine the form of unstructured
communication which will support this form of strategic co-operation. The second
stage evaluation will be useful if there is evidence consistent with the understanding
that unstructured information exchange is a significant issue in shareholder
management relationships. The second stage evaluation is not undertaken in the
empirical exercise and will constitute the agenda for further work if unstructured
communication is shown to be a significant attribute of shareholder management
relationships.
The existence and implications of the adoption of dominant strategy and the relevance
of unstructured communication can be evaluated for top-management accountability,
a key concern in corporate governance. As discussed in Chapter 2 the emergence of
the management as a controlling group in corporations significantly altered the
shareholders expectations regarding the value of the firm's assets. The emergence of
management control may have the effect of reducing the value of the assets for the
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owner. Managerial actions regarding the utilisation of the firms assets may be
motivated by their self-interest. Top management accountability can be proxied by top
management turnover. Greater accountability will be ensured through turnover
because of the associated risks to managerial human capital (Jensen and Murphy,
1990; Weisbach, 1988). Top manager changes have also been associated with
corporate decisions. Changes in the top management may alter the strategy, structures
and internal processes (Wallace Worrell and Cheng, 1990) or it may lead to board
reforms (Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori, 1989). We can examine the role of
financial performance indicators and board configuration for top management
turnover to assess the existence and consequences of the use of dominant strategy by
shareholders.
Communication between shareholders and managers can be of two types, viz.,
structured and unstructured. Structured communication will be through 'focal points'
such as financial performance indicators. The form of communication is standardised
and simplified to be universally understood and is independent of firm specific norms
and practices (Kreps, 1988). Financial performance indicators are a good example of
structured information exchange. When shareholders adopt a dominant strategy what
matters is structured communication. Unstructured communication on the other hand,
will be informal and not in a predetermined form. It will take place through fora like
the corporate board. It will comprise idiosyncratic information about organisation
specific norms or what Kreps (1988) refers to as organisational 'culture'. With the
help of the hypotheses we explore the relevance of unstructured communication for
effective corporate governance. This will provide evidence in support of the use of
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the procedural Justice mode as the basis for strategic co-operation between
shareholders and managers.
Unlike structured communication unstructured communication can only be proxied.
The board attributes like boarding duality, directors block shareholdings, board size
etc. may reflect the volume of unstructured communication between shareholders and
managers. A board characterised by duality reflects greater concentration of power at
the apex of the organisation and the top management may have a reduced inclination
to communicate to the board. Board size has also been associated with control. Jensen
(1993) considers large boards as dysfunctional and easier to control. Hence larger
boards can be hypothesised to have a lower volume of unstructured information flow.
Large block shareholdings by directors reduces the separation of ownership from
control and information asymmetry. Larger directors' block shareholding implies a
larger volume of unstructured information available to shareholders. Larger
proportion of non-executive directors on the board may increase the flow of
unstructured information depending upon their affiliation. Similarly institutional
block shareholdings may take a direct interest in their shareholdings and induce
greater information flow. However, it is possible that regulatory provisions like
insider laws may prevent a direct involvement. Greater information flows may then be
induced by insistence on separation of the posts of chairman and the CEO or a greater
representation/effectiveness of non-executive directors on the board.
The problem is that these board attributes are also proxies for relative power. We have
to distinguish between the influence of relative power (a reflection of opportunism)
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and unstructured communication for governance turnover'. Among the board
attributes identified as proxies for the volume of unstructured communication
directors block shareholdings is the most appropriate variable to make this distinction.
Larger directors block shareholdings narrows the separation of ownership from
control. Information asymmetry between shareholders and managers will be reduced.
The insider manager will in possession of considerable firm-specific information
(Fama and Jensen 1983). Inside ownership will align managerial and shareholder
interests (Jensen and Meckiling, 1976). Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) in their study of
the stock market reactions to the appointment of inside directors with block
shareholdings conclude that the expected costs of an inside director's expert
knowledge clearly outweigh the expected costs of managerial entrenchment only
when managerial and outside shareholder interests are closely aligned. Thus it is
possible that large block shareholdings will contribute to greater managerial
accountability by being positively associated with top management turnover. Larger
directors block shareholdings will also increase the relative power of the incumbent
management vis-à-vis the remaining body of shareholders (Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1988a). However, if larger director block shareholdings are positively
associated with governance turnover then it will demonstrate the value of unstructured
communication for top management accountability. The positive influence of
directors block shareholdings on governance turnover will show that board monitoring
increases even though the principal agents conceptualisation would suggest that
greater power in shareholder management relationship lies with the incumbent
management. •
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Forms of unstructured communication by definition cannot be completely identified.
There will always be the problem of omitted variables. Panel data techniques allow
for the identification of firm-specific heterogeneity as group effects. Group effects
will pick up omitted variables. Significant and large group effects will suggest that the
governance changes will have systematic variation with unidentified variables. The
use of dummies in panel data estimates to allow for firm-specific and sample period-
related variation does not allow for the identification of the causes that lead to a shift
in the regression lines. However, the existence of fixed effects show that the firm
specific heterogeneity is correlated with the explanatory variables (Kmenta, 1986,
Pindyck and Rubinfield, 1998). It is possible that some of this firm-specific
heterogeneity relate to information that has a bearing on the shareholder management
relationship and hence require unstructured communication or deliberation between
shareholders and managers. Large group effects will be consistent with the relevance
of unstructured information exchange though they will not constitute evidence in
support of deliberation between shareholders and managers.
The discussion leads us to the hypotheses that are specifically tested.
Hypothesis 1 is formulated in the following terms to reflect the pursuit of dominant
strategy by shareholders
. Hypothesis I 
Top management turnover will be inversely related to financial performance and more
specifically to stock markets based performance.
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The second hypothesis will indicate of the relevance of structured information for
governance changes. It is expected that the financial performance indicators will have
a relatively small impact on top management turnover as managers engage in
opportunistic behaviour.
Hypothesis 2
The impact of financial performance indicators on top management turnover as
measured by the partial elasticity of top management turnover due to financial
performance change will be low.
e = 0lp —
Where e u, is the partial elasticity of governance change due to financial performance
change.
The consequences of the adoption of dominant strategy will be pervasive opportunism
in shareholder management relationship. Board attributes, which reflect relative power
of the incumbent management vis-à-vis shareholders will be significant in explaining
'disciplinary top management turnover. This gives us several variants of the third
hypothesis, which can be individually identified with specific variables. This
hypothesis incorporates the principal agents issues examined in the conventional
literature on corporate governance.
Hypothesis 3A 
Top management turnover will be inversely related to board duality.
Duality in the top position on the Board has been the subject of much interest in the
literature (Boyd, 1995; Rechner and Dayton, 1991). Duality has been associated with
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better performance as it gives the firm a clear direction and other positive leadership
attributes (Cochran Wood and Jones, 1985; Vance, 1964). However, duality has also
been associated with ineffective governance and hostile takeovers (Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny, 1989).
Hypothesis 3B
Top management turnover will be inversely related to board size.
Board size has been hypothesised to have implications for corporate governance.
Large boards are deemed to be ineffective and dysfunctional (Jensen, 1993). This has
been supported by a number of empirical studies (Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells,
1998; Huther, 1997; Yermack, 1996; Conyon and Peck, 1998c).
Hypothesis 3C
Top management turnover will be positively related to the proportion of non-
executive directors.
The role of non-executive directors is difficult to interpret. From the human capital
perspective it has been argued that non-executive directors need to signal their
expertise and hence will monitor the executive management (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
However, the non-executive directors may not have the necessary incentive to monitor
if they have insufficient financial involvement in the firm and may be obligated to the
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top management for their position (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995; Weisbach,
1988).
,
Hypothesis 3D
Top management turnover will be positively related to institutional block
shareholdings.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) show that institutional block shareholders can monitor top
management either through informal negotiations with management or through the
market for corporate control by facilitating the takeover of a firm whose management
is underperforming. The latter form of monitoring is however, not substantiated by the
empirical evidence on UK firms. Franks and Mayer (1996) do not find that the
incidence of hostile takeovers is associated with past performance. Given the share
premiums associated with tender offers it is more likely that large shareholdings will
increase the likelihood of a hostile takeover for opportunistic reasons.
This fourth hypothesis demonstrates the relevance of unstructured communication or
firm-specific investment for corporate governance.
Hypothesis 4
Top management turnover will be positively related to larger director block
'shareholdings.
Panel data analysis provides an assessment of the role of firm-specific variation in
explaining top management-turnover. If firm-specific variation is large it is possible
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that a better understanding of firm-specific heterogeneity in top management turnover
can be obtained through unstructured information exchange between shareholders and
managers.
4.3.1 The Methodology of Panel Data Analysis
In a panel data set the various variables of interest are observed both across firms and
over several time-periods (t). It is a time series of cross-sectional data. Typically, t <
n, n being the number of individual units (which in this case are firms) observed. As
the number of time periods involved is not very large, the data set is not quite suited
to the econometric techniques appropriate to time-series data. At the same time such a
data set does not qualify for analysis as a cross-section data set. A simple pooling of
the data will require strong assumptions. All observations will have to be presumed to
be homogenous. Thus if i firms are observed over t number of years and there are k
	
exogenous variables 1 ,x 2	 	 x k , and a dependent variable y,„ then a panel data
model in its most general form will be:
Y	 R lit +	 2u X 211 + 	 + 13 kit X kit +
	
(I)
. In effect the implications of homogeneity are:
13 = 13 k' For all i and t; where k> 1kit
and
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(i) var(p,„ ) = cy2 , a constant
(ii) Coy01	 js ) 0, where ij and st
The use of panel data has a number of advantages. There are n x t observations. Thus
the efficiency of the estimators is improved because of the increase in the number of
observations. Panel data sets also alleviate the problem of multicollinearity as the
explanatory variables vary in two dimensions. In principle, panel data techniques
allow for more sophisticated models with less restrictive assumptions. When choosing
the econometric methodology and econometric specification, an important
consideration is to allow for the aggregative nature of the information represented by
secondary data. The advantage of panel data techniques is that it makes a distinction
between residual heterogeneity associated with changes over time (period effects) and
across firms (group effects). This allows for a better identification of the factors
leading to changes in corporate governance.
The general descriptive model represented by equation (1) above needs to be
structured by specifying the assumptions with regard to the explanatory variables, the
properties of the disturbance term and the relation between explanatory variables and
the disturbance term (for surveys of panel data techniques see Hsiao, 1986; Matyas
and Sevestre, 1995; Maddala, 1993; Baltagi, 1995). In addition to these assumptions
common to the identification of an econometric model we also need to make
assumptions regarding the variability of the regression coefficient or the specification
of the residual heterogeneous behaviour across firms. The latter is specific to the
analysis of panel data. All the models discussed in the literature assume that the
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explanatory variables are non-stochastic and independent of the errors. They differ in
their assumptions regarding the residual term and the degree of variability of the
regression coefficients. The different panel data models arising from the different
specifications are:
(a) Individual regression model
(b) Seemingly unrelated regression model
(c) Error components model
(i) Fixed effects
(ii) Random effects
(d) Random coefficients model
4.3.2 Choice of Specification
The choice of the econometric specification depends on the way the problem is
visualised and the characteristics of the data set. In the individual regression model the
coefficients are taken to be specific to each specific firm, but the coefficients are
constant over time, that is 13 = 13, for all i . The classical assumptions of constantkit
variance and uncorrelated observations continue to hold. Thus in this specification
each corporate governance change is independent of the corporate governance
changes in other firms. This technique is not appropriate if t, the time period is small
(Gujarati 1995). Furthermore our interest in the present exercise is not the specific
firm but the identification of firm characteristics which form the basis for the
governance changes.
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The second specification for the evaluation of panel data is the seemingly unrelated
regression model (SURE). Here 13 k„ = ki for all i as before, however,
(i) E(p. ) =0 for all i and t;
(ii) ,tt ) cy for all t = s;
(iii) E(ii	 ) =--- 0, where ts;
Essentially, this specification relaxes the assumption of constant coefficients over
time. The specification argues that some non-observable factors may affect all or
some of the individual coefficients at the same time giving rise to a non-zero
covariance between the disturbance for two different individual firms. In this manner
the interdependence in the behaviour of individual firms is introduced into the
estimation process. The model is quite comprehensive in the sense that it
simultaneously accounts for individual specific effects and interdependence among
firms. However, when n is large and t is small, as is the case in our data set (218 firms
observed annually over 6 years) there is a serious problem of degrees of freedom. The
number of parameters to be estimated is n x k coefficients and (1/2)(n)(n+1) elements
of the coefficient matrix. This reduces the reliability of estimates especially for small
values oft.
The purpose of using panel data analysis is to capture in the estimation process the
heterogeneity across the years and the heterogeneity across individual firms in their
corporate governance behaviour. This implies an error structure, having the following
characteristics
(i) var(p., ) =	 , i = 1,2,....n;
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(ii) Cov	 ) >0, where s # t
An error structure which incorporates the firm specific effects and the period effects
is given by the error components model. The general form of the error components
model is:
Y ii = 13 Iii	 +	 2if X21,	 	  P kif X kir ± V1
	(I)	 +.
 4 f 	 (2)
where, IA „ v +0), +):.
and v = firm-specific error component
, # period specific error component
4 = the normal error term or the pure error term.
For the purpose of the present discussion we will ignore the period effects.
There are the two approaches to estimating the error components model, the fixed
effects model and the random effects model. The fixed effects model assumes that the
[3 coefficients are the same for all individuals except for generic individual (fixed)
effect. Thus v, and co , are fixed parameters and the generic effect can be allowed in
the specification by allowing for a different intercept for each individual firm. The
general form of the fixed effect model is
Y, = Ii	 + 13 211 X lit 4-
	 + 13 kir X (k-Dir ± 4 if	 (3)
The individual differences are uniquely related to the coefficients 13 . The model has
(n + k-1) parameters. The generic individual effects represent the whole range of
factors affecting the corporate governance behaviour of firms. These unobservable
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differences can also be viewed as random firm specific differences as in the classical
regression model where the effects of omitted variables, across the firms are captured
by the error term.
For the random effects model it is typically assumed that the unobserved differences
are uncorrelated with any of the explanatory variables. That is, Cov(X kit ) = 0. This
in effect implies that the firms undergoing changes in corporate governance and those,
which have not undergone corporate governance changes, have the same expectations
regarding corporate governance changes. This is a strong assumption, which is
unlikely to be satisfied except when observations are collected by randomised
experiment. Thus the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimators is biased. In the
absence of such data the random effects model is estimated using the generalised least
squares estimators (GLS).
The random coefficient model is an extension of the random effects model where not
only is the intercept term random but all coefficients can take random values. Thus,
R kit =p,+ [1, , where P k is fixed (unknown) and p. ki is random.
An appropriate stochastic specification is adopted. The estimation process in random
coefficient and random effects models requires estimation of k parameters. However,
the implications for degrees of freedom are different as the unknown parameters of the
covariance structure of the random components model must be estimated. Typically,
for such models, the estimation procedure requires as a first step, estimation of the
covariance model. In the case of the random effects model the estimation of the
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covariance is feasible whenever t 2. The random coefficients model necessitates
OLS estimation of the covariance model individual by individual which implies that
at least t k, the number of independent regressors.
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that the error components model, is
the appropriate model for our data set. The individual regression model cannot be
used as we expect considerable firm-specific differences in corporate governance
behaviour. The random coefficients model and the SURE model are not appropriate
models because of the low value of t. In the error components model the choice
between the fixed effects and the random effects models can be based on the various
specification tests. LIMDEP allows for the estimation of both using the same
estimation routine and the appropriate specification can be chosen using various test
statistics based on the LM and the Hausman test statistic. However, there are a priori
reasons for making the choice between the random effects and the fixed effects
models. The fixed effects model is less restrictive. As pointed out the random effects
model is based on the assumption that the unobservable differences are uncorrelated
with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects model does not require such an
assumption. The individual intercept terms automatically control for all unobserved
differences regardless of whether or not these differences are associated with the
likelihood of corporate governance changes. Generality of the inferences that can be
drawn from the estimated coefficients is also cited in the literature as a possible
consideration in the choice between the fixed effect and the random effect models
(Kennedy, 1995). It is argued that if the exercise draws inferences, which are
recognised to be applicable only to the sampled observation, then the fixed effects
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model will serve the purpose. If one wants to draw inferences about the entire
population then the use of the random effects model is advised.
The above discussion has enabled us to identify the error components model as the
correct modelling specification. There can be a priori reasons for arguing in favour of
the fixed effects or the random effects but these arguments by themselves are not
conclusive. The choice between the random effects model and the fixed effects model
will be based on the specification test statistics. We estimate both versions of the error
components models and incorporating firm fixed effects and period effects in the first
instance. Then on the basis of the specification tests we decide between the random
effects and the firm fixed effects as a next step. Subsequently, we make a choice
between the two way error components model incorporating both the firm fixed
effects and the period effects and the one way error components model incorporating
either the firm fixed effects or the period effects on the basis of significance tests. The
tests and the results are reported in the next chapter.
The fixed effects model is the same as the dummy variable model. It is easily
estimated using OLS with a set of additive dummies. This is possible if the number of
observations are only a few thousand (Greene, 1997). In our case the observations are
less than a thousand. In the case of the random effects model the method of
generalised least squares is used to account for the possible correlation between the
unobserved differences and the error term. There are a number of ways of estimating
the variances; which are required to estimate the random effects model using
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generalised least squares. For example the sample variance of the estimated fixed
effects can be used.
Two of the four measures employed in the study to measure corporate governance
changes are dichotomous. Another attribute of the data, which can have important
implications for the estimation process, is the number of takeover bids identified in
the sample. The data condition for dichotomous dependent variable techniques, like
the logit /probit model is that there should be a fair distribution of ones and zeroes,
that is, there should be a fair distribution of instances of takeovers and firms which did
not experience such an event during the sample period. As a minimum requirement
there should be at least k values of each, where k is the number of regressors. In this
data set there are 77 instances of tender offers. Thus the instances of takeovers are
fewer though this is a fairly large proportion of the 218 firms in the sample which
have been subjected to the extreme discipline of the market for corporate control at
some point in the sample period. As pointed out earlier a large majority of the
incumbent top management team lose their job within one year of hostile takeover
(Franks and Mayer, 1996).
Binary choice models can be normally estimated using either the logit or probit
models. The choice is often based on computational convenience and the numerical
equivalence of the estimates can be worked out (Amemiya, 1981). However, in the
case of panel data we have to take into account particularly restrictive computational
problems while making a choice between logit or probit models. The random effects
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model can be estimated using the probit model only while the fixed effect model can
be estimated using the logit model only.
In any model to be estimated the intercept coefficient and coefficients of the
regressors are the parameters to be estimated. When t tends to infinity the maximum
likelihood estimates of a ; , the firm specific effects are consistent. When t is finite,
as is usually the case in panel data, there are only a limited number of observations of
the dependent variable Y i, that contain information about a,. An increase in the
number of the cross-sectional units, n provides no information about a 1 and the
number of firm-fixed effects that need to be estimated goes up. In the case of the
linear regression model, the inability to obtain consistent estimates of a, does not
preclude the possibility of obtaining a consistent estimate of 13 because the estimation
of 13 and a, are asymptotically independent. It is possible to do this by finding a
consistent estimator for the parameter by finding functions of the parameter which are
independent of a, and satisfy the property that the structural parameters are true
values and the function converges to zero in probability as n —> 00. This is done for
example in the case of linear probability models by taking the difference with respect
to the individual means and taking the least squares regression of the difference
equation. This yields a consistent estimation of 13 as n --> 00• It is possible to identify
such functions for the fixed effect logit model but difficult to identify such functions
for the probit model.
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In the case of the random effects model it is not possible to estimate the logit model.
As we know the composite error term with random effects is correlated across cross-
section units even if the v is IID. The multivariate logistic distribution has the
disadvantage that the correlations are all constrained to a fixed value (1/2). Therefore
in the case of random effects we only use the probit models.
We estimate both the fixed effects logit and the random effects probit models.
LIMDEP is able to carry out an internal check of the appropriateness of the two
models for the data set being analysed. If the data does not show evidence of random
effects the estimate of p, the starting value will turn out to be negligible. The
estimation process gives a diagnostic and reverts back to reporting the result of the
basic probit model. If it turns out that there is no evidence of random effects in the
data then the fixed effect logit model will be estimated. Here it is possible to test for
the existence of heterogeneity in the data by using a Hausman specification test.
4.4.1 Measurement of Variables
Given the range and interdependence of factors having influence on changes in
corporate governance, the scope for empirical investigation is extensive. New
contributions can be identified in most major journals on a regular basis. Three
conclusions can be drawn from a perusal of the literature in the area. First, studies
statistically evaluate the effectiveness of the individual components of the governance
structure. However, the various corporate governance devices are seen as multiple
devices reflecting the understanding that none of these devices individually is
comprehensive and efficient enough to resolve the problem of monitoring. The
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conduct of corporate governance is ignored and there is little insight offered by these
studies regarding the overall design of the corporate governance structure and the role
of these individual devices like takeovers, block shareholdings etc., in the design of
,
such a mechanism. As cited earlier there is evidence now on the interdependence or
complementarity of various governance mechanisms in empirical studies. However,
these studies do not see the various mechanisms of corporate governance as part of a
structure and that one component of the structure can impede the working of the other
components thereby reducing the effectiveness of the corporate governance as a
whole.
Second, the consequences of such a fragmented view of corporate governance can be
seen in the empirical literature. Most studies focus on one corporate governance
mechanism at a time. Such studies do not contribute to an understanding of the
problem of monitoring and efficacy of the corporate governance structure as a whole.
It is now recognised that there is a degree of complementarity and substitutability
between corporate governance mechanisms (Rediker and Seth, 1995; Zajac and
Westphal, 1995). It is possible that the inferences drawn about the effectiveness of one
corporate governance mechanism is not valid because the particular mechanism is not
the preferred mechanism of corporate governance in that environment or because the
effects are actually the implicit effects of another governance mechanism. The studies
fail to give a complete view of the relevance of the mechanism. Individual devices are
evaluated with different data sets, making it difficult to have an overall picture of
corporate governance structure in any corporate environment.
107
The third remark about the studies on corporate governance also relates to the
empirical coverage of the literature. The UK corporate governance environment is
unique in terms of the strong mediating role of the stock market (Jenkinson and
-
Mayer, 1994; Franks and Mayer, 1996). It represents an accentuated empirical
opportunity for the evaluation of the hypotheses set up in section two. The ambiguity
in the decision making environment of top management under stock-market corporate
governance mechanisms, at times loosely termed as 'short-termism' can be evaluated
with considerable insight in the context of UK companies.
The studies reported in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 show that there is a consistent and
significant relationship between turnover of top management and the performance of
the firm. The interdependence of the corporate governance mechanisms as
demonstrated by the interrelationships between block shareholdings, performance and
the internal and external control mechanisms in determining their influence over top
management turnover is another important finding of the literature. However, it is
unclear the extent to which the board characteristics can be dis-aggregated to identify
a consistent set of influences of the board attributes for top management turnover and
accountability. The empirical studies do not give an assessment of the extent of firm
specific and period related influences for top management accountability. The
principal and agents conceptualisation of corporate governance with its emphasis on
structure and performance has difficulty in explaining the possible implication of
these firm specific variations in corporate governance except in terms of sampling and
specification errors. As we have seen in Chapter 3 it is possible that the firm-specific
effects may have the effect of altering the nature of the shareholder management
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relationship itself. A preference of dominant strategy by shareholders or an absence
of strategic co-operation in the procedural justice mode will have the effect of
increasing opportunism in shareholder management relationship and exacerbating the
corporate governance problem. Finally, as Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 shows much of the
empirical work on top management turnover relates to US firms and of late Japanese
firms. There are only three studies on top management turnover in firms in the United
Kingdom. Evidence on top management turnover relating to UK firms will add to our
understanding given the intensity of the influence of the market for corporate control
in the United Kingdom as discussed in section 2.4 of Chapter 2.
It is expected that top management turnover will be greatly influenced by what Kreps
(1988) terms as organoisational culture or firm-specific norms and customs. These
norms and customs can also be related to board attributes used to explain top
management turnover. Panel data techniques account for these firm specific influences
in the estimation process. In the studies on management turnover summarised in Table
2.2 in Chapter 2 only Kaplan (1994b) and Kaplan and Minton (1994) include firm-
specific and time related dummies. Other studies in corporate using panel data
techniques are Jensen and Murphy (1990), Conyon and Peck (1998b; 1998c) in the
area of executive compensation and Yermack (1996) in the study of the effects of
board size.
4.4.2 Sample
The data set comprises separate samples of manufacturing and financial services firms
in the UK. All the firms are UK controlled and quoted. We have drawn the sample
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from two sectors, viz., the manufacturing sector and the financial services sector. The
interest in the financial services firms or what are termed as authorised institutions in
the UK is an outcome of the conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3. An
important conclusion of the conceptual framework is that in the presence of an active
market for corporate governance, shareholders will lack the incentive to give credible
commitments in the contracting relationship and the managers fearing the risk to their
human capital will engage in opportunistic behaviour. Thus opportunism, instead of
being controlled by the corporate governance structure will be endogenous to the
corporate governance arrangement. Our initial understanding based on the public
pronouncements of the Bank of England was that the Bank discouraged hostile
takeovers. Further, there are only two referrals of financial services firms on takeovers
in banks to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission since 1966. Thus in a way the
authorised institutions sector represents a governance sector where the market for
corporate control as a disciplining device is not a readily available option for the
exercise of corporate governance.
Analysis of the regulatory arrangement has shown that the central bank acts not only
as the centrepiece of the governance structure in the financial services sector. The role
of the central banks in terms of corporate governance, however, has been to replace
the conventional governance goal of shareholder wealth maximisation with concerns
for depositors security and the stability of the financial system. Thus the mere absence
of hostile takeovers does not result in the shareholders giving credible commitments
and starting to engage in deliberative corporate governance. In effect the study of
authorised financial institutions will not serve as a control case for testing the
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hypotheses arising out of the conceptual framework proposed in section two of this
chapter. As a result in this light the hypotheses set up in section 4.2 have been
appropriately modified in section 6.3 of Chapter 6. The study of governance changes
in authorised institutions is an interesting study of corporate governance in the
financial services sector and can provide the initial basis for a search for a supervisory
arrangement in tune with the changes in this sector over the last few years. The setting
up of the new super regulatory body, the Financial Services Authority, and the
divestment of the supervisory function from the traditional responsibilities of the
Bank of England is indicative of the policy interest in this area.
The empirical evaluation of corporate governance in M'Cs cont-rik)..\\.e.s
existing evidence on this sector. It is also interesting as it allows for comparison of
governance of firms in the same country but under different regulatory environments.
The data-sets comprises 218 UK controlled quoted manufacturing enterprises listed in
The Times 1000 for the year 1987-88 and the complete list of 44 quoted and UK
controlled authorised financial institutions listed in the February, 1989 issue of the
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. Data on financial performance has been collected
for the years 1987-88 to 1994-95. Data on corporate governance has been gathered for
the period 1989-90 to 1994-95. Among the top 1000 manufacturing firms in 1987-88
listed in The Times 1000, 468 were identified as UK controlled. Of these 468 firms,
237 are further classifiable as manufacturing enterprises. The rest of the 468 firms
were in various services and non-manufacturing activities. From the list of 237
manufacturing firms which had gone into receivership or liquidation were excluded
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from the sample and some firms were excluded because they were under government
control for a part of the sample period. Firms were also excluded from the sample if
they were successfully taken over in the first year of the study as we are using panel
data techniques.
The variables considered in the analysis fall into four groups. The four variable groups
are:
(a) Corporate governance change variables like board turnover, CEO change and
hostile takeovers which also represents a comprehensive overhaul of top management;
(b) Financial variables which represent the 'focal points' for communication between
managers and shareholders;
(c) Corporate governance characteristics or board variables and shareholding
characteristics, e.g., like block shareholding characteristics, etc., which affect the
governance function of the shareholders;
(d) The final group of variables can be termed as control variables, like age and tenure
of the CEO, etc., used to improve the sensitivity of the estimated influences of
performance and governance characteristics on the various forms of corporate
governance changes;
We will be making use of variables from each of these groups. There can be two
levels of interpretation that can be attributed to the estimates. We can interpret the
estimates within the conceptual framework of corporate governance proposed in
Chapter 3; the Hypotheses set up in section two of this chapter and section three of
Chapter 6. Previous studies have given justification for the individual governance
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attributes, but no attempt has been made in the literature to interpret these results in
the context of an overall conception of corporate governance. Alternatively we can
also draw inferences by examining the significance of the coefficients of the
individual variables in line with principal and agents analysis of corporate
governance. The significance of the individual variable estimates based on UK data
can be interpreted in light of earlier studies for a better understanding of corporate
governance in the United Kingdom.
4.4.3 Dependent Variables
The dependent variable is an indicator of changes in corporate governance. Four
measures of changes in corporate governance, i.e., turnover of all directors, turnover
of executive directors, CEO change classified as disciplinary and hostile takeovers,
are defined with a view to assessing their relationship with financial performance
indicators and board characteristics. All forms of governance changes are evaluated
using the same data set. The use of the same data set for different types of governance
changes allows better judgement on the relevance of different governance
mechanisms given their complementarity and substitutability in a particular
governance environment. The dependent variables defined are similar to the ones used
in Kaplan and Minton (1994); (Kaplan 1994a, 1994b) ; Kang and Shivdesani (1995).
We have a practical problem of identifying the exact reasons for a board level change
and thus what can be termed as disciplinary management turnover. Instances of
change related with death, illness and age have been excluded. This has been
completed on the basis of the details provided about such events in the chairman's and
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the directors' reports which form part of the company annual reports. There is an
absence of reliable information on whether Board changes are disciplinary or non-
disciplinary. In other words we have some difficulty in identifying whether a board
change took place because of lack of performance or because the particular board
member was hired away for above average performance. Information on this is very
hard to obtain and even in much publicised cases is open to speculation in the media.
Companies or chief executives do not like to admit that a change is related to lack of
satisfactory performance. Some earlier studies have made use of media coverage in
the case of CEO changes to classify the changes as a disciplinary or non-disciplinary
turnover (Denis and Denis 1995). Given the speculative riature of these 'epos it is
difficult to see how this reduces the margin of error. When measuring change in
governance due to the change in CEO we have followed a relatively more objective
and consistent criteria for distinguishing between a disciplinary or non-disciplinary
turnover by using the subsequent status of the CEO after leaving office (in line with
some recent studies). In the literature CEO change is defined as disciplinary or non-
standard if the CEO remains on the board, but not as non-executive chairman, or
leaves the board (Kang and Shivdasani 1995; Kaplan 1994b). Further, the use of CEO
age and tenure as control variables has allowed for a further refinement of the
distinction between a disciplinary and non-disciplinary or routine turnover.
There is very little basis for introducing such refinements when the measure of
governance change is the turnover of executive and non-executive directors as we
seldom come across firm-specific information relating to such board changes.
However, this measure of board turnover is a ratio and not an absolute number. It will
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be reasonable to assume that every board will have a fair distribution of directors with
different levels of abilities. Hence a mean level of turnover will reflect the differential
abilities of good or bad directors. A change in the percentage of directors resulting
from bad performance can reasonably be construed to be associated with disciplining.
We further refine the interpretation of the turnover of executive and all directors by
making use of a CEO change dummy as an explanatory variable. The board may be
seen as the creature of the chief executive. So, we use a dummy variable CEOCH for
the year before, after and during the year of the CEO change. If the dummy turns out
to be significant and has a positive sign it will show that turnover of directors is
associated with CEO change.
Explicitly, our four measures of change in corporate governance are:
1. Non-standard CEO change (CEO): 
Following Kang and Shivdasani (1995) CEO change is defined as disciplinary or non-
standard if the CEO remains on the board but not as non-executive chairman or leaves
the board. In UK firms there is no consistent designation of the CEO. At times they
are also referred to as the MD. However, in our data a MD is not considered to be the
CEO if the board has an executive chairman. CEO changes resulting from illness,
retirement or deaths, as indicated in the annual reports are excluded from instances of
CEO changes. It is possible that some of the departure attributed to ill health may
actually be disciplinary. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) compare their estimates with an
alternative definition of non-routine turnover defining it to include all cases of CEO
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turnover where the product does not become chairman of the board. Similar results are
obtained with their approach although the coefficients are less precisely estimated. We
have therefore used the definition as used by Kang and Shivdasani (1995) in their
study.
2 and 3. Turnover of Executive Directors (CED) and Directors (CD)
The percentage of the directors in the previous accounting year who are no longer
directors in the present accounting year is used to measure the turnover of all directors
(CD). Similarly in the case of executive directors turnover is again measured as the
percentage of all executive directors in previous accounting year who are no longer
executive directors in the current accounting year (CED). Changes in the board
composition resulting from a non-executive director becoming an executive director
are excluded from instances of change in all directors. Such changes are not treated as
disciplinary. As in the case of the change in the CEO, instances of death, illness and
retirement as reported in the annual reports are excluded from the calculation of CD
and CED.
Data on the above variables (1, 2 and 3) was gathered from the Stock Exchange
Directory (various volumes) for the years 1988/89 to 1994/95. These directories list
the board members by name with their designation on the board of the firm. Further,
information regarding the board has been collected from the annual reports of the
companies. This is available on CD-ROM (Laser-D) for the last three years. Data
prior to that has been obtained from the microfiches of the Annual Reports available
from Company House.
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4. Takeover (TO) 
TO is measured as a dichotomous variable taking the value j in the event of a hostile
takeover bid, successful or not, in a sample year, and the value 0 otherwise. A large
percentage of the top management team is replaced subsequent to a takeover. This is
irrespective of whether the tender offer is friendly, hostile or successful or
unsuccessful (Walsh, 1988; Franks and Mayer, 1996). Thus takeovers represent a
severe threat to the firm-specific managerial human capital. It is possible that
takeovers take place for synergistic reasons (Weisbach, 1993). The general perception
of the literature on takeovers is that hostile takeovers are disciplinary while friendly
takeovers are synergistic (Davis and Stout, 1992). Following Shivdasani (1993) we
define a takeover as hostile if the incumbent management initially resisted the tender
offer. For the fixed effects logit and the random effects probit models TO as a
dichotomous measure for hostile takeovers is used. It will take a value 1 if the firm
was subject to a hostile tender offer and 0 otherwise.
The data on takeover is compiled from the information contained from the
publication: Mergers and Takeovers by Extel. The publication gives a broad
categorisation of takeovers in terms of whether resisted, successful or unsuccessful.
This allowed for a refined compilation of takeover figures. If a firm is successfully
taken over it disappears from the sample for the future years of the sample period.
117
4.4.4 Independent Variables
Independent variables used in the study can be classified in terms of three categories,
viz., financial ratios, attributes of corporate governance„ and refining or control
variables.
1. Financial Ratios
There is evidence from surveys of methods used by investment analysts that there is a
predominant focus on financial statement analysis or fundamental analysis in the
evaluation of firms for investment purposes (Arnold and Moizer, 1984; Pike,
Meerjanssen and Chadwick, 1993). An important constituent of financial statement
analysis is financial ratios analysis. Financial ratios by themselves cannot be the
complete basis for evaluating a firm's performance. The complex and multiple
attributes of the modern corporate environment cannot be summarised by these simple
ratios. The analysts who examine these ratios to assess firm performance and decide
on their investment strategy are well aware of the limited information content of these
ratios. These ratios are helpful in focusing the analysis on key aspects of firm
performance and in conjunction with other aspects of market information, give the
analysts useful clues to the appropriate questions about the firms prospects and past
performance. In this sense because of the universality of their information and
simplicity these financial ratios can be interpreted as local points'. The selection of
financial ratios for this analysis can be based on a number of considerations. Previous
studies have selected financial ratios on the basis of their prior usage in the relevant
literature. In the context of the present study we have used those ratios, which can be,
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best expected to reflect managerial effort. Given their interpretation as 'focal points'
another consideration in the choice of the variables has been their relative popularity
with financial analysts and practitioners. The two performance indicators or focal
points based on financial ratios used in the present study are:
Returns on capital employed (ROCE)
Returns on capital employed have been used as a performance measure.
Forms of this financial ratio have been used in earlier studies to reflect the short-term
profitability of the firm (Weisbach, 1988). The use of this measure supplements the
use of stock market data in explaining changes in top management. Stock prices
reflect the present discounted value of the expected future cash flows of the company.
As the stock prices will incorporate the possibility of a firing of a bad CEO or a board
it is logical to argue that the stock price of a firm with a bad CEO will be higher if the
CEO is likely to be fired as compared to a situation when the CEO has a lifetime
guarantee over the job. Thus in effect the stock prices by themselves will
underestimate the role of such a focal point in explaining corporate governance
changes. This is why it is worthwhile to use earnings data along with stock prices data
(ABNOR), to evaluate governance changes as a consequence of performance of the
firm.
Annual abnormal stock market returns (ABNOR)
Annual abnormal returns is defined as the performance of the share price over the past
one year relative to the market as a whole. This is the most popular of the performance
measures used in the assessment of managerial effort (Franks and Mayer 1996;
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Kaplan 1994a; Kaplan 1994b Kang and Shivdasani, 1995; Weisbach, 1988), the
understanding being that abnormal annual returns as opposed to annual returns will be
a key factor in the movement of funds between various investment possibilities. It can
be taken as the marginal value, which affects the investors' decisions in their effort to
maximise their wealth.
The accounting definitions for these ratios (ROCE and ABNOR) are provided in
Appendix 1 to this paper. The data has been collected from two databases
(i) DATASTREAM and
(ii) London Business School, Risk Measurement Service.
The latter is the source for the annual abnormal returns on stocks data. Two versions
of the above ratios have been used in the study. One version is a one year lag measure
and the other is a two year average of the one year lags. To get a better assessment of
managerial effort the financial ratios are formulated in terms of their levels and
changes in their levels and industry adjusted level measures. We have defined the
level measures in Appendix 1. We compute the performance indicators for level
changes by subtracting the performance as in equations 1 and 2, that is year (t-1), from
the performance indicators of the firm for year (t-2). It is possible that in the
managerial labour market, firms employ what they can afford and the cost of
managerial human capital is a reflection of its quality. As a consequence firms effect
governance changes only when their expectations are not met and not on the basis of
absolute considerations of performance or industry adjusted performance indicators.
Thus the managerial effort will be evaluated with respect to their own effort or with
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respect to the managerial capital that has been affordable by the firm in the past. To
account for industry related effects the values are also adjusted to the mean levels of
the financial ratios for the industry group at the four digit SIC level. In cases where a
particular SIC industry at 4 digits does not have at least 3 firms in the sample that
industry is merged with its three digit firms closest to its original 4 digit classification,
to compute the industry adjusted financial ratios. Thus the following versions of the
financial ratios with one year and two year lags are used in the study:
(a) Level measures
(b) Changes in level measures
(c) Industry adjusted level measures
2. Corporate Governance Variables
Two groups of variables are used in studies based on secondary data to denote
corporate governance characteristics. The two groups of variables are:
(a) Board characteristics; and
(b) Block shareholdings.
The governance characteristics have antecedents in the literature and have been
interpreted individually in studies on corporate governance. The role of the board is
seen as a forum where the representatives of the shareholders and the managers
interact. Different perspectives of the board of directors have been proposed (Zahra
and Pearce II; 1989). The role of the board is to reduce the problem of information
asymmetry in the monitoring of the management. The effectiveness with which this
function is carried out will depend on power relations in the board. In the studies
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based on secondary data the power relations and their consequent implications for the
monitoring role of the board is a function of board attributes like proportion of non-
executive directors on the board, separation of the posts of the CEO and Chairman,
etc.
In the present study we interpret the significance of the individual governance
characteristics in the context of corporate governance framework proposed in Chapter
3. Power relations for example, will acquire meaning in the context of the argument of
:
opportunistic behaviour by managers. A positive relationship between the percentage
of non-executive directors, with the departure of the CEO, or with the change in
directors is evidence of the relative power on the board. The corporate governance
characteristics used in the study are measured as follows:
(a) Board Characteristics
(i) The size of the board of directors as measured by the number of directors on the
board (TB)
(ii) The percentage of non-executive directors on the board (NED/TB)
(iii) A dummy which takes the value 1 if the posts of CEO and chairman are
combined, 0 otherwise.
(iv) The percentage of the shares held by the directors of the firm (DSH). A further
distinction is made with the help of dummies between firms having director's
shareholdings less than 5%, 15%, 30% and in excess of 30%.
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We make a distinction between who is also a CEO and a chairman who is an
executive chairman with a board member designated as a managing director (MD).
The MD is not the CEO in the UK context if there is an executive chairman in the
board. We account for this distinction in the duality variable. If the chairman is an
executive chairman and there is a MD on the board we treat the existence of an
executive chairman as a duality case (SP 1). If the chairman is a CEO we treat this as
the conventional duality case (SP2).
(b) Block Shareholdings
The block shareholdings or the institutional shareholdings are measured as the
percentage of ordinary shares in excess of 3% held by the investors other than
directors (ISH). The block shareholders are further distinguished by dummies in terms
of less than 15%, 30%, 45% and in excess of 45%.
The data on corporate governance variables is collected from the Stock Exchange
Directory published annually. Data was collected for the accounting years 1988-89 to
1994-95.
3. Control variables
Three control variables are used in the study. Similar control variables have been used
in some of the studies cited in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2 (e.g. see Shivdasani, 1993). Two
of these relate only to the Chief Executive Officer. The third relates to the effect of
size of the firnion governance changes. It is possible that governance changes in large
companies may be different from governance changes in smaller firms. This will
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suppress the effect of independent variables on governance changes. It is also possible
that CEOs of large corporations may not be dispensable, in line with the Penrosian
argument of a limited management pool available to manage large corporations. Age
has been associated with the standing of the Chief Executive in the firm and
hypothesised to reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement (Jensen and Murphy,
1990). The tenure of the CEO can also be interpreted to reflect the standing of the top
office in the firm.
The control variables are defined as:
(i)The age of the CEO starting from the sample observation period (AGE).
(ii) The number of years the incumbent CEO has been in job for each year of the
sample period (TEN);
(iii) The market capitalisation of the firm for each year of the sample period (MCAP).
The data on the first two variables were collected by contacting the individual firms
by telephone and requesting the information on their present/earlier CEO. Some gaps
in the compilation of CEO age remained. We tried to fill this gap by going through
publications like the Corporate Register and by consulting the annual reports of earlier
years. Still, we could not track down the age/tenure of 2-3% of the executives. For
these CEOs the average value of the AGE and TEN variables have been used. The
data on MCAP has been obtained from the London Business School, Risk
Measurement Service.
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4.5 Conclusion
The discussion in the previous sections we have specified the hypotheses and
discussed the estimation technique. The variables used in the study have also been
identified and the measures have been specified. For a summary of variables, see
appendix 2 of this chapter. In the next two chapters we discuss the panel data
estimates of the variables affecting corporate governance changes in the firms
belonging to manufacturing and authorised financial institutions sectors.
The empirical evaluation in its content is not very different from the conventional
analysis of corporate governance undertaken in the principal and agents literature.
However, the contribution of the empirical exercise is not limited to additional
evidence on corporate governance, for the case of the United Kingdom. Empirical
studies of corporate governance have largely evaluated structure performance
relationships. To quote a meta-analytic review of empirical studies on board
composition, leadership structure and financial performance:
As indicated in prior sections, we are not optimistic that further research in the general
areas of board composition/financial performance and board leadership
structure/financial performance would be fruitful. Also, the evidence would not seem
to provide much confidence in further examinations of the moderating influence of
those relationships. (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson, 1998; 284).
Further they conclude,
At the heart of the discussion and debate regarding suggested board composition
• configurations and board leadership structures is the view one adopts regarding
managerial motivations. (op cit:285)
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The examination of managerial motivations and the study of corporate governance as
a process is being suggested as the way forward in empirical studies. The
interpretation of the empirical findings in the context of the framework proposed in
Chapter 3 shows why the conduct of corporate governance and its implications for
managerial motivations is an important issue in corporate governance.
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Appendix 1 to Chapter 4	
,
Measures of Financial Ratios
Return on Capital Employed
This is item 707 in Datastream and is defined as the ratio of following items:
153 +157
322 + 309 — 344 — 928
Where,
153 = Total interest charges
157 = Pre-tax profits including associates
309 = Borrowings repayable within one year
322 = Sum of all non-current liabilities
344 = All intangibles like R&D intangibles etc.
928 = Future income tax benefits
Annual Abnormal Returns
This is the performance of the share over the past year relative to the market as a
whole. It is equal to the difference between the actual return on the share and the
percentage return available over the same period from an investment in a diversified
portfolio with the same beta. Where beta measures the sensitivity of the share to
market moves. A share with a beta of 1.0 tends to perform in line with the index and a
beta of 1.2 tends to change by 1.2 percent for each 1 percent move in the index.
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CHAPTER 5
,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN LARGE
MANUFACTURING FIRMS IN THE UK
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we discuss the panel data estimates of the hypotheses detailed above on
the factors affecting governance changes in large manufacturing firms in UK. The
assessment takes place in light of the earlier studies discussed in Chapter 2 and the
conceptual framework of the corporate governance structure proposed in Chapter 3.
The justification for the use of panel data techniques and the variable definitions has
been provided in Chapter 4. The major hypotheses to be evaluated in light of the
empirical estimates have been specified in section 4.2 of Chapter 4. The present
chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2 lists the steps involved in the
estimation process and the specification of the models to be estimated. In Sections 3
and 4 we discuss the data characteristics and evaluate the hypotheses in light of the
estimated models. Section 5 summarises the principal conclusions of the chapter.
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5.2 Estimation
Several alternatives have been suggested for the choice of econometric methodology
(Gerrard, 1995). In the textbook or the average economic regression approach
economic theory provides the specification of the deterministic component of the
econometric model to be estimated. Alternative variables and alternative functional
forms are tried to extend or correctly specify the initial model in general terms.
Econometrics is used to illustrate the theories derived independently. The modelling
strategy is described as specific-to-general as the initial model is extended. The other
modelling strategy is where economic theory and empirical evidence interact to arrive
at a good empirical way. The economic structure is not required to be fully
determined before starting the estimation. The theoretical framework is not precisely
identified and the econometric evaluation is an attempt to arrive at a more correct
picture of the economic structure. This econometric method is termed as the general to
the specific method. For the evaluation of corporate governance the use of the general
to the specific method is appropriate. There is a broad conception that board attributes
and corporate performance are related. Top management turnover with its associated
risks to managerial human capital will be related to corporate performance and board
structure. The selection of variables and their predicted signs is partly explained by
the conception of the board and its role in monitoring. The choice of variables is also
justified by the previous empirical work in this area. We have also experimented with
alternative functional forms. Most of the results are based on a linear form but we also
used a semilog polynomial form in some regression equations involving the CD and
the CED dependent variables.
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We estimate the following relationship to evaluate top management turnover
Top management turnover = (I)(Po Go CO +v i+ co t+ 4i,
Top management turnover is taken as either the annual turnover of all directors; or the
annual turnover of executive directors; CEO change and hostile takeover bid. Pft,
represents the financial performance measures. Git are the board attributes identified in
chapter 4. One of the board attributes, board size takes a log form. The choice is based
on the relative significance of the simple board size and the log of board size for the
management turnover variable. The results are the basis of empirical inferences
regarding the effect of board size for management turnover. The Director block
shareholdings are also included in the regression equation to reflect findings of their
effect on top management turnover in previous empirical work.' Finally C ft represents
the control variables (i.e. age of the CEO, tenure of the CEO and the market
capitalisation of the firm) of which sometimes the size variable is used in log form
depending upon its empirical significance. v i is the firm-specific error component or
sources of variation in governance changes that are specific to the firm. co, is the
period specific error component or time effects that reflect the impact of policy or
macroeconomic developments on governance changes over a period of time. Finally,
'These issues are examined further in the paragraphs below. The motivation behind splitting of the
sample on the basis of key governance characteristics and evaluation of the stability of the factors
explaining top management turnover is also motivated by the general to the specific methodology. For
example, the splitting of the sample on the basis of mean level of non-executive directors in the
complete sample is motivated by the understanding that greater proportion of non-executive directors
and the on the board should lead to greater monitoring and an increased sensitivity of top management
turnover to performance changes. Subsequently the suggestion has been made (backed up evidence
from previous empirical studies e.g. Weisbach, 1988) that monitoring levels by non-executive directors
can also be a function of the performance of the firm. These suggestions illustrate the validity of the
general to the specific econometric methodology and will be used to further refine the estimates of the
empirical work presented in this chapter.
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it is the pure error term. The equation is estimated using panel data techniques
discussed in Chapter 4.
Four forms of governance changes have been evaluated for their dependence on
financial performance and corporate governance variables. In addition, control
variables have been used to refine the sensitivity of the estimated relationships. The
format for reporting the results will be the same for all the four forms of governance
changes. For each of the dependent variables we report the full model incorporating
all the variables. The only choice here is between the log and the absolute form of two
of the independent variables; MCAP (market capitalisation as a measure of size) and
TB (board size). This choice is made on the basis of the relative significance of the t-
values and the overall fit of the estimated equations. If the log value is preferred then
it indicates a convex relationship between the dependent variable and the MCAP and
TB variable(s). For example a negative relationship between governance change and
Log of TB suggests that governance changes change at a decreasing rate as the Board
size increases.
In the case of the director's and institutional block shareholdings, we use continuous
measures of the shareholding and the square of the block shareholdings. The square of
block shareholdings has been used as it was noted that when the block shareholdings
were disaggregated by using dummies for various percentages of block shareholdings
there were instances of sign reversal in their impact on governance changes. These
sign reversals .
 are consistently present in some governance changes and are at times
significant.
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In order to understand the impact of the DSH and ISH variables at a disaggregated
level and the financial performance indicators, we report F,tests or Wald tests to
assess the significance of these variables for governance changes. Directors and
institutional block shareholdings have been further disaggregated into four groups as
described in Chapter 4 Section 4.4.4. The F Tests or the Wald tests have also been
reported for six sets of financial performance variables. In addition elasticity estimates
have been used to indicate the quantitative impact on governance changes as reflected
by the CD and CED variables.
The discussion of the complete sample is supplemented by estimates on subsamples.
From table 2.2 we observe previous studies have reported significant interaction
effects of the independent variables on top management turnover. For example,
Weisbach (1988) found that performance measures were more highly correlated with
CEO turnover in outsider dominated boards. We account for these interaction effects
in a more general form across all the variables included in the study by splitting the
sample on the basis of key governance characteristics that have been found to
significantly affect top management turnover. The motivation behind the splitting up
of the complete sample into subsamples has been the debate on corporate governance.
The individual subsample estimates are not reported but characteristic differences
between subsample estimates and the complete sample estimates have been
incorporated in the discussion on individual governance change variables. The
subsample estimates have been carried out in the case of the CD, CED and the CEO
governance change variables, in the same format as in the complete sample case. In
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the case of hostile takeovers we do not report subsample estimates, as the instances of
hostile takeovers in individual subsamples are often too low to allow for meaningful
interpretation of the estimated results. Thus the complete sample has been split up on
the basis of the following characteristics:
1. CEO Duality
2. Change in CEO
3. Above and below complete sample mean directors block shareholdings
4. Above and below complete sample mean institutional block shareholdings
5. Above and below complete sample mean market capitalisation
6. Above and below complete sample mean non-executive directors on the board
7. Whether the firm has been the subject of a hostile takeover.
A complete table of variable definitions is provided in Appendix 2 of Chapter 4. For
binary dependent variables CEO and TO logit/probit estimation incorporating panel
data have been carried out. In the case of CEO and TO the independent variable
CEOCH is dropped and two control variables AGE (age) and TEN (tenure) have been
incorporated in the equation. The CEOCH dummy is relevant for the turnover of the
board as it is possible that board turnover may be significantly related to CEO
changes. The AGE and TEN variable are only relevant for the CEO dependent
variable as they measure the age and the tenure of the incumbent CEO respectively.
The models were estimated using LIMDEP econometric software. The program
output for CD and CED gives estimates of the group effects and the period effects for
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the fixed effects, and the random effects, models. Group effects relate to the firm
specific effects and the period effects relate to the variations over the period of the
sample. A number of test statistics for choosing the appropriate, model and diagnostic
checks for individual coefficients and the explanatory power of the estimated equation
and the size of the group and period effects are also provided as part of the program
output. The Likelihood Ratio Test and the F-Test statistics allows us to choose
between a two factor model incorporating group and period effects and a one way
factor model incorporating group effects only. Similarly, the Likelihood Ratio Test
and the F-Test statistics show whether the group effects are significant in the models
with dependent variables CD and CED. We also have available R 2 values for the
various variable groups. The choice between random effects and fixed effects model is
made with the help of the LM and the Hausman test statistics. A number of statistical
tests are used for deciding on the appropriate model and also for assessing the role of
the group effects and the other variables in explaining governance changes. In
addition the t statistics allow for the selection of significant variables.
In the case of the dichotomous variables CEO and TO, the choice between probit and
logit models is based on a priori considerations for estimating the random effects or
the fixed effects models respectively. This has been discussed in Chapter 4. For the
dichotomous variables existence of significant group affects is determined with the
help of Hausman test statistics.
The variables CD and CED are bounded between 0- 100 %. It is possible that the
predicted values from our assumed linear relationships are not bounded between 0 and
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100. Linearity may be a local approximation of what might be a very non-linear
relationship. An examination of the predicted values shows that only 13 predicted
values of CD and 24 predicted values of CED are below 0 out of 1200 observations
and none exceed the boundary limit of 100. Thus the assumed linearity although
theoretically a problem is not a practical problem of any significance. We feel
justified in imposing the specification of a linear form. 2
5.3 Data Characteristics
Table 5.1A gives the basic characteristics of the sample firms. The average turnover
of all directors and executive directors is 13.55% and 14.58% respectively. The mean
ROCE of the firms is 19.3%. The sample companies on average performed better (a
positive ABNOR) than other firms in the same group. The average size of the board in
the sample is 7.35. The average percentage of non-executive directors is 38.69%. The
mean insider block shareholdings (in excess of 3%) stood at 9.17%. The mean
institutional block share holding (in excess of 3%) was 28.8%. In 59 % of the cases
the chairman was also an executive member of the board. In 36% of the cases the
CEO was also the chairman of the board. The average tenure of the CEO was 7.90
years and the average age was 53.13 years. Table 5.1B shows the distribution of firms
each year.
2 Eeconometric texts (e.g. Studensmund 1997) suggest the assigning of the boundary extreme values (0
and 100) to all estimated values below the 0 and above the value of 100, respectively. The signs and
general significance of the estimated values remain unaffected by the unboundedness of the estimated
(forecast) values.
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Table 5.1B
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
YEAR WISE DISTRIBUTION OF NUMBER OF FIRMS
YEAR NUMBER OF FIRMS
1989 218
1990 218
1991 203
1992 193
1993 187
1994 181
TOTAL 1200
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Table 5.2 gives the correlation matrix of the variables used in the study. The
characteristics of the data set are interpreted in conjunction with the t tables for the
independence of means of the various subsamples drawn from the complete sample.
The t tables are reported in the Appendix of the thesis. Some preliminary inferences
that can be drawn about the complete data set from the correlation matrix are detailed
below. Changes in CEO and turnover of executive and all directors are significantly
correlated. Executive chairmen and CEOs also functioning as chairmen are less likely
to be replaced. The proportion of non-executive directors and CEO, CD and CED are
positively and significantly correlated. This gives substance to the argument that non-
executive directors are an important influence on bringing about governance changes.
Tenure of the CEO has a negative and significant association with changes in
executive and all directors. This reinforces the perception that the top management's
association with the company is contingent upon the continuation of the incumbent
CEO. Larger boards have significantly more non-executive directors on them and they
are less likely to have a CEO and the chairman as the same person. These CEOs are
significantly younger and have a longer tenure. Boards with larger directors' or
insider block shareholdings have smaller boards with smaller percentages of non-
executive directors. Large values of insider block shareholdings appear to have a
disincentive effect on institutional shareholdings. Non-executive directors are
positively and significantly associated with institutional shareholdings. Institutional
shareholdings are positively associated with positive abnormal returns and negatively
associated with returns on capital employed. There is also an inverse association
between institutional shareholdings and the chairman being an executive director of
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the board or the CEO also being the chairman of the board. Returns on capital
employed have a delayed positive association to abnormal returns. Only 2-year
moving averages show a significant and positive association with abnormal returns.
Com_parison of independence of means of subsamples
The tables reporting the t values testing for independence of means are reported in the
appendix at the end of the thesis.
When we split the sample into two subsamples one comprising firms which
experienced a change in the CEO during the sample period and the other comprising
firms which did not undergo a change in the CEO, we find that the t values of the
means of the two subsamples differ in a number of ways. Firms, which witnessed a
change in CEO, had a significantly higher turnover of executive directors and all
directors. They had smaller boards and a larger percentage of non-executive directors.
Firms associated with a CEO change had a lower mean of director block
shareholdings but a significantly higher mean value of institutional block
shareholdings. There was a significantly lower likelihood of the CEOs holding dual
positions, with the CEOs being younger and with a shorter tenure in the subsample of
firms experiencing a change in the CEO. Firms, which witnessed a change in CEO,
had a significantly lower level of performance as interpreted in terms of most of the
performance indicators used in the study.
On comparing the subsample of firms subject to a hostile takeover with the subsample
of firms not subject to a hostile takeover we find that CEOs holding dual positions on
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the board are less likely to be the targets of hostile bids. However, firms subject to a
hostile bid have significantly lower mean values of ROCE and current, industry
adjusted and two year moving averages of ABNOR.
Subsamples of firms having greater and lesser than the average value of market
capitalisation for the complete sample differ in a number of respects. Firms with
above market capitalisation have significantly larger boards. They also have
significantly lower levels of directors and institutional block shareholdings. When we
disssaggregate these shareholdings into block shareholdings we find that while
directors block shareholdings upto 5% are significantly and positively associated with
above market capitalisation the same are negative and significant beyond 5% block
shareholdings. In the case of institutional shareholdings, size, as measured by MCAP,
has a positive and significant association with above average market capitalisation at
15% and 30% block levels but the association becomes significantly negative at levels
of 45% and beyond. The CEOs of above average market capitalisation firms are older,
have a shorter tenure and are more likely not to hold dual positions of CEO and
chairman of the board. The larger than average market capitalisation firms are also
likely to have significantly above average ROCE, DROCE and DAROCE (returns on
capital employed measures). Only in the case of DABNOR or the industry adjusted
abnormal returns do they seem to perform better than firms with market capitalisation
below the mean of the complete sample.
On comparing the subsamples of above and below average block shareholdings of
directors we find that firms with above average directors shareholdings are less likely
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to replace their CEO. These CEOs have longer tenures and the turnover of executive
directors will be significantly less. They also have significantly smaller boards with
lower percentage of non-executive directors. Institutional blockshareholdings are also
significantly less for firms having above average block shareholdings. Such firms are
significantly more likely to have chairmen who are either executive chairmen or who
are also the chief executive officers of the company. Firms with above average
directors' shareholdings are significantly smaller. There is no significant difference in
the financial performance indicators between the two subsamples of firms.
When we split the sample of firms on the criterion of CEO duality we find that when
Chairmen are either executive chairmen or are CEOs. the two subsamples are different
in a number of respects. Duality in the top position on the Board has been the subject
of much interest in the literature (Boyd, 1995; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). Duality has
been associated with better performance as it gives the firm a clear direction and other
positive leadership attributes (Cochran Wood and Jones, 1985; Vance, 1964).
However, duality has also been associated with ineffective governance and hostile
takeovers (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988b). We find evidence in support of both
these perceptions on CEO duality. Boards characterised by CEO duality are less likely
to replace their CEO and have a lower turnover of executive directors. They also have
significantly smaller boards and a smaller proportion of non-executive directors.
Director block shareholdings are positively and significantly associated with CEO
duality. Institutional block shareholdings are inversely and significantly associated
with CEO duality. Chairmen who are also CEOs are significantly older, and have a
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longer tenure. Such firms are also significantly smaller. Performance measures based
on ROCE are significantly higher for firms with boards characterised by CEO duality.
When we compare boards with above average and below average proportions of non-
executive directors we find that boards with above average non-executive directors
have a significantly higher executive directors turnover. Such boards are significantly
larger, have a smaller percentage of director block shareholdings but a larger mean
value of institutional block shareholdings. On boards with above average percentage
of non-executive directors the instances of CEO duality, that is CEOs being chairmen
or executive members of the board are significantly less. Above average
representation of non-executive directors will be positively associated with market
capitalisation. However, there is no consistently significant difference between the
two subsamples in terms of various performance indicators.
Finally, we compare the subsamples of firms having greater and less than average
institutional block shareholdings. Firms with greater than average institutional block
shareholdings are more likely to replace their CEO, and are less likely to be taken
over. They also had significantly smaller boards and a smaller mean value of
directors' shareholdings. The CEOs of firms with greater than average institutional
block shareholdings are less likely to hold dual positions, they are younger and have a
significantly shorter tenure. Various performance measures based on ROCE, viz.,
DROCE, DAROCE and AROCE are significantly lower for firms with greater than
average institutional shareholdings.
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5.4 Discussion of the Estimates
Eight different equations have been estimated for each of the dependent variables. The
first six equations incorporate various formulations of the two performance indicators.
The corporate governance characteristics remain the same in the six equations. In the
first equation the performance variables are for one year prior to the year in which the
corporate governance characteristics and governance changes are measured. The
understanding being that governance changes are effected with a one year lag and
corporate governance attributes affect governance changes contemporaneously. In the
second equation the performance variables are 2-year moving averages of
performance indicators with 1-year lags. The understanding being that governance
changes might also be the result of assessment of managerial effort over a longer
period. Equations three and four define performance indicators as in the first two
equations but the values are adjusted by subtracting the mean performance of the
group to which the individual firms belong from the firm performance indicators.
Thus they reflect industry-adjusted levels of performance. Similarly, for the fifth and
sixth equations we compute the performance indicators by subtracting the
performance as in the first two equations, that is year (t-1), from the performance
indicators of the firm for year (t-2). It is possible that in the managerial labour market,
firms employ what they can afford and the cost of managerial human capital is a
reflection of its quality. As a consequence firms effect governance changes only when
their expectations are not met and not on the basis of absolute considerations of
performance or industry adjusted performance indicators. Thus the managerial effort
will be evaluated with respect to their own effort or with respect to the managerial
capital that has been affordable by the firm in the past. For equations 2 to 6 we report
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only the F or the Wald statistics testing the significance of the two performance
variables in each equation. We report the full equation estimates for equations 1 only.
When we disaggregate the block shareholdings for the directors and the institutional
shareholders, using dummies for various levels of block shareholdings, observed
instances of sign reversal in the t statistics testing for independence of means. We test
the significance of these block shareholdings at levels of block shareholdings defined
in Chapter 4 by estimating equations seven and eight. The performance measures used
are as in equation 1 and 2. The estimates give us an idea of the significance of block
shareholdings in effecting governance changes. We report the F or the Wald statistics
to assess the significance of these dummies.
Turnover of all Directors (CD)
Table 5.3 to 5.6 relates to the annual turnover of all directors (CD). From Table 5.4
we observe that changes in all directors are significantly and negatively dependent on
financial performance. The F tests for the combined significance of financial
performance indicators are significant. However, the partial elasticities as shown in
Table 5.4 are extremely low. Thus the performance indicators matter but play a very
small role in explaining the turnover of all directors. In the subsample estimates there
are some interesting results. For the firms in which the CEO changed during the
sample period the F statistics for performance indicators ROCE and ABNOR;
DROCE and DABNOR are not significant at 10%, in explaining the changes in all the
directors. The F values were also not significant at 10%, for the majority of the
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TABLE 5.3
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
Independent variables Variables affecting percentage change in
all directors (Fixed Effects)
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year (t-1) 	 -0.0892
(-1.573)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1) 	 -0.0273*
(-2.423)
Change in CEOin year (t-I) and (t-2) 	 8.8056**
(6.745)
Log of Board Size	 -62.183**
(-8.962)
Non-executive directors (%)	 0.0126
(0.252)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 0.6442**
(3.721)
Square of directors block shareholdings (°/0)	 -0.0070**
(-2.634)
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 0.0450
(-0.500)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%)
	
0.0009
(0.730)
Log of market capitalisation 	 -5.1878f
(-2.184)
Executive chairman	 0.0010
(0.00)
Chairman is CEO
	
-2.0456
(-0.1169)
R 2 0.35
F Test 2.29**
[d.f.] (229,970)
Test Statistics R2
Group Effects only (2) 0.23
X- Variables only(3) 0.22
X & Group Effects only(4) 0.34
X, Group & Time Effects only(5) 0.35
Hypotheses Tests F Test
Group Effects 1.79**
(d.f. =217) (217,2.93)
Time Effects 1.42
(d.f. =217) (5,969)
Random Effects Model
LM Vs. (3) 0.34
(d.f=1) 0.56
Fixed Vs. Random Effects (Hausman) 66.40**
(d.f.) (12)
Number of Firms 218
Number of observations 1200
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; t p< 0.10;
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TABLE 5.5
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of director block shareholdings for the
annual turnover of all directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	 -13.539**
(-3.973)
-10.071**
(-2.724)
_. 30% > 15%	 -6.877t
(-1.902)
> 30 %	 -3.2280
(-0.811)
F Test 4.30**
D.F. (4, 967)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p <0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; Ip< 0.10;
TABLE 5.6
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for the annual
turnover of all directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS
 15%	 15.580t
(22019)
 30%> 15 %	 15.902t
(2.073)
 45% > 30%	 17.721t
(2.301)
>45%	 18..921*
(2.420)
F Test 2.18/
D.F. (4, 967)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
performance indicators in the estimates of the subsamples having above average
institutional shareholdings and below average level of non-executive directors. In the
subsample estimates the performance indicators reflecting the change in 'own'
performance viz., OROCE, OABNOR OAROCE, OAABNOR, do not emerge as
significant factors (F values not significant at 10%), explaining governance changes as
measured by CD in subsamples where: (i) there is no CEO duality; (ii) there has been
a change in the CEO during the sample period; (iii) the mean level of institutional
shareholding is less than the mean of the complete sample; (iv) the mean level of
director shareholding is greater than the mean of the complete sample; and finally, (v)
where the mean proportion of non-executive directors on the Board is less than the
sample mean.
CD is significantly and inversely related to changes in Board size measured by Log of
TB. We tested both Log of TB and TB and chose Log of TB. Both the coefficient and
the t value for Log of TB were higher suggesting a decline in turnover at a decreasing
rate with the increase in board size. The elasticity measure of - 4.5891 suggests a
significant negative impact on CD of Log of TB. This is consistent with the
understanding of the literature that larger boards become dysfunctional and are easier
to control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). This relationship between
changes in all directors and Log of TB continues to have validity for all subsample
estimates.
The influence of directors block shareholdings (DSH) on changes in all directors is
interesting. We also take the square of the DSH, DSHSQ as we had some indications
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of sign reversal from the dummy variables used for various levels of DSH. We find
both DSH and DSHSQ to be significant CD is positively influenced by the DSH
variable. DSHSQ has an inverse influence with CD changes thus indicating that at
higher levels of DSH the influence of DSH on CD changes to an inverse relationship.
In the subsample estimates the relationship between DSH and CD is significant and
positive in all the subsamples except in the case of those firms which were not subject
to a hostile bid during the sample period. When DSH is disaggregated into various
levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX ) we find that DSH5, DSH15, DSH30
significantly and negatively influences changes in all directors. The F value testing for
the significance of all these levels of DSH on CD is significant. The evidence is
supports the hypotheses on the role of inside directors and the block shareholdings by
Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983) and Rosenstein and Wyatt
(1997). At higher levels the interests of the block shareholdings support the
entrenchment of directors. The confusing evidence of disaggregated block
shareholdings of directors suggests that the levels of disaggregation are arbitrary and
do not capture the overall tendencies in the data.
Institutional block shareholdings (ISH) have no significant influence on CD in either
the complete sample estimates or in any of the subsample estimates. However, when
we disaggregate the ISH variable in terms of levels of block shareholdings (ISH15,
ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX) we find that the disaggregated levels of ISH have a
significant and positive impact on the turnover of all directors. The F statistics
measuring for the impact of these variables on the CD variable is also significant at
10%. SP1 (Chairman is an Executive Chairman) or SP2 (Chairman is also the CEO)
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do not have a significant effect on the annual turnover of all directors. However, in the
estimates in the subsample where the CEO has changed during the sample period, the
variable SP2 has a significant and inverse impact on changes in the CD variable. The
size of the firm as measured by the Log of market capitalisation (MCAP) is
significant and inversely influences changes in the CD. CEOCH or the dummy
variable associated with change in the CEO is an important influence on the turnover
of all directors. Board changes are more closely aligned with CEO changes than any
other variable used in the study.
We have evaluated the significance of individual variables. This provides us with the
basis for the evaluation of the hypotheses proposed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4. From
Table 5.3 we find that financial performance indicators are important in explaining the
turnover of all directors. However, the partial elasticity measures are extremely low.
This provides evidence in support of hypotheses 1 and 2. Hypothesis 1 states that top
management turnover will be inversely related to financial performance indicators and
more specifically financial performance indicators.
Institutional shareholdings measured as a continuous variable ISH and ISHSQ do not
influence CD significantly. However, at the disaggregated level ISH has a significant
and positive influence in effecting turnover of all directors as measured by CD.
LOGTB has a significant and negative influence on CD. As cited above, the literature
suggests that larger boards are dysfunctional and monitor the incumbent management
less effectively (Jensen, 1993). Thus weaker boards, reflecting a poorer ability and
willingness to monitor the incumbent management have an inverse relationship with
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the turnover of all directors. Thus we have evidence in support of hypothesis 3B and
limited evidence in support of hypothesis 3D that state top management turnover will
be inversely related to board size and positively related institutional block
shareholdings respectively. We do not find evidence in support of 3A and hypothesis
3C that predict that top management turnover will be inversely related to board
duality and positively related to the proportion of non-executive directors
respectively.
Tables 5.3 and 5.5 provide evidence on the role of directors block shareholdings. The
o
evidence on DSH and DSHSQ is not straightforward to interpret. The disaggregated
levels of block shareholdings show an inverse and significant relationship between
CD changes and directors block shareholdings. However, DSH has a positive and
significant impact on CD. Thus block shareholders among directors will monitor the
management. Thus there is mixed evidence in support of hypothesis 4 which states
top management turnover will be positively related to the size of director block
shareholdings.
The significance of the CEOCH variable shows that board changes are closely related
to CEO changes. This can be either interpreted as an expression of collective
responsibility or that all power is derived from the CEO. The size of the CEOCH
coefficient reflects on the poor accountability in governance change. The size of the
group effects shows the extent of the unexplained but systematic variation in control
changes. We • also find that the group effects, or firm-specific influences, are
marginally larger than the financial performance and governance characteristics taken
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together, in explaining the turnover of all directors as measured by CD. Group effects
inter alia, reflect unobservable firm specific information.
Turnover of Executive Directors (CED)
The estimates for the dependent variable CED, i.e., the turnover in executive directors
are presented in Tables 5.7 to 5.12. The results are broadly similar to the CD variable.
As in the case of the CD variable changes in executive directors are significantly
influenced by financial performance. The F tests for the combined significance of
financial performance indicators are significant for all the performance indicators,
From Table 5.8 it can be seen that as in the case of CD, the partial elasticities are
extremely low. The performance indicators are significant but have a small impact on
the turnover of executive directors. In the subsample estimates the subsample of firms
in which the CEO changed during the sample period the F statistics for performance
indicators ROCE and ABNOR DROCE and DABNOR are not significant at 10% in
explaining the changes in executive directors. The F values are also not significant at
10% for most of the performance indicators in the estimates of the subsamples having
above average institutional shareholdings and below average level of non-executive
directors. The performance indicators do not emerge as significant (F values not
significant at 10%), in explaining governance changes as measured by CED in
subsamples where (i) there is no CEO duality (ii) there has been a change in the CEO
during the sample period and (iii) where the mean proportion of non-executive
directors on the Board is less than the whole sample mean.
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As in the case of the CD variable CED is inversely related to the Log of Board size
(TB). Log of TB is preferred over TB as a measure of board size as the coefficient and
the t value for Log of TB were higher suggesting a decline in turnover at a decreasing
rate with an increase in board size. The significant and negative impact on CED of the
Log of TB measured by the elasticity of board size —3.7871 is consistent with the
understanding that larger boards become dysfunctional and are easier to control
(Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993). The subsample estimates also show similar
results for Log of TB.
Directors block shareholdings (DSH) has positive and significant on turnover of
executive directors. DSHSQ is also significant however, DSHSQ has an inverse and
significant association with CED turnover thus indicating that at higher levels of DSH
the influence of DSH on CED changes to an inverse relationship. The positive and
significant effect of DSH for lower values of DSH suggests monitoring of incumbent
management by directors. In the subsample estimates the relationship between DSH
and CED is significant and positive in a majority of the subsamples. However, DSH
does not have a significant influence on CED in the subsamples without CEO duality,
the firm has not been subject to a hostile takeover bid and where the subsample mean
of non-executive directors on the Board is less than the mean of the complete sample.
On disaggregating DSH into various levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX)
only DSH5 emerges as significant and has a negative influence on the turnover of
executive directors. The F value testing for the significance of these levels of DSH on
CED is not significant in the subsample estimates.
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As in the case of the CD variable, institutional block shareholdings (ISH) is not
significant in explaining changes in CED in neither the complete sample estimates nor
in any of the subsample estimates. On disaggregating the ISH variable in terms of
levels of block shareholdings (ISH15, ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX) we find that the
disaggregated levels of ISH15, ISH30 and ISH45 is a significant and has a positive
influence on the turnover of executive directors. The F statistics measuring for the
impact of these variables on the CED variable, unlike in the case of the CD variable
is, not significant. SP1 (Chairman is an Executive Chairman) has a significant and
negative influence on CED. However, SP2 (Chairman is also the CEO) does not have
a significant role in explaining the turnover of executive directors. In the estimates
based on the subsamples we find that SP1 has consistent negative influence on
changes in executive directors except in the subsample of firms which have not been
the subject of a hostile bid. SP2 fails to emerge as significant in any of the subsample
estimates.
The size of the firm as measured by the Log of market capitalisation (MCAP) is not
significant in its influence on CED. The absence of a significant influence of the size
variable on the turnover of executive directors suggests that the influence of MCAP
on CD is more likely a consequence of board composition. Larger firms have
significantly larger boards and also a larger percentage of non-executive directors on
the Board. Hence it is possible that there will be a significant inverse relationship
between CD and MCAP but not between CED and MCAP. As in the case of the
turnover of all directors, the CEOCH or the dummy variable associated with change in
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I ABLE 5.7
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
Independent variables Variables affecting percentage change in all
directors (Fixed Effects)
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year
	
-0.16859t
(t-1)
	
-- (-2.253)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1)
	
-0.0352*
(-2.562)
Change in CEOin year (t-1) and (t-2)
	
14.312**
(6.964)
Log of Board Size	 -55.217**
(-6.552)
Non-executive directors (/0) 	 0.28845**
(4.608)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 0.61473**
(2.886)
Square of directors block shareholdings (°/0) 	 -0.0074**
(-2.272)
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 0.0440
(0.343)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%)	 -0.0010
(-0.648)
Log of market capitalisation	 -3.4675
(-1.094)
Executive chairman	 -6.205 it
(-2.271)
Chairman is CEO	 --0.9015
(-0.412)
Constant
	
57.10**
(5.613)
122 0.37
F Test 2.48**
[di.] (235,964)
Test Statistics R2
Group Effects only (2) 0.22
X- Variables only(3) 0.18
X & Group Effects only(4) 0.36
X, Group & Time Effects only(5) 0.38
Hypotheses Tests F Test
4 Vs. (3) 1.10
(d.f. =217) (217,973)
5 Vs. (4) 3.27**
(d.f. =217) (5,967)
Random Effects Model
LM Vs. (3) 5.13
(d.f.= 1) (2)
0.07
Fixed Vs. random Effects (Hausman) 56.76**
(d.f.) (12)
Number of Firms 218
Number of observations 1200
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; :p< 0.10;
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TABLE 5.9
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of director block shareholdings for annual turnover of
executive directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	 -7.0613:
(-1.691)
-3.562
(-0.808)
 30%> 15%	 -0.9575
(-0.217)
> 30 %	 1.2620
(0.260)
F Test 1.17
D.F. (4.962)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; .1p< 0.10;
TABLE 5.10
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for annual
turnover of executive directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 15%	 15.341:
(1.612)
 30% > 15 %	 15.93P
(1.698)
 45%> 30%	 16.066:
(1.710)
>45%	 18.082
(1.898
F Test 1.04
D.F. (4,962)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; :p< 0.10;
-Table 5.11
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
YEAR WISE DISTRIBUTION OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
YEAR NEDTB
1989 35.44
1990 35.68
1991 38.02
1992 39.85
1993 41.45
1994 42.81
Table 5.12
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
YEARWISE DISTRIBUTION OF DUAL APPOINTMENTS
YEAR SP1 SP2
1989 141 86
1990 140 86
1991 122 81
1992 109 66
1993 101 60
1994 94 52
the CEO is an important influence on the turnover of executive directors. Board
changes thus are more closely aligned with CEO changes. This result is valid for all
the subsample estimates.
The proportion of non-executive directors on the Board (NEDTB) has a positive and
significant influence on the turnover of all executive directors (partial elasticity
0.7654). The direction of the influence and significance is consistent for all the
subsample estimates except for the subsample estimate where the mean NEDTB is
less than the mean NEDTB of the complete sample. The significance of the NEDTB
in explaining the turnover of executive directors suggests that non-executive directors
are a countervailing influence on the power of the incumbent management. The
countervailing influence of the non-executive directors can be the result of their
human capital concerns or an outcome of the incentive effects of director block
shareholdings (Weisbach, 1988; Jensen, 1993).
In Table 5.8 we observe a consistently negative association between financial
performance indicators or focal points and CED. The significance of stock market
indicators based on ABNOR (or abnormal returns) is consistently negative and
significant (except OABNOR). Thus Hypothesis 1 is substantiated by evidence
presented in Table 5.8. However, the partial elasticities of both performance indicators
are quite low. These focal points are inversely related to governance changes but their
impact on governance changes is quite small. This is evidence in support of
Hypothesis 2. The evidence on DSH is stronger and consistent in comparison to the
CD variable. DSH has a positive and significant influence on the turnover of all
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directors. At the disaggregated level only DSH5 is significant and has a negative
influence on CED. This is evidence in support of hypothesis 4.
Institutional shareholdings measured as a continuous variable ISH and ISHSQ do not
influence CED significantly. However, at the disaggregated level ISH has a
significant and positive influence in effecting turnover of executive directors as
measured by CED. LOGTB has a significant and negative influence on CED. As cited
above the literature suggests that larger boards are dysfunctional and monitor the
incumbent management less effectively (Yermack, 1996). Thus weaker boards
reflecting a poorer ability and willingness to monitor the incumbent management have
a lower turnover of executive directors. The significance of the CEOCH suggests that
the continuation of the incumbent CEO is the important explanatory variable in
explaining turnover of executive directors.
Further insights into the nature of the power relationships within the Board are
possible from the evaluation of the turnover of executive directors. The presence of a
chairman who is an executive chairman significantly reduces the turnover of executive
directors. We do not find the traditional conception of CEO duality where the
Chairman is also the CEO, to have any impact on the turnover of executive directors.
The proportion of non-executive directors on the Board has also been found to have a
positive and significant influence on the turnover of executive directors. Thus they are
a countervailing influence on the power of the incumbent management.
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In the case of the CED variable we find evidence in support of hypothesis 3B, 3C and
limited evidence in support of 3A and 3D. As in the case of the CD variable Table 5.7
shows that the group effects or firm-specific influences, are larger than the financial
performance and governance characteristics taken together, in explaining the turnover
of executive directors (CED).
The panel data analysis of turnover of executive directors displays significant time
effects. That is the explanatory variables have a significant differential impact on the
dependent variable CED over the sample period. The Cadbury Committee on
corporate governance submitted its report in 1992. As shown in Tables 5.11 and 5.12
we observe a decline in SP1 and SP2 and a rise in the proportion of non-executive
directors across the years. This can be a possible explanation for the significant
time/period effects in the estimates. The significant period effects are found in all the
subsample estimates except for the subsample of firms where the CEO did not change
during the sample period and for the subsample of firms having non-executive
directors less than the mean value of NEDTB for the complete sample.
Change in CEO (CEO) 
The size and significance of the CEOCH coefficient shows that the CEO is the crucial
governance change variable in the corporate governance of firms. The estimates using
the dependent variable CEO, i.e., the change in the CEO, are presented in Tables 5.13
to 5.17. The findings are broadly consistent with previous studies on the likelihood of
CEO replacement (Conyon, 1998; Cosh and Hughes, 1997). We find statistically
significant evidence that stock prices react favourably to announcement of CEO
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TABLE 5.13
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Likelihood of CEO change
Logit Fixed Effects; All variables
Independent variables All Variables
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year 	 0.0045
(t-1)	 (0.330)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t- 	
-0.0032
1)	 (1.175)
Log of Board Size	
-4.7010"
(2.719)
Non-executive directors (%)	 0.0086
(0.714)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 0.1098t
(2.324)
Square of directors block shareholdings (%) 	
-0.00009
(-1.244)
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 0.0118
(0.504)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	
-0.00019
(-0.587)
Log of market capitalisation 	
-0.8036
(-1.392)
Executive chairman	
-2.2436"
(-3.877)
Chairman is CEO	
-0.4906
(-1.194)
Age of CEO	
-0.0247
(-0.629)
Number of years as CEO
	 -0.0225
(-0.487)
LL -156.23
HAUSMAN 15.16
Number of Firms 218
Number of observations 1200
t-values are in parentheses
** p <0.0001 ; * p <0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
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TABLE 5.16
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of directors block shareholdings for the likelihood
of CEO change
Dependent variable:: Change in CEO
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	
-0.87344
(-1.114)
. 15%> 5 %
	
0.66916
(0.731)
 30% > 15%	 -0.04294
(-0.046)
> 30 %	 1.9061
(1.441)
Wald 8.321
(4)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; :p< 0.10;
•	 TABLE 5.17
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for likelihood of
CEO change
Dependent variable:: Change in CEO
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 15%	 11.589
(0.065)
 30% > 15 %	 11.903
(0.067)
. 45% > 30%	 11.636
(0.066)
>45%
	 12.009
(0.068)
Wald 1.58
(4) (0.81)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; :p< 0.10;
replacement. However, we do not find that non-executive directors increase the
likelihood of CEO change. In the full regression model, reported in Table 5.13,
changes in CEO are not significantly dependent on the financial performance
indicators. Wald tests for the significance of financial performance indicators are
however, significant for AROCE, AABNOR, DAROCE and DAABNOR, OAROCE
and OAABNOR. As shown in Table 5.15 the logit fixed effects estimates using these
performance indicators suggests that the likelihood of CEO replacement increase if
these performance indicators show a downward movement. The marginal effects of
these performance indicators on the CEO change cannot be computed in the fixed
effect logit estimates (Greene, 1997). In the subsample estimates there are some
interesting results. In the subsample of firms in which the mean director block
shareholdings is less than the mean of the complete sample the Wald statistics for
performance indicators AROCE and AABNOR; DAROCE and DAABNOR are
significant at 10% in explaining the changes in CEO. The Wald statistics were not
significant at 10% for the majority of the performance indicators in the estimates of
the other subsamples. Table 5.15 evaluates the ability of the governance structure to
replace poorly performing CEOs with better CEOs. In Table 5.15 we compare the
financial performance means 1-year before, 1-year after and 2-year after CEO change
with the performance means of the year of the CEO change. The firms, which
underwent a change in CEO, were having a significantly higher ROCE, DROCE and
OROCE means (t- values significant at 5 %). and a significantly higher AROCE,
DAROCE and OAROCE mean values (t-values significant at 10%). in the year prior
to the replacement of the CEO. Thus the punishment for bad performance in the
current year was swift. The stock market reacted favourably to these CEO
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replacements. Mean values of stock market performance indicators, viz., ABNOR,
DABNOR, and OABNOR were significantly higher at 5% in the year following
replacement. In the second year following replacement of the CEO, the stock market
continued to respond favourably with AABNOR and OAABNOR continuing to be
significantly higher in comparison to their corresponding values in the year of the
CEO change. OROCE was also higher at 5 % in the year 2 of the replacement of the
CEO. However, AROCE and DAROCE were significantly different in the year 2
following CEO replacement with t values significant at 5 %. In sum Table 5.15 gives
a poor account of the ability of the governance structure to replace poorly performing
CEOs with better CEOs. The financial performance indicators response to a CEO
change is similar to the effects on share prices subsequent to a tender offer.
The likelihood of CEO replacement is significantly and inversely related to Board size
measured by Log of TB. We tested out both Log of TB and TB and chose Log of TB.
Both the coefficient and the t value for Log of TB were higher suggesting a decline in
the likelihood of CEO replacement at a decreasing rate with the increase in board size.
This is consistent with the understanding of the literature that larger boards become
dysfunctional and are easier to control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).
Larger Boards are thus less likely to replace their CEOs. This inverse relationship
between the likelihood of a CEO change and Log of TB is valid for all subsample
estimates.
The influence of directors block shareholdings (DSH) on the likelihood of CEO
change is positive and significant. We also take the square of the DSH, DSHSQ as we
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had some indications of sign reversal from the dummy variables used for various
levels of DSH, However, we find only DSH to be significant. Thus there is no inverse
influence of DSHQ on the likelihood of CEO turnover, indicating Ihat at higher levels
of DSH the relationship between CEO and DSH does not change to an inverse
relationship. In the subsample estimates the relationship between DSH and CEO is
significant and positive in subsamples where (i) the firm has not been subject to a
hostile takeover bid (ii) the mean market capitalisation is less than the mean market
capitalisation of the complete sample and (iii) where the subsample mean of
institutional block shareholdings is less than the mean of the complete sample. When
DSH is disaggregated into various levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX )
none of the dummy coefficients are significant. The Wald statistics testing for the
significance of these levels of DSH on CEO is significant only for the complete
sample and not significant for any of the subsample estimates. The evidence on the
role of directors' block shareholdings is more consistent with monitoring by inside
directors in possession of firm specific information (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Fama and Jensen, 1983 and Rosenstein and Wyatt; 1997) and does not support the
findings of the Morck, Shleifer and Visl-my (1988a) on entrenchment.
Institutional block shareholdings (ISH) do not emerge as significant in explaining
changes in CEO in either the complete sample estimates or in any of the subsample
estimates. When we disaggregate the ISH variable in terms of levels of block
shareholdings (ISH15, ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX) we find that at the disaggregated
level none of the Coefficients are significant in their influence on the CEO variable.
SP1 (Chairman is an Executive Chairman) has a significant and negative influence on
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the likelihood of a change in the CEO. However, SP2 (Chairman is also the CEO)
does not have a significant role in explaining governance changes as reflected by the
CEO variable. In the estimates based on the subsamples we _find that SP1 has
consistent negative influence on the likelihood of CEO replacement. SP2 fails to
emerge as significant in any of the subsample estimates.
The size of the firm as measured by the Log of market capitalisation (MCAP) is not
significant in its influence on change in CEO. Thus MCAP is significant in its
influence only on CD but not on CED or CEO. The proportion of non-executive
directors on the Board (NEDTB) is not significant in its influence on the likelihood of
CEO change.
We have evaluated the significance of individual variables. The logit fixed effects
estimates suggest that there are sizeable firm specific effects on the dependent
variable, which are unobservable. The Hausman test statistics is large and significant.
The analysis again underscores the importance of firm specific information in
explaining governance changes. The corporate governance characteristics, which
emerge as significant in explaining governance change reflected by CEO, are
LOGTB, DSH, and SP1. The LOG TB and SP1 variables reflect the relative power of
the incumbent management vis-à-vis shareholders. The variables LOGTB, DSH, and
SP 1, which emerge as significant, suggest that the likelihood of CEO replacement is
largely the outcome of the Board attributes. Out of the six sets of performance
indicators three emerge as significant and have a negative influence on the likelihood
of CEO change as shown in Table 5.12. Thus we have mixed evidence in support of
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hypothesis 1 that the top management turnover is inversely related to financial
performance indicators. We cannot provide direct evidence for hypothesis 2 that
regarding the impact of financial performance indicators on top management turnover
because marginal effects cannot be computed for fixed effects logit models.
DSH has a positive and significant impact on the CEO variable. As in the case of the
CD and CED variables this is indicative of monitoring by directors who have block
shareholdings in the firm. LOGTB has a significant and negative influence on the
likelihood of CEO change. As cited above the literature suggests that larger boards are
dysfunctional and monitor the incumbent management less effectively (Jensen, 1993).
Thus weaker Boards reflect a poorer ability and willingness to monitor the incumbent
CEO. The presence of a chairman who is an executive chairman significantly reduces
the likelihood of CEO replacement. We do not find the traditional conception of CEO
duality where the Chairman is also the CEO to have any impact on the CEO variable.
The ambiguity that surrounds the likelihood of CEO change is not only reflected by
the Hausman statistic suggesting significant fixed effects but also by the related
evidence on CEOs and performance as presented in Table 5.15.
Hostile takeover Bids (TO)
The logit fixed effect estimates using the dependent variable TO i.e., the occurrence of
a hostile takeover bid, are presented in Tables 5.18 to 5.21. We do not report
subsample estimates for the TO governance change variable, as the number of hostile
takeovers in individual subsamples is often too small to allow for meaningful
interpretation of results. The tables evaluate the ability of the market for corporate
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TABLE 5.18
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Likelihood of Hostile Takeover (TO)
Logit Fixed Effects; All variables
Independent variables All variables
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year (t-1) 	 -0.04915
(-1.420)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1) 	 -0.00039
(-0.079)
Log of Board Size	 -8.3031k
(-2.287)
Non-executive directors (%) 	 0.05474k
(2.249)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 0.00650
(0.095)
Square of directors block shareholdings (%)	 -0.00062
(-0.615)
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 -0.063190
(-1.546)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 0.00011
(0.194)
Log of market capitalisation	 0.52624
(0.416)
Executive chairman	 2.3807t
(1.900)
Chairman is CEO	 0.42822
(0.623)
Age of CEO	 0.23168
((1.014)
Number of years as CEO	 0.32233
(1.374)
LL -51.08
HAUSMAN 11.29
(1)
Number of Firms 218
Number of observations 1200
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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TABLE 5.20
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of directors block shareholdings for the likelihood
of hostile takeover bid
Dependent variable:: Hostile takeover bid (TO)
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	 2.8074t
(1.849)
5_15%>5%
	
3.0208t
(1.6391)

 30%> 15%	 1.6287
(1.232)
> 30 %	 0.82616
(0.464)
Wald 3.99
(4)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; f p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
TABLE 5.21
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for the
likelihood of hostile takeover bid
Dependent variable:: Hostile takeover bid (TO)
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 15%	 11.611
(0.067)
 30%> 15 %	 11.956
(0.069)
 45% > 30%	 11.727
(0.068)
>45%	 12.099
(0.070)
Wald 3.30
(4)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; tp<0.10;
control to function as the ultimate governance mechanism. The understanding is that
the market for corporate control is one in which alternative management teams
compete for the right to manage corporate assets. The team, which promises the
highest returns to the shareholders, wins the right to manage the corporate asset until
another management team promises higher returns to shareholders. The process
continues independent of the volition of the incumbent management team (Jensen,
1988). We have seen in Chapter 2 Section 2.5, that subsequent to a hostile takeover
bid nearly the entire incumbent management team is replaced. In this sense hostile
takeovers are a governance mechanism as they lead to control changes. As reported in
Table 5.18 and 5.19, we can observe that financial performance indicators do not
significantly influence hostile takeover bids. The Wald statistics to test for the
significance of financial performance indicators are not significant in explaining the
likelihood of a hostile takeover bid. This is consistent with previous empirical studies
on UK firms (Franks and Mayer, 1996).
The likelihood of a hostile takeover bid is significantly decreased by an increase in the
Board size measured by Log of TB. Log of TB has been chosen over TB as both the
coefficient and the t value for Log of TB were higher. This indicates that a decline in
the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid at a decreasing rate with the increase in board
size. The influence of directors block shareholdings (DSH) on the likelihood of a
hostile bid is not significant. The square of the DSH, DSHSQ to test for indications of
sign reversal of the influence of DSH, is also not significant. When DSH is
disaggregated into various levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX) we find
that only the coefficients of DSH5 and DSH15 are significant and positively
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associated with the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid. However, the Wald statistics
testing for the combined significance of these levels of DSH on the TO variable is not
significant.
,
Similar results hold for the influence of institutional block shareholdings. When we
disaggregate the ISH variable in terms of levels of block shareholdings (I5H15,
I5H30, ISH45, ISHMAX) we find that at the disaggregated level none of the
disaggregated dummies are significant.
The size of the firm as measured by the Log of market capitalisation (MCAP) is not
significant in the likelihood of TO. We do not find evidence to support the view that it
is the smaller firms which are more subject to a hostile takeover as has been suggested
in the literature (Singh, 1975). The proportion of non-executive directors on the board
(NEDTB) decreases the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid. The presence of an
executive chairman on the board also increases the likelihood of a hostile takeover
bid.
The significant and large Hausman test statistics show that there are there are sizeable
firm specific effects in the logit estimates for the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid
TO. Firm specific effects reflect the 'corporate culture' of the firm. The interpretation
of 'corporate culture' of the firm depends on organisation specific norms and customs
(Kreps, 1988). The 'corporate culture' cannot be deciphered through arms length
exchange of information as embodied in financial information flows. LOGTB,
NEDTB and SP1 are significant in their influence on. The variables NEDTB and SP1
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reflect the relative power of the incumbent management vis-d-vis shareholders. These
variables which emerge as significant suggests that the likelihood of a hostile tender
bid largely the outcome of the Board attributes. The significance and influence of SP1
-
variable reflect the relative power of the incumbent management. Thus if the chairman
is also an executive chairman then we have seen from the estimates of the governance
change variables CED and CEO that the incumbent management is more difficult to
change. The estimates on the TO variable suggest that the presence of an entrenched
management reflected by a chairman who is also an executive member of the board
will increase the likelihood of a hostile takeover bid. This is consistent with work on
UK mergers which shows that if the CEO is also the chairman the likelihood of
hostile bid increases (Weir, 1997).
The percentage of non-executive directors on the board has a significant and positive
influence on the turnover of executive directors. In the case of the TO variable we find
further evidence to support the view that non-executive directors monitor the
executive management. The likelihood of a hostile takeover is inversely related to the
proportion of non-executive directors on the board. The evidence on the role of non-
executive directors is mixed. A study of US firms did not find any significant
influence of outside directors on the likelihood of a hostile take-over (Shivdasani,
1993). In the US study unaffiliated outside directors who have significant ownership
and additional directorships lower the likelihood of hostile bids. This is taken as
evidence in support of the hypothesis that outside directors contribute to internal
governance. However, a study of UK mergers found that acquired firms are likely to
have fewer non-executive directors (Weir, 1997).
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The evidence on the effectiveness of the market for corporate control in disciplining
the incumbent management and ensuring the realisation of shareholder wealth
,
maximisation is mixed. We find no evidence of hostile takeovers as a governance
mechanism for underperforming management, as measured by financial performance
indicators. However, we do find evidence to support the view that the market for
corporate control functions as a countervailing power to the authority of incumbent
management. The likelihood of a hostile takeover is inversely related to the proportion
of non-executive directors on the board but positively and significantly related to the
chairman of the board being an executive chairman. The evidence can be interpreted
to imply that the market for corporate control as a court of last resort and plays an
important role in protecting shareholders when the corporations internal governance
mechanisms are rather ineffective (Jensen, 1988).
5.5 Conclusion
Financial performance indicators based on returns on capital employed and abnormal
stock market returns (ABNOR) significantly and negatively influences the CD and
CED variables. The findings are similar to earlier studies on US and Japanese firms
(Kaplan, 1994b; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani, 1995). However,
the partial elasticities of these performance indicators are extremely low and thus have
a very small impact on CD and CED. This is evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 and
2 that focal points will be significant but will have a very small influence on the
governance change variables. The significance of the performance indicators for the
likelihood of CEO replacement is less clear, and does not exist for the TO variable.
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Thus there is limited evidence in support of hypothesis 1 for the CEO variable and the
estimates of the TO variable do not support hypothesis 1.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) make six predictions on the basis of their model,
which they assert are consistent with the existing evidence from the empirical studies.
On the basis of the study of UK firms we are in a position to comment on three of
their predictions. The three predictions are:
1. A CEO who performs poorly is more likely to be replaced than the one who
performs well
2. CEO turnover is more sensitive top performance when the board is independent.
3. Accounting measures of performance are better predictors of management
turnover than poor performance.
From Tables 5.1, 5.4 and from the subsample estimates of the six formulations of
accounting and stock market based performance indicators we find that there is a poor
association of the likelihood of CEO replacement with company performance. We
split the sample into two on the basis of the mean value of the proportion of non-
executive directors. We do not find any association between the likelihood of CEO
replacement in the subsample having above average proportion of non-executive
directors. It is possible that the effectiveness of the non-executive directors is
dependent on the level of their share interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995;
Weisbach, 1988). We have not examined the relationship between the share interests
of non-executive directors and the likelihood of CEO turnover. However, we do have
evidence that directors' block shareholdings do increase the likelihood of CEO
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replacement. In the relative effectiveness of accounting and stock market based
performance measures, Tables 5.4, 5.8 and 5.14 clearly show that in the case of the
CD and the CED variables the stock market based performance variables are
consistently better predictors of top management turnover. In the case of the CEO
variable where the link between the likelihood of turnover is weak two of the
accounting based performance measures are significant at 10% (DARCOE, ORCOE)
and one is significant at 5% (ARCOE).
Directors block shareholdings and the percentage of non-executive directors on the
board have a positive influence on turnovers represented by the CD, CED and CEO
variables. This supports the hypothesis (Jensen and Meekling, 1976; Fama and
Jensen, 1983 and Rosenstein and Wyatt; 1997) that monitoring is positively related to
the volume of unstructured communication or firm specific information. In the case of
the CD and the CED variables the significance and negative sign of the square of
directors block shareholdings is evidence that at higher levels of directors block
shareholdings supports entrenchment of directors as found by (Morck, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1988a).
Hypotheses 43, 3B, 3C and 3D relate to the power relations within the board and the
ambiguity that surrounds governance changes. The set of variables which emerge as
significant and the direction of their influence suggest that governance changes
represented by CD and CED are largely explained by the incidence of CEO change.
The CEOCH dummy has a significant and inverse influence in explaining the
behaviour of CD and CED variables. The other characteristic relating to the Chairman
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being an executive chairman (SP 1) has a similar influence on CD and CED. We are
not sure what leads to the replacement of the CEO. Some of the financial performance
indicators have an inverse relationship with CEO replacement. Further, the analysis
suggests that underperformance of CEOs is followed by a replacement but the
succession does not lead to significantly better performance even though the stock
market welcomes the replacement with higher share prices in a manner, which
resembles the stock market response to hostile takeovers. However, we do know that
large boards and executive chairman reduce the likelihood of a CEO replacement.
Director block shareholdings however increase the likelihood of a CEO replacement.
The results above show that the variables used in structure performance studies
examining principal agent relationships in corporate governance change do not
explain as much of the turnover of all directors (CD) and executive directors (CED),
as do the group effects. There are important unobservable firm specific attributes that
explain these turnovers. The size of the firm specific effects is also significant for the
likelihoods of CEO replacement and tender offers (TO). This is consistent with the
view that deliberation between shareholders and managers will be critical for effective
corporate governance as the firm fixed effects will be unobservable using arms length
exchange of information represented by financial performance indicators. The
conceptual framework emphasises the importance of the conduct of corporate
governance.
Evaluation of hostile takeovers adds to the picture of ambiguity. Financial
underperformance does not lead to hostile takeover bids. The likelihood of hostile
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takeovers increases with an executive chairman and declines with large boards and a
larger percentage of non-executive directors on the boards. In the independence of
means tests we find that larger boards have significantly higher percentage of non-
,
executive directors. The literature suggests that large boards will be less effective in
monitoring the incumbent management. The association of larger boards with larger
percentage of non-executive directors (NEDTB) and the inverse association of
NEDTB with the TO variable and a positive association with the CED variable
suggests that the role of board size and NEDTB needs to be further investigated. This
makes it difficult to judge the true significance of percentage of non-executive
directors on the board. The estimates highlight the significance of the power relations
within the board and the ambiguity that surrounds governance changes in corporate
governance.
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CHAPTER 6
,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN AUTHORISED FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS IN THE UK
6.1 Introduction
The chapter examines the corporate governance of financial institutions in the United
Kingdom that are authorised by the Bank of England and hence are under its
regulatory control.' The business of banking has undergone considerable changes over
the last decade (Kaufman and Mote, 1996). Dramatic episodes both in UK and abroad
have demonstrated that failures of banks have not been the fallout of the proclivity of
shareholders for higher returns but the considerable discretion and variation in risk
preferences demonstrated by managerial decisions. A possible reason why these
episodes have been dramatic and little cognisance has been given to early warning
signals has been the lack of a suitable governance framework. With the globalisation
of the financial services industry the scope for excessive use of managerial discretion
has increased. The complexities of international markets with banks operating in
many countries have made the task of shareholder monitoring extremely difficult. The
'Under the 1987 Banking Act no one may take deposits from the public, as part of a deposit taking
business, without authorisation from the Bank of England. In order to be and remain authorised, an
institution has to satisfy the Bank of England that it has adequate capital and liquidity, a realistic
business plan, adequate systems and controls, provisions for bad debts, and that its business is carried
on with integrity and skill and in a prudent manner. Its directors, managers and controllers have to be
'fit and proper' for the positions they hold. The title bank is reserved under the Act for those authorised
institutions with more than f5 million of capital.
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response of the regulators has been to strengthen the mechanisms of internal
governance, (e.g. the increase in the disclosure requirements for large exposures) and
to emphasise a greater use of information technology.' These developments will
increase the ability of regulatory authorities to monitor banks and other firms in the
financial sector. However, this approach does not recognise the possibility of agency
problems between the shareholders and managers. It remains relevant to ask whether
regulation primarily motivated by concerns for systemic stability independent of
shareholder management accountability will serve the current requirement.
The corporate governance of banks is a complex issue. It has been argued that the
legal and regulatory framework in which the banks operate makes the governance
mechanism of hostile takeovers ineffective as a method of corporate governance
(Prowse, 1997a; 1997b). Thus, governance issues in banks have to be discussed in an
environment where the management has a considerably reduced threat perception
from the market for corporate control (MCC). This however, is not the only
implication of the role of the central bank in the corporate governance of banks. The
central bank replaces the conventional goal of corporate governance, shareholder
wealth maximisation, with concerns for depositor's security and the stability of the
financial system. The aim of the regulation is not the maximisation of shareholders'
2 This is evident from a perusal of the latest round of evaluation of the supervision and surveillance of
the Bank of England , see Arthur Anderson (1996) report on supervision and surveillance, and the
Bank of England (1996) response to it; also see Hall, 1997). This thinking is also reflected in the latest
policy initiative of the current UK government. The creation of a 'super regulator', the Financial
Services Authority is based on the understanding that centralisation of information flows will make
decision-making more effective given the latest developments in information technology. The
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in his address in 1996 emphasised the need to develop more
sophisticated and quantified internal control practices making use of the development in the area of
information technology (Greenspan, 1996).
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wealth but minimising the probability of failure of the banks (Prowse, 1997a;
Greenspan, 1996). There are a few studies on the functioning of corporate governance
mechanisms in banks. These studies exclusively based on US data examine the role of
takeovers (Allen and Cabenoyan, 1991; Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado, 1990; Brickley
and James, 1987); compensation mechanisms (Haye, 1997); deposit insurance (Billet,
Garfinkel and O'Neal, 1998; Gorton and Rosen, 1995); board duality (Pi and Timme,
1993); ownership (Glassman and Rhoades, 1979) and top management turnover
(Prowse, 1997a) in the corporate governance of banks. Researchers are also
increasingly interested in how corporate governance mechanisms in general vary in
different legal and regulatory environments. There is a growing realisation that the
corporate governance of banks has important differences in comparison to firms
belonging to other sectors (Subrahmanyan, Rangan and Rosenstein, 1997). This
chapter provides empirical evidence on the corporate governance mechanisms in
banks and also compares the findings with corporate governance in the manufacturing
sector in the United Kingdom.
The chapter is divided into six sections. In the second section we examine the
regulatory framework and its implications for the corporate governance of banks. This
forms the basis for the formulation of the major hypotheses for empirical evaluation.
Section three specifies the methodology for the empirical estimation. Section four
describes the variable measures and data sources used in the empirical evaluation.
Section five presents the empirical estimates. Section six provides a summary and
directions for further research.
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6.2. Corporate Governance of Authorised Financial Institutions
The nature of the governance problem in banks cannot be understood independent of
the institutional context. The regulatory framework has significant implications for the
corporate governance of banks.
6.2.1 The Market for Corporate Control
A large percentage of the top management team is replaced subsequent to a takeover.
This is irrespective of whether the tender offer is friendly, hostile, successful or
unsuccessful (Walsh, 1988; Franks and Mayer, 1996). Thus takeovers represent a
severe threat to the firm-specific managerial human capital. It is possible that
takeovers take place for synergistic reasons (Weisbach, 1993). There is a growing
realisation in the banking industry that the harmonisation and globalisation of the
international financial market will require synergistic mergers and acquisitions to
fully realise economies of scale and scope (Forbes and Molyneux, 1994). The general
perception of the literature on takeovers is that hostile takeovers are disciplinary while
friendly takeovers are synergistic (Davis and Stout, 1992). The Bank of England is not
favourably disposed towards the MCC in its role as the ultimate disciplining
mechanism of the incumbent management in banks.3
The last major pronouncement (reaffirmed as the current position of the Bank's in a letter by the
supervision and surveillance unit) we have had on the MCC was in 1987 (Bank of England Quarterly
Bulletin, August, 1987). In this pronouncement the Governor of Bank of England states that in
principle the Bank is not averse to ownership changes in banks. However, takeovers should be for
synergistic reasons. Ownership changes, as an outcome of hostile takeovers to replace
underperforming management is not to be encouraged. The pronouncement specifically mentions that
the Bank of England will not look favourably at tender offers, which put banks into play. Restructuring
transactions subsequent to hostile take-overs which might involve selling-off unremunerative lines of
business will also not be favourably looked upon. The pronouncement also states that though not
averse to foreign ownership in principle the Bank of England would like to keep a strong and
continuing British presence in the UK banking system.
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In banks, in addition to the various statutory and non-statutory bodies overseeing take-
over activities and ownership changes, the Bank of England has specific and detailed
responsibility for approving ownership changes and take-overs. The approvals depend
on what the Bank considers to be 'fit and proper' for the conduct of business by the
banks. Finally, governance changes leading to the transfer of control to foreign
investors can be vetoed by the Treasury if it feels that they would affect the
'Britishness' of the financial institutions, or if it does not meet considerations of
reciprocity in the takeover provisions of the countries to which the investors belong
(Hall, 1993).
The Bank of England has elaborate concerns with regard to the identity of the
shareholders/controllers of banks. The Bank of England has to be informed if any
group or person intends to acquire shares in a bank incorporated in the UK. The
Banking Act of 1987 gives the Bank of England specific rights to accept/reject
changes in 'controllers' of banks. A 'controller' in a bank is defined as an institution
or a person holding shares of a bank under whose directions the directors of the banks
are accustomed to act. To be a 'controller' the criterion of 'fit and proper' has to be
satisfied in the perception of the Bank of England. In the interpretation of the 'fit and
proper' criterion a key consideration is the likely or actual impact on the interests of
the depositors and potential depositors. The criterion is interpreted according to the
circumstances of the individual cases and the position held by the 'controller'. The
standards of the criterion increase with the level of control, that is the level of
shareholdings. In judging the fitness criterion the Bank of England takes a cumulative
approach. Thus the Bank may decide that a person does not fulfil the criterion on the
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basis of several instances of conduct, which taken individually may not lead to that
conclusion.
Subsequent to 1987 the definition of controllers has changed in a number of ways.
The net effect of these changes is that the requirement to report changes in the
ownership of shares now covers smaller levels of ownership and a wider class of
shares. In 1992 the definition of controllers was extended to include the holding of
non-voting shares. The threshold level of becoming a controller has been brought
down to 10% of shareholding from 15%. A new category of 'controllers' called
'parent controllers' has also been defined. A 'parent controller' is a 'controller' of the
bank by virtue of being a major shareholder in another institution of which the bank is
a subsidiary. The Bank of England also has power over existing shareholders by
disallowing continuation of a person as a shareholder or it may impose restrictions on
the rights attached to specified shares.
The consideration of contagion also limits the scope of ownership changes. There are
informal guidelines, practices and understandings between the Bank of England and
government departments like the Department of Trade and Industry which are
motivated by the desire to limit the scope for interlocking ownership of banks and
non-bank financial institutions. The risks associated with connected lending and
cross-contamination is sought to be minimised (Hall, 1993). Considerations of
contagion become particularly relevant in the case of 'parent controllers'. The Bank of
England is guided by considerations that possible inappropriate conduct by the
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holding company or a member of the group of companies may damage confidence in
the bank.
,
6.2.2. Substitution Hypothesis
As mentioned in Chapter 2 Jensen (1993) identifies the following governance
mechanisms that may be used to solve the agency problems arising out of the
separation of ownership from control.
a. Capital markets
b. Legal/political/regulatory systems
c. Product and Factor markets
d. Internal governance systems headed by the board of directors
The MCC is greatly constrained in its working in the case of banks. The product and
factor markets have a limited role because of the market structure being an oligopoly.
In the UK a few large banks called clearing banks control most of the business in the
industry. This leaves the internal governance systems with the major share of the
responsibility for the governance of the banks. An important prediction of the
literature on corporate governance is that internal governance mechanisms reflected in
a strong and independent board will emerge if the MCC is weak (Fama and Jensen,
1983; Williamson, 1983). This hypothesis has been termed as the substitution
hypothesis. A stronger board will emerge, as the benefits of such a board will increase
with an ineffective MCC. The validity of this hypothesis in the literature has been
ascertained by examining the proportion of outside directors on the board. The
understanding being that a greater proportion of outside directors will be the
characteristic of effective boards when the MCC is weak (Brickley and James, 1987;
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Mayers, Shivadasani and Smith, 1997). However, a greater percentage of outside
directors on the boards of banks and `mutuals' may not be a reflection of effective
boards. Baysinger and Zardkoohi (1986) and Booth and Tehranian (1993) find that in
regulated environments non-executive directors will be appointed for their public
relations role and not a monitoring role as hypothesised.
The substitution hypothesis cannot be evaluated independent of the institutional
context of the regulation of banks. The goal of shareholder wealth maximisation is not
the motivation behind the regulation of banks. Therefore the regulator is not a
substitute for the role of the MCC as in other sectors like manufacturing. Thus it is a
simplification to predict strong and effective internal governance mechanisms if the
MCC is weak or ineffective. The aim of the regulatory agencies is not maximising the
wealth of shareholders but minimising the probability of failure (Prowse 1997a). The
goal of regulatory intervention that is maintaining the stability of the individual banks
and the financial system, is a threshold objective. The operational goal of the
threshold objective translates into a concern for the security of depositors' funds.
Effectiveness of internal mechanisms will be emphasised by regulators because of
their concern for depositors' funds. The effectiveness of governance mechanisms will
be a function of this threshold objective and not of the continuum of shareholder
wealth maximisation.
Banks, given the nature of their business, are opaque institutions (Davies, 1995).
Information about a bank's decisions and its dealings with its depositors and
borrowers are confidential and privy to the institution. The primary concern of
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regulators as illustrated by the statement of the heads of two of the major central
banks has been the position of the depositors amongst the various stakeholders of the
banks identified above'. The claims of the depositors can be diluted because of the
nature of the deposit contract, which prevents priority ranking being given to current
depositors over new and future depositors. The 'first-come-first-served' nature of the
deposit contract threatens the stability of the financial system as it increases the
possibility of bank runs and `fire sales' by banks, given the opacity of their business
decisions. Deposit insurance is a measure used by the regulators to engender
confidence among deposit holders and impart a degree of stability to the financial
system by minimising the alleged advantages of the 'first-come-first-served' nature of
deposit contracts in times of lower depositors' confidence in a bank. However,
regulators are equally conscious of the moral hazard problem of deposit insurance.
Gorton and Rosen (1996) and Billet, Garfinkel and O'Neal (1998) show that it might
induce greater risk taking by banks and thus may further contribute to the dilution of
the deposit contract
In the case of banks the property rights of depositors have been the focus of all
regulatory intervention. The regulators aim to reduce the risk to the depositors and the
threat of instability of the financial system by placing a number of restrictions on the
property rights of shareholders. Ownership changes are subject to a number of ex ante
In a speech the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System stated that the
genesis of regulatory intervention lies in the historical experience of the effects on the real economy of
the disruptions of the financial markets and bank failures (Greenspan, 1996). In a speech to the City
bankers and merchants the Governor of Bank of England described the objectives of supervision and
regulation as the setting of minimum prudential standards so as to reduce the risk of failure in each
individual bank, primarily in the interest of protecting depositors. The overall goal being to preserve
systemic stability (Bank of England of Quarterly Bulletin, August, 1997). These statements give us an
idea of the motivations behind regulatory intervention in banks.
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controls. Also, the risk profile of shareholders is linked with any attempt to dilute the
deposit contract by linking deposit insurance premiums to risk and by incorporating
capital adequacy requirements. The risk weighted capital adequacy requirement
implies that larger risk activities require a larger proportion of shareholder funds and a
smaller share of depositor's funds. Large depositors have also been given a share of
the responsibility for monitoring the activities of banks by limiting deposit insurance
to 90% of the deposit value for deposits up to £20,000. However, it is possible that
they use their position for monitoring the activities of the banks to gather advance
information and implementing the 'first-come-first-served' principle of the deposit
contract to their advantage.
In the banks the agency problems between the shareholders and managers have been
ignored by the regulators even when it is recognised that the business activities of
banks are opaque and shareholders, like depositors, will have only limited information
about managerial decisions. For example, the implicit assumption of the risk weighted
capital adequacy requirement is that by increasing the share of equity capital, riskier
decisions will reflect the risk profile of the shareholders. A possible explanation for
not making a distinction between managers and shareholders can be the risk
associated with managerial human capital. As in the case of manufacturing managerial
human capital continues to have a high degree of firm-specificity. This human capital
risk is non-diversifiable while shareholders can easily diversify their risk by holding
the shares of a number of banks in their portfolio. Therefore it is possible that
managers will be more risk averse than shareholders. This could be a possible
explanation why regulators perceive a lower level of threat from managers to
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shareholders' funds and hence choose to ignore the agency problem between
managers and shareholders. The risk perceived by the managerial human capital is
increased by the restrictions imposed by the regulators on the choice and selection of
managers.'
These aspects of regulatory intervention will affect the effectiveness of internal
governance mechanisms. For example, the requirement of capital adequacy can have
the effect of reducing the management share in equity capital thus reducing the
control of the incumbent management in board decisions. It can also introduce larger
outside interest in equity capital. The escalating level of evaluation of large controllers
by the Bank of England makes it more likely that large shareholdings will play the
role of effective monitors in the banking sector. The regulatory framework imposes
limitations in terms of the available management pool and the working of the
managerial labour market. This limitation on the available management pool can have
the effect of limiting the options in terms of internal governance changes
(Subramanyan, Ranjan and Rosenstein, 1997).
6.2.3 Hypotheses
On the basis of the discussion relating to bank regulation the following hypotheses are
proposed for empirical evaluation. The discussion shows that the MCC is ineffective
5 Section 16 of the Banking Act of 1987 lays down requirements expected from a person likely to be
appointed as a director, chief executive, managing directors and managers of banks. The Bank of
England has to be informed and approval sought before a person can be appointed to these levels. The
assessment of the person is based on skills, soundness of judgement in the specific context of the
designated job. The person should have had experience in line with the job and be in possession of
appropriate qualifications and training. Previous conduct of the person, as in the case of controllers, is
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in the banking sector. Further, the regulatory authority is not a substitute for the MCC
as its objective for regulation are different. The regulatory authority is more concerned
with the possibility of financial instability that may be caused by bank failures and is
,
not motivated by the objective of shareholder wealth maximisation. The objective of
regulatory intervention is to achieve this threshold objective and not a maximising
objective such as shareholder wealth maximisation, as in conventional corporate
governance. To achieve this objective the regulatory authorities like the Bank of
England seek to make internal governance mechanisms more effective. However, this
is not the outcome of the conventional substitution hypothesis. The possible
effectiveness of the internal mechanisms is the outcome of measures like the capital
adequacy requirement, which seek to reduce the risk faced by depositors by increasing
the exposure of shareholders to managerial decisions. The regulators concerns do not
display cognisance of agency problems between shareholders and managers. The
regulatory institution has to approve the appointment of managers and the changes in
ownership. The motivation behind these appointments is effective boards in the
interest of depositors' security. In light of these arguments we propose the following
hypotheses for empirical evaluation:
Hypothesis 1.
Top management turnover will not be significantly associated with financial
performance indicators and more specifically stock market based performance
indicators.
assessed in a cumulative fashion.
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Given the involvement of the regulatory body in the appointment of directors
provisions like the risk weighted capital adequacy requirement and the approval of
ownership changes we formulate the following hypotheses regarding non-executive
,,.
directors and block shareholdings by directors and institutional shareholders.
Hypothesis 2A 
Top management turnover will be positively related to the proportion of non-
executive directors.
Hypothesis 2B
Top management turnover will be positively related to institutional block
shareholdings.
6.3 Data Characteristics
The data-sets comprises the complete list of 44 quoted and UK controlled authorised
financial institutions listed in the February, 1989 issue of the Bank of England
Quarterly Bulletin. Data on financial performance is for the years 1987-88 to 1994-95.
Data on corporate governance has been collected for the period 1989-90 to 1994-95.
Table 1 gives the basic characteristics of the sample firms. The average turnover of all
directors and executive directors is 12.99% and 14.19% respectively. The mean
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ROCE of the firms being 10.46%. The average size of the board in the sample is
11.88. The average percentage of non-executive directors is 41.69%. The mean insider
block shareholdings (in excess of 3%) stood at 8:00%. The mean institutional block
share holding was (in excess of 3%) 26.14%. In 58% of the cases the chairman was
also an executive member of the board. In 12% of the cases the CEO was also the
chairman of the board. The average tenure of the CEO was 7.08 years and the average
age was 57.56 years.
Table 2 gives the correlation matrix of the variables used in the study. The
characteristics of the data set are interpreted in conjunction with the t tables for the
independence of means of the various subsamples drawn from the complete sample.
The t tables are reported in the Appendix at the end of the thesis. Some preliminary
inferences that can be drawn about the complete data set from the correlation matrix
are detailed below. Changes in CEO and turnover of executive and all directors are
significantly correlated. Executive chairmen and CEOs also functioning as chairman
are less likely to be replaced. The proportion of non-executive directors and CEO, CD
and CED are positively and significantly correlated. This gives substance to the
argument that non-executive directors are an important influence on bringing about
governance changes. Larger boards have significantly more non-executive directors
on them and they are more likely to have a CEO and the chairman as the same person.
These CEOs are significantly younger and have a longer tenure. Larger firms as
measured by market capitalisation are more likely to have larger boards. Boards with
larger directors' . or insider block shareholdings have smaller boards with smaller
percentages of non-executive directors. Large values of insider block shareholdings
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appear to have a disincentive effect on institutional shareholdings. Non-executive
directors are positively and significantly associated with institutional shareholdings.
Institutional shareholdings are positively associated with positive abnormal returns
and negatively associated with returns on capital employed. There is also an inverse
association between the institutional shareholdings and the chairman being an
executive director of the board or the CEO also being the chairman of the board.
Returns on capital employed have a delayed positive impact on abnormal returns.
Only 2-year moving averages show a significant and positive association with
abnormal returns.
Comparison of independence of means of subsamples 
The tables reporting the t values testing for independence of means are reported in the
appendix at the end of the thesis.
When we split the sample into two subsamples one comprising firms which
experienced a change in the CEO during the sample period and the other comprising
firms which did not undergo a change in the CEO, we find that the t values of the
means of the two subsamples differ in a number of ways. Firms, which witnessed a
change in CEO, had a significantly higher turnover of executive directors and all
directors. They also had larger boards and a larger percentage of non-executive
directors. Firms associated with a CEO change had a lower mean of director block
shareholdings and a significantly lower mean value of institutional block
shareholdings. A disaggregation of the block shareholdings suggests that in AFIs or
banks that underwent a CEO change there were significantly less instances of
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DSHMAX and significantly more firms where directors had block shareholdings
within the DSH5 range. There was a significantly higher likelihood of the CEOs
holding dual positions and with a shorter tenure in the subsample of firms
experiencing a change in the CEO. AFIs that witnessed a change in CEO were no
different in financial performance.
Subsamples of firms having greater and lesser than the average value of market
capitalisation for the complete sample differ in a number of respects. Firms with
above market capitalisation have significantly larger boards. The larger firms had
significantly larger proportions (nearly 50%) of non-executive directors on the Board.
They also have significantly lower level of directors and institutional block
shareholdings. A break-up of these shareholdings suggests that while directors block
shareholdings up to 5% are significantly and positively associated with above market
capitalisation the same are negatively related and significant beyond the 5% block
shareholding level. In the case of institutional shareholdings there is a positive and
significant association with above average market capitalisation at 15% block level
only and the association is significantly negative for ISHMAX. The CEOs of above
average market capitalisation firms are older, have a shorter tenure and are more
likely to be executive chairmen than hold the dual positions of chief executive and
chairman of the board. The larger firms as measured by market capitalisation are no
different from smaller APIs in terms of financial performance.
On comparing the subsamples of firms based on above and below average block
shareholdings of directors, we find that firms with above average directors
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shareholdings are no different in terms of their association with the governance
change variables CD, CED and CEO in terms of the percentage of non-executive
directors on the Board. Institutionally block shareholdings are significantly less for
firms having above average block shareholdings of directors only at the ISH30 level.
There is no indication that such AFIs are significantly more likely to have chairmen
who are either executive chairmen or who are also the chief executive officers of the
company. Firms with above average directors' shareholdings are significantly smaller.
There is no significant difference in the financial performance indicators between the
two subsamples of firms. Firms with above average directors' shareholdings have
significantly older CEOs who hold the office for a shorter period.
When we split the subsample of firms on the criterion of CEO duality we find that
when Chairmen are either executive chairmen or are CEOs the two subsamples are
different in a number of respects. Duality in the top position on the Board has been
subject of much interest in the literature (Boyd, 1995; Rechner and Dalton, 1991).
Duality has been associated with better performance as it gives the firm a clear
direction and other positive leadership attributes (Cochran Wood and Jones, 1985;
Vance, 1964). However, duality has also been associated with ineffective governance
and hostile takeovers (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988b). We find evidence in
support of both these perceptions on CEO duality. However, unlike in the case of
manufacturing firms we find that in the case of AFIs, duality on the board does not
affect the likelihood of CEO replacement. There is no significant difference between
the two subsamples in terms of their Board sizes. However, there is significant
difference between the two in terms of the percentage of non-executive directors on
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the Boards. Firms with CEO duality will have significantly lower proportion of non-
executive directors on the Board. Director block shareholdings at the 15% level is
negatively and significantly associated with CEO duality but at the 30% level is
positively and significantly associated with CEO duality. Institutional block
shareholdings will be inversely and significantly associated with CEO duality.
Chairmen who are also CEOs will be significantly older, with a longer tenure. Such
firms will also be significantly smaller. Board duality has no effect on performance
measures based on ROCE and ABNOR .
When we compare boards with above average and below average proportions of non-
executive directors we find that boards with above average non-executive directors
have a significantly higher governance change as measured by CD, CED and CEO
variables. Such boards are significantly larger have a smaller percentage of director
block shareholdings but a larger mean value of institutional block shareholdings. On
boards with above average percentage of non-executive directors the instances of
CEO duality, that is CEOs being chairmen or executive members of the board are
significantly less. Above average representation of non-executive directors will be
associated with market capitalisation. Firms with an above average sample of non-
executive directors will have a significantly lower likelihood of having an executive
chairman and the tenure of the CEO is significantly shorter. In terms of various
performance indicators we find that AFIs with an above average proportion of on-
executive directors have a significantly lower ROCE, DROCE, AROCE, DAROCE,
AABNOR, DAABNOR.
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Finally we compare the subsamples of firms having greater and less than average
institutional block shareholdings. Firms with greater than average institutional block
shareholdings are not significantly associated with the likelihood of CEO change.
They have significantly smaller boards and a larger proportion of non-executive
directors on the Boards. They also have a smaller mean value of directors'
shareholdings. At the disaggregated level of block shareholdings firms having above
average institutional shareholding are positively associated with DSH15 and inversely
associated with DSHMAX.
6.4 Discussion of the Estimates
The estimation methodology is similar to the one used in the case of manufacturing
firms discussed in Section 5.2 of Chapter 5.
Turnover of all Directors (CD)
Tables 6.3 to 6.6 show that changes in all directors are not significantly dependent on
financial performance. The F tests for the combined significance of financial
performance indicators are also not significant. Returns on capital employed and
annual abnormal returns do not explain the turnover of all directors. In the subsample
estimates there is no consistent and significant influence of financial performance on
the turnover of all directors. The F values were also not significant, for the financial
performance indicators in the estimates of the subsamples.
CD is inversely and significantly influenced by Board size measured by the Log of
TB. We tested both Log of TB and TB and chose Log of TB. Both the coefficient and
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the t value for Log of TB were higher suggesting a decline in turnover at a decreasing
rate with the increase in board size. The elasticity measure of - 4.1468 suggests a
significant negative impact on CD of Log of TB. This is consistent with the
understanding of the literature that larger boards become dysfunctional and are easier
to control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996). This relationship
between changes in all directors and Log of TB continues to have validity for all
subsample estimates. The impact on directors block shareholdings (DSH) on turnover
of all directors is not significant. The square of the DSH, DSHSQ is not significant.
Thus there is no sign reversal in the significance of the directors shareholdings. This
result is valid for all the subsample estimates. When DSH is disaggregated into
various levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX) we find that none of the
dummy coefficients and the F statistics testing for the significance of all these levels
of DSH on CD are significant. For institutional block shareholdings (ISH) we have
similar results for the complete sample and the subsample levels. SP1 has a significant
and negative influence on the turnover of all directors, except in the subsamples where
the CEO has not changed and where the mean level of the non-executive directors on
the Board is more than the mean of the complete sample. SP2 (chairman is also the
CEO) significantly reduces the turnover of all directors. In the subsamples estimates,
the influence of SP2 on CD is not clear. It reduces the turnover significantly only in
the subsamples where the mean NEDTB and the mean ISH is more than the complete
sample and the mean MCAP is less than the mean MCAP of the complete sample.
205
IABLE 6.3
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
Independent variables	 . Variables affecting percentage change in all
directors (Fixed Effects)
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year (t-1) 	 00669
(0.890)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1)
	
-0.01652
(-0.0809)
Change in CEOin year (t-1) and (t-2)
	 7.0036-
(3.168)
Log of Board Size	 -53.868-
(-3.741)
Non-executive directors (%) 	 0.04616
(0.432)
Directors block shareholdings (%)
	
-0.02856
(0.868)
Square of directors block shareholdings (%)
	
--0.000006
(-0.0071)
Institutional block shareholdings CYO	
-0.08832
(-0.489)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%)
	 0.00113
(0.461)
Market capitalisation	
-0.001831
(-1.744)
Executive chairman	 -10.639-
(-2.694)
Chairman is CEO	 -12.573-
(-2.419)
R2 0.44
F Test 2.85-
[d.f.] (55,197)
Test Statistics
R2
Group Effects only (2) 0.31
X- Variables only(3) 0.22
X & Group Effects only(4) 0.44
X, Group & Time Effects only(5) 0.46
Hypotheses Tests
F Test
Group Effects 1.75-
(d.f. =217) (43,196)
Time Effects 1.285
(d.f. =217) (5,194)
Random Effects Model
LM Vs. (3) 0.29
(d.f.=1) (I)
Fixed Vs. Random Effects (Hausman) 28.54-
(d.f.) (12)
Number of Firms 44
Number of observations 254
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; 1 p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
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TABLE 6.5
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of director block shareholdings for annual turnover of
all directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	 -1.3382
(-0. 327)
 15 % > 5 %	 0.019853
(1.572)
 30%> 15%
	
5.2867
(1.119)
> 30 %	 5.5607
(1.161)
F Test 1.09
D.F. (4,190)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; .1 . p<0.05 ; Ip< 0.10;
TABLE 6.6
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for annual
turnover of all directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of all directors
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 15%	 5.97
(0.889)
 30%> 15 %	 1.3733
(0.213)
 45% > 30%	 -0.21209
(0.034)
>45%	 2.4523
(0.410)
F Test 0.97
D.F. (4,195)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; f p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
The size of the firm as measured by market capitalisation (MCAP) is a significant
influence and reduces the turnover of all directors except in the subsample where the
mean MCAP is less than the mean MCAP of the complete sample.
CEOCH or the dummy variable associated with change in the CEO is an important
influence on the turnover of all directors. Board changes are more closely aligned with
CEO changes than any other variable used in the study. We have evaluated the
significance of individual variables. This provides us with the basis for the evaluation
of the hypotheses proposed in section three. None of the financial performance
indicators have a significant influence in explaining turnover of all directors. This
reflects the objectives of the regulatory body overseeing governance changes and
supports hypothesis 2. In Table 4 we observe no significant influence of financial
performance indicators based on ROCE and ABNOR on CD.
The corporate governance characteristics that emerge as significant in explaining
governance changes measured by CD are CEOCH, LOGTB, MCAP, SP1 and SP2.
The variables LOGTB, SP1 and SP2 reflect the relative power of the incumbent
management vis-à-vis shareholders. LOGTB has a significant and negative influence
on CD. As cited above the literature suggests that larger boards are dysfunctional and
monitor the incumbent management less effectively (Yermack, 1996). Thus weaker
Boards reflecting a poorer ability and willingness to monitor the incumbent
management have an inverse relationship with the turnover of all directors. The
negative influence of board attribute variables SP1 and SP2 provide further evidence
on the close link between CEO replacement and turnover of all directors. Thus power
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relationships in explaining board changes are important. Thus we find that there is
evidence to support the hypotheses 2A and 2B. Block shareholdings and non-
executive directors do not emerge as countervailing powers to ,
 the authority of the
incumbent management.
Turnover of Executive Directors (CED) 
The estimates for the factors explaining the turnover of executive directors are
presented in Tables 6.7 to 6.12. Turnover of executive directors are also not
significantly related to financial performance. The F tests for the combined influence
of financial performance indicators are not significant for any of the performance
indicators. Thus performance does not play a role in explaining the turnover of
executive directors. As in the case of annual turnover of all directors none of the
performance indicators emerge as significant in explaining the turnover of executive
directors in any of the subsample estimates.
CED is inversely and significantly related to Board size measured by Log of TB and
the board size elasticity is -2.5784. Thus there is a large impact on CED of Log of
TB. Our empirical estimates also support the view that larger boards become
dysfunctional and are easier to control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993;
Yermack, 1996). This relationship between changes in executive directors and Log of
TB is valid for all subsample estimates except when the mean of the subsample for
directors and institutional block shareholdings is less than the mean of the complete
sample and where the mean non-executive directors on the board is higher than the
mean non-executive directorship of the complete sample.
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Directors block shareholdings (DSH) does not significantly affect the turnover of
executive directors in both the complete and subsample estimates. When DSH is
disaggregated into various levels (DSH5, DSH15, DSH30 and DSHMAX ), none of
the dummy coefficients are significant in explaining the turnover of executive
directors. The F value testing for the significance of these levels of DSH on CED is
also not significant. Institutional block shareholdings (ISH) do not emerge as
significant in explaining changes in CED in either the complete sample estimates or in
any of the subsample estimates. At the disaggregated levels the institutional
shareholdings ISH15, ISH30, ISH45 and ISHMAX have a significant and negative
impact on the turnover of executive directors. The F statistics measuring for impact of
these variables on the CED variable is significant. This result is valid for all the
subsample estimates. SP1 (Chairman is an Executive Chairman) has a significant and
negative influence on CED. However, SP2 (Chairman is also the CEO) does not have
a significant role in explaining governance changes. In the estimates based on the
subsamples we find that SP1 has consistent negative influence on the turnover in
executive directors except in the subsample of firms where the CEO changed during
the sample period and where the mean institutional block shareholding is higher than
the sample mean. SP2 fails to emerge as significant in any of the subsample estimates.
The size of the firm as measured by market capitalisation (MCAP) is significant in its
influence in reducing the annual turnover of executive directors.
As in the case of the turnover of all directors' board changes thus are closely aligned
with CEO changes. The CEOCH or the dummy variable associated with change in the
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TABLE 6.7
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
Independent variables Variables affecting percentage change in all
directors (Fixed Effects)
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year (t-1) 	 0.11674
(1.088)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1)
	
0.00268
(0.091)
Change in CEOin year (t-1) and (t-2)	 9.2845-
(2.944)
Log of Board Size	 -36.588
(1.801)
Non-executive directors (%)	 0.43614-
(2.860)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 -0.15894
(-0.267)
Square of directors block shareholdings (%) 	 -0.00138
(-0.119)
Institutional block shareholdings (%)	 0.00785
(0.030)
Square of Institutional block shareholding 5 (%)	 -0.0002
(-0.057)
Market capitalisation	 -0.002791;
(-1.869)
Executive chairman	 -16.195-
(-2.875)
Chairman is CEO	 -11.792
(1.590)
R 2 0.45
F Test 2.89-'
[di.] (55,197)
Test Statistics
It2
Group Effects only (2) 0.29
X- Variables only(3) 0.22
X & Group Effects only(4) 0.45
X, Group & Time Effects only(5) 0.47
Hypotheses Tests
F Test
4 Vs. (3) 1.891-
(d.f. =217) (43,198)
5 Vs. (4) 1.76
(d.f. =217) (5,194)
Random Effects Model
LM Vs. (3) 1.84
(d.f.= 1) (1)
Fixed Vs. random Effects (Hausman) 24.14'
.	 (d.f.) (12)
Number of Firms 44
Number of observations 254
t-values are in parentheses
** p <0.0001 ; * p <0.01 ;1* p<0.05 ; $p< 0.10;
8
.9 c 3;	 ce
.....	 cd	 Di)
-5 5 c o -a 0
u C " '1) ZCI. 0	 'LltA 4-.	 >	 . CO
sC	 114.	 et	 ''' ''	 <T) = 0. ,w) ',V, 0
.7	 •-•	 n.,,	 .-	 • -
0 "	 ti	 5	 ci.J
a) 0 V C.)u>-,E aoon
a., ,	 ir) ..-N
a \ ,-,	 N cO(:). cn	 1/40	 t•-•
oo cn	 0 •-•
-	 •	 c)	 •
.	 ,.._.	 .	 c)
<=)'-'	 0	 I,	 ......
e".nh
°O .:Too ,_,
C)	 -C,1
, , ,9 . o'	 > .,,, - : .7c, <124
U F., "	 0
o.
00 0
	
'1- N
o
c4ii	 0
o. .'-•	 ..) Z
__	 L. >. cd < hin0.) ..a	 cA	 = 0 .1- In
ON en	 0 Cl
cp,
CrN	 ,-...
,-.
0
2	 .> t".. li93.,	 ti,	 .	 -.
g 6- ri. 0c4
-c0
u
. 0
c'	 CL...--
6 C4
0
a)e_
13
0
>
•	 c.	 0
`5-% 4	 z
,-,1 ..	 co
rstkr)	 0	 f----	 •:1- h
0
a)x
CD
e
c)
.,_,
0a)
7.3	 Ca 2 n
-o	 .3 `. -
.-	 =0 ,, u =, . ,
2 ,S2,	 g 7); t_Lj
.-:	 00	 0
00 00	 ON kr)tr, cv	 cn c)
CD	 •
CD CD	 '
c." -2-'	 6 .._.•
n0 0.,
,./-)	 --
0
c.v.'
0 --13 >, .c	 c4
->	 <
U)
z
o
I-,
_
--
a)
8
=
=
a)
.
=o0
a)
.....
-
0	 c:..)E......
ix
0
0e) I- cu (I) ,,,	 Z
. -
I—
=
c
4—
0
,..,	 7 -,,, CO
-. „ < co .n	 -4- N 0U)
V..1 Z
i--
c
W
s-
CD
0
lu: .E. „, c
-, ,.,;..(3	 (,3,,L .'
2 7
- .7	 kr) S
•— Cr:	 1
-. CD	
C,1"
 - 66 ..-.
1/40 Cr'
.	 .--.
0	 ^N
ril CI
'< U)LLI
°
ti)
tE 6›...	 0
—	 g
a
E-1 -
Ce ccj -CD
_
0
=
=
C
c •	 gI—
<
fc.2
i—I
(1)
a.
col
4,
.75
al
.r..
`5:, a) 0
(V g 7
(N -C ' MI
:g	 .1 <
ON	 C\ ...",
v-, --,
c-, c,	
ON ON
.-. tn,-.
..--.
,..0	 c:IN
RI 0	 00 0	 .	 N In
__
C.) >
•
•T	 gg) .o
; 
LIS
-"'	 C..)
CD 0 	 0
c;	
0	 -6 ..... c3 cv"
Z
ct
tz4
te--(
CI.
a)
CI
•	 o
'5% E 0g
0
4-.
C..)
C1
Sal CC0
- 00 z
ca On
,Zr •-.	 00 ,-..C-••	 00	 1/40	 .--.
..---.
N-
Z - <
-o	 ,_:
0
‘.0 CO	 CV 01
-. c::.'	 0 0
-.	 ,....,	 0	 -
_. 00	 •••-•"	 c)	 •.-.,
C::,	 cp,
sc, --
ci	 -(-4
04
-
.3
>
cu
CO
.
17	 cnC)>.,	 112
o	 al
a	 _c
to
cu	 c
o
(I)
._	 E
t.1
co Lii- ,....
03	 = L.aLI.(..)	 nI-)
To
*-0
C
o
. .—.	 ". CC
.
E u-I	 E 0
. 0	 0 z
Li: •-• 0(1) ,...	 C co21 <
CC '.:1--	 < ---
TABLE 6.9
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of directors block shareholdings on annual turnover
of executive directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGSr.
<5%
	
-0.15078
(-0.026)
 15%>5%	 0.02087
(1.147)
 30% > 15%	 0.3576
((0.053)
> 30 %	 -0.27878
(-0.040)
F Test 0.33
D.F. (4, 195)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; Ip< 0.10;
TABLE 6.10
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings on annual
turnover of executive directors
Dep. variable: Annual turnover of executive directors
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGSr.
 15%	 -21.641'
(-2.309)
 30%> 15 %	 -28.449—
(-3.167)
... 45%> 30%	 24.566—
(2.864)
>45%	 -25.3131—
(-3.039)
F Test 3.26'
D.F. (4, 195)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
TABLE 6.11
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON THE BOARD
YEARS MEAN VALUE OF NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS
1989 37.92
1990 39.05
1991 41.63
1992 43.37
1993 42.83
1994 45.40
TABLE 6.12
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INSTANCES OF CEO DUALITY
YEARS SP1 SP2
1989 28 6
1990 27 6
1991 26 7
1992 23 6
1993 23 3
1994 21 3
CEO is an important influence on the annual turnover of executive directors. This
result is valid for all the subsample estimates. The proportion of non-executive
directors on the Board (NEDTB) has a positive and significant influence on the
turnover of all executive directors (elasticity 1.2788). The direction of the influence
and significance is the same for all the subsample estimates. There can be several
alternative explanations for this finding on non-executive directors. The
appointment(s) of the non-executive directors have to be approved by the bank of
England. From the human capital perspective, it has been argued that non-executive
directors need to signal their expertise and hence will monitor the executive
management (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Non-executive directors may have the
necessary incentive to monitor if they have sufficient financial involvement in the
firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hart, 1995; Weisbach, 1988). Baysinger and Zardkoohi
(1986) and Booth and Tehranian (1993) finding that in regulated environments non-
executive directors will be appointed for their 'public relations 'role can also be a
possible explanation for this finding on non-executive directors. Thus non-executive
directors in regulated environments where important consideration is given to the
appropriateness of the person will lead to greater emphasis being given to their public
relations role and lesser emphasis being given to their monitoring responsibilities.
The estimates provide us with the basis for the evaluation of the hypotheses set up in
section three. As in the case of the CD variable we find that none of the financial
performance indicators have a significant influence in explaining turnover of the
executive directors. This reflects the objectives of the regulatory body overseeing
governance changes. This supports hypothesis 1.
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CEOCH, LOGTB, NEDTB and SP1 emerge as significant in explaining the turnover
of executive directors. LOGTB has a significant and negative influence on CED. The
presence of a chairman who is an executive chairman significantly reduces the
turnover of executive directors. We do not find the traditional conception of CEO
duality where the Chairman is also the CEO to have any impact on the turnover of
executive directors. Institutional shareholdings measured as a continuous variable ISH
and ISHSQ do not influence CED significantly. However, at the disaggregated level
ISH has a significant and negative influence in effecting turnover of all directors as
measured by CED. We find that the proportion of non-executive directors does have a
positive influence on the turnover of executive directors. Thus non-executive directors
are a countervailing influence on the power of the incumbent management. This could
reflect the effectiveness of the supervisory regime in appointing independent directors
to the board and supports hypothesis 2A. There is limited evidence in support of
hypothesis 2B. Institutional shareholdings are significant in their influence on the
annual turnover of executive directors only when we disaggregate the institutional
shareholdings in terms of ISH15, ISH30, ISH45 and ISHMAX.
Change in CEO (CEO)
The estimates using the CEO dependent variable are based on logit binomial model.
The logit fixed effects model could not be estimated as the model failed to converge.
The random effects probit model does not indicate the existence of random effects as
p is less than 0.001 and the estimates are unchanged from the probit estimates
(Greene, 1997).
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The estimates for the change in the CEO are reported in Tables 6.13 to 6.17. In the
full regression model, reported in Table 6.13, changes in CEO are not significantly
dependent on the financial performance indicators. Wald tests for the significance of
financial performance indicators are not, significant for any of the performance
indicators. As shown in Table 6.13 the logit effects estimates using these performance
indicators suggest that the likelihood of CEO replacement is not affected by these
indicators. In the subsample estimates measures based on ABNOR emerge as
significant in some of the subsamples. The Wald statistics are significant in the
subsamples where the mean of block shareholdings of directors and market
capitalisation is less than the complete sample mean. In the Table 6.15 we compare
the financial performance. This evaluates the ability of the governance structure to
replace poorly performing CEOs with better CEOs. There is no significant difference
in performance means 1-year before, 1-year after and 2-year after CEO change with
the performance means of the year of the CEO change. We also find that none of the
financial performance indicators have a significant influence in explaining turnover of
CEOs. As in the case of the CD and the CED variable, this reflects the objectives of
the regulatory body overseeing governance changes.
The influence of directors block shareholdings (DSH) on the likelihood of CEO
change is not significant. In the subsample estimates DSH has no influence on the
likelihood of CEO replacement. When DSH is disaggregated into various levels
(DSH5, DSH15,'DSH30 and DSHMAX ) only DSHMAX increases the likelihood of
CEO replacement significantly. The Wald statistics testing for the significance of
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TABLE 6.13
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Likelihood of CEO change
All variables
Independent variables All variables
Returns on capital employed (ROCE) in year (t-1)	 -0.00239
(-0.293)
Abnormal returns on shares (ABNOR) in year (t-1)
	 0.00389
(1.545)
Board Size	 0.05945'
(2.026)
Non-executive directors (%) 	 0.02939-
(3.722)
Directors block shareholdings (%) 	 0.00079
(0.016)
Square of directors block shareholdings (%)	 -0.00173
(-01.434)
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 	 -0.031081
(-1.777)
Square of Institutional block shareholdings (%)	 0.00007
(0.341)
Log of market capitalisation	 -0.89250-
(-3.845)
Executive chairman	 -0.038521
(-1.432)
Chairman is CEO	 0.0708241
(1.805)
Age of CEO	 -0.01173
(1.025)
Number of years as CEO
	
0.08257-
(2.727)
LL -78.03
Res LL -97.96
X' 39.85*.
(12)
Number of Firms 44
Number of observations 254
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; .1. p<0.05 ; tp< 0.10;
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TABLE 6.16
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of directors block shareholdings for likelihood of
CEO change
	
-
Dependent variable:: Change in CEO
DIRECTORS BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 5%	
-0.6144
(-0.015)
 15 %> 5 %	 0.00230
(0.200)
 30% > 15%
	
-0.02088
(-0.043)
> 30 %	 -1.7162*
(2.448)
Wald 6.30
(4) (4)
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; tp<0.10;
TABLE 6.17
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
Significance of institutional block shareholdings for likelihood of
CEO change
Dependent variable:: Change in CEO
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCK
SHAREHOLDINGS.
 15%	 -2.5307t
(2.294)
 30%> 15 %	 -3.3270**
(-3.012)
 45%> 30%
	
-3.3562**
(3.059)
>45%	 -3.5805**
(-3.430)
Wald 18.49**
(4) (4)
0.00
t-values are in parentheses
** p < 0.0001 ; p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; tp<0.10;
these levels of DSH on CEO are not significant either for the complete sample or for
the subsample estimates. Institutional block shareholdings (ISH) is significant and
reduces the likelihood of CEO change in the complete sample,estimates. The square
of the ISH variable ISHSQ however, fails to emerge as significant thus suggesting
that the likelihood of CEO change does not change with the level of institutional
block shareholdings. In the subsample estimates the institutional block shareholding is
significant where the mean director block shareholding is less than the mean of the
complete subsample. When we disaggregate the ISH variable in terms of levels of
block shareholdings (ISH15, ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX) we find that at the
disaggregated level all the dummy coefficients are significant in reducing the
likelihood of CEO replacement. The Wald statistics is also significant for the
disaggregated level of institutional block shareholdings. The proportion of non-
executive directors on the Board (NEDTB) is also significant and increases the
likelihood of CEO change. The direction and significance of the MCAP and NEDTB
are valid for all the subsample estimates.
Board size measured by TB is inversely related to the replacement of the CEO. We
tried out both Log of TB and TB and chose TB. Both the coefficient and the t value of
TB were higher. Larger Boards are thus less likely to replace their CEOs. This inverse
relationship between the likelihood of a CEO change and Log of TB is valid for all
subsample estimates. This is in conformity with the literature that larger boards
become dysfunctional and are easier to control (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen,
1993; Yermack, .1996).
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SP1 (Chairman is an Executive Chairman) does not have a significant and negative
influence on the likelihood of a change in the CEO. However, SP2 (Chairman is also
the CEO) does have a significant role in explaining governance changes as reflected
by the CEO variable. It has the effect of increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement
suggesting that Chairman who are also CEOs are more stringently observed, probably
by the regulatory bodies. In the estimates based on the subsamples we find that SP1
has a consistent negative influence on the likelihood of CEO replacement except in
the subsample where the mean NEDTB is higher than the mean of the complete
sample. SP2 fails to emerge as significant in any of the subsample estimates.
The size of the firm as measured by the Log of market capitalisation (MCAP) is
significant in its influence in decreasing the likelihood of CEO change. Tenure of the
CEO is significant and increases the likelihood of CEO change. This is explained by
the average age of CEOs in AFIs being 57.56 as opposed to 53.13 in the case of
manufacturing firms.
It has not been possible to estimate the significance of the fixed effects. However,
inference can be drawn regarding the role of the firm specific attributes which are
unobservable using secondary data (Thompson, 1997). The X 2 statistic is significant
at 00.001 percent level of significance. However, their overall explanatory power in
explaining the likelihood of CEO change is low. The likelihood ratio index used to
assess the goodness of fit yields the value of 0.2085. Thus there are important
unobservable firm-specific attributes which influences the likelihood of CEO
replacement which are not captured by the secondary data analysis.
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Financial performance indicators do not affect the likelihood of CEO change. This
supports hypothesis 1 that states that financial performance indicators and more
specifically stock market based performance indicators will not be significantly
associated with top management turnover. The evidence in support of hypothesis 2A
and 2B that state that top management turnover will be positively associated with the
proportion of non-executive directors and the level of institutional block
shareholdings is mixed. Increase in block shareholdings has the effect of reducing the
likelihood of CEO change while the proportion of non-executive directors on the
board increases the likelihood. The corporate governance characteristics, which
emerge as significant in explaining control change reflected by CEO, are TB,
NEDTB, ISH, and SP2 suggests that the likelihood of CEO replacement is largely the
outcome of the Board attributes. ISH has a negative and significant impact on the
CEO variable. This is an interesting result suggesting that institutional block
shareholdings function as insiders in support of the incumbent CEO reducing the
likelihood of its CEO replacement. The presence of a chairman who is a CEO,
however, significantly increases the likelihood of CEO replacement. Non-executive
directors however, are a countervailing power to the incumbent CEO and increase the
likelihood of CEO replacement.
6.5 Comparison of Estimates of the AFI and the Manufacturing Sectors
In this section we compare the attributes of the governance mechanisms. The
comparison is based on the empirical analysis of the manufacturing firms and the
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authorised financial institutions in the United Kingdom, carried out in this and the
previous chapter.
Data Characteristics
The annual turnover of executive and all directors is similar in the case of
manufacturing firms and the AFIs. However, turnover of CEOs in APIs is 13% as
compared to 10% in the case of manufacturing firms. Instances of hostile take-over
bid are far lower, at 2% in AFIs as compared to 5% in manufacturing. AFI boards are
larger, the average size being 11.88 as compared to 7.35 of manufacturing firms. The
AFI boards have on average more non-executive directors (41.61%) as compared to
manufacturing firms (38.69%). Instances of dual appointments are far higher in
manufacturing firms when compared to APIs. In only 12% of the cases we find dual
appointments in AFIs as compared to 36% in the case of manufacturing firms. The
CEOs in AFIs are older (57.56) years in comparison to manufacturing (53.13) years.
Comparison of independence of means of subsamples
Manufacturing firms, which had a change in the CEO in the sample period, were
significantly smaller while in AFIs the firms were significantly larger as measured by
market capitalisation. Institutional block shareholding in the manufacturing firms
which underwent a CEO change was significantly larger as compared to AFIs where
the institutional block shareholding was significantly smaller. Instances of CEO
duality were significantly higher in AFIs, which underwent a CEO change. In
comparison instances of dual appointment were significantly lower in manufacturing
firms which underwent a CEO change. In manufacturing firms characterised by CEO
226
duality the annual turnover of all directors and executive directors was significantly
lower. No such significant difference is observed in the case of AFIs. Firms with
mean institutional block shareholding above the sample mean are less likely to have
duality in the chairman CEO appointments. No such significant difference is observed
in the case of AFIs.
Estimates
Turnover of All Directors (CD)
Financial performance indicators do not influence the turnover of all directors in the
AFIs but they have a significant negative influence on the turnover of all directors in
the case of manufacturing firms. CEOCH and LOGTB have a similar influence on the
CD variable. In the case of manufacturing firms the size variable is LOG of MCAP
suggesting that turnover of all directors declines at a decreasing rate with increasing
MCAP. In AFIs the turnover of all directors declines with increasing MCAP at a
constant rate. Directors block shareholdings influence the CD positively in the case of
manufacturing firms. However, they have no influence on the CD variable in the case
of AFIs. The SP1 and SP2 duality variables in the case of AFIs significantly reduce
the turnover of all the directors. These two variables have no such influence in the
case of the manufacturing firms. At the disaggregated level of directors block
shareholdings both DSH5, DSH15, DSH30, DSHMAX have significant negative
influence on the CD variable in the case of manufacturing firms but we observe no
such influence in the case of AFIs. For institutional block shareholdings ISH15,
ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX, have a positive and significant influence on the governance
change variable CD but have no significant impact on the CD variable in AFIs.
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Turnover of Executive Directors (CED)
Financial performance indicators do not influence the turnover of executive directors
in the AFIs but they have a significant negative influence on the turnover of all
directors in the case of manufacturing firms. CEOCH, NEDTB and LOGTB have a
similar influence on the CED variable in both groups of firms. In the case of
manufacturing firms the size variable is LOG of MCAP suggesting that turnover of
executive directors declines at a decreasing rate with increasing MCAP. In AFIs the
turnover of executive directors declines with increasing MCAP at a constant rate.
Directors block shareholdings influence the CED positively in the case of
manufacturing firms. However, they have no influence on the CED variable in the
case of AFIs. The turnover of the executive directors is significantly reduced by the
SP1 and SP2 duality variables in the case of manufacturing firms but only SP2
influence the CED variable in AFIs. At the disaggregated level of directors block
shareholdings DSH5, DSH15, DSH30, DSHMAX have no significant influence on
the CED variable in the case of manufacturing firms and AFIs. For institutional block
shareholdings ISH15, ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX again have no significant influence on
the governance change variable CED in manufacturing but have a significant negative
impact on the CED variable in the case AFIs. This shows that institutional
shareholders function as insiders in the turnover of executive directors in AFIs. The
proportion of non-executive directors on the Board increases significantly the turnover
of executive directors, as in the case of manufacturing firms. However, the impact of
non-executive directors in the case of AFIs is much larger with an elasticity of 1.2788
as compared to 0.7654 in manufacturing firms. This reflects the greater effectiveness
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of non-executive directors in AF1s. In the estimates involving the CED governance
change variable in AFIs we do not observe any period or time effects as in
manufacturing. From Tables 5.11,6.11, 5.12 and 6.12, we obserVe a similar decline in
SP1 and SP2 and a rise in the proportion of non-executive directors across the sample
period in AFIs and in manufacturing.
Change in CEO (CEO)
The estimates for the CEO dependent variable are based on Logit analysis in AFIs and
not on Logit fixed effects analysis as in the case of manufacturing. The AFIs had
similar data characteristics except that instances of duality where the chairman is also
the CEO were fewer, only 12% as compared to 36% in the case of manufacturing. In
AFIs the financial performance indicators are not a significant influence on the
likelihood of CEO replacement. We observe that in manufacturing three of the
performance indicators significantly affect the likelihood of CEO replacement. The
performance indicators suggest that there is little correspondence between
performance before and after CEO change in AFIs. We find the stock market responds
significantly and positively to CEO replacement in manufacturing firms. The board
size variable, which affects the likelihood of CEO replacement in the case of AFIs, is
TB and not Log of TB as in manufacturing. This suggests that the likelihood of CEO
replacement is not affected by the increase of board size in AFIs as was observed in
manufacturing. There are important differences between manufacturing and AFIs in
the role of block shareholdings. In manufacturing, directors block shareholding
significantly increase the likelihood of CEO replacement. In the AFIs the directors
block shareholdings have no significant role; however, the institutional shareholdings
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function as insiders and significantly reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement of the
incumbent CEO. At the disaggregated level of directors block shareholdings DSH5,
DSH15, DSH30, DSHMAX have a significant influence on the CEO variable in the
case of manufacturing firms but not for AFIs. For institutional block shareholdings
ISH15, ISH30, ISH45, ISHMAX again have no significant influence on the
governance change variable CEO in manufacturing but have a significant negative
impact on the CEO variable in the case AFIs. The size variable is insignificant in
manufacturing but the Log of MCAP significantly reduces the likelihood of CEO
replacement. There are important differences in terms of the role of the duality
variables. SP1 has a significant role in reducing the likelihood of CEO replacement in
the case of manufacturing firms but this does not emerge as a significant variable in
the case of the AFT firms. However, the role of the SP2 variable in APIs is interesting.
SP2 has the effect of increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement suggesting that
they are more likely to be held accountable in AFIs.
6.6 Conclusion
From the estimates it is clear that financial performance indicators based on returns on
capital employed and abnormal stock market returns have no influence on the
governance change variables. Thus the evidence supports hypothesis 1. As shown in
section 2 the institutional context of banks implies that the working of the market for
corporate control is severely constrained by the regulatory environment. The
regulatory structure does not aim for shareholder wealth maximisation but minimising
the probability of individual bank failure and wider systemic failure of the financial
system.
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Hypothesis 2 relates to the role of non-executive directors and institutional block
shareholder in ensuring the accountability of top management. The evidence here for
banks is mixed. The proportion of non-executive directors on the board increases the
annual turnover of executive directors and the likelihood of CEO change. The
institutional block shareholdings are insignificant in their influence on the annual
turnover of all directors and executive directors. However, the institutional block
shareholders reduce the likelihood of CEO change. Barclay and Holderness (1989)
also find that the objective of large shareholders and small shareholders may not be
similar and large shareholders may gain by functioning as insiders. Thus the
institutional block shareholders have an insider role in corporate governance change
in banks. Measures like the risk weighted capital adequacy requirement do not appear
to induce greater monitoring of incumbent management CEO by large shareholders.
This is significant as CEO change has important implications for changes in top
management.
In light of the weak MCC in the banking sector the expectation is that the regulatory
authorities will work towards effective internal corporate governance mechanisms.
The lack of significant association of various financial performance indicators with
disciplinary changes in top management is expected. The goal of the regulator is not
shareholder wealth maximisation. However, we do expect that the board attributes
over which the Bank of England exercises close control, such as the appointment of
directors and the changes in ownership, will have larger role in disciplining top
management. The estimates however, suggest that directors and institutional block
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shareholdings do not have a significant role in the annual turnover of all directors and
executive directors and function as insiders and reduce the likelihood of CEO change.
We expect non-executive directors, to be more effective in disciplining top
management in banks in comparison to the manufacturing sector. From the human
capital perspective, it has been argued that non-executive directors need to signal their
expertise and hence will monitor the executive management (Fama and Jensen, 1983).
We expect this to be the case given the role of the Bank of England in their
appointment. We find that non-executive directors increase the likelihood of CEO
change. In the manufacturing sector the non-executive directors did not influence the
likelihood of CEO change.
The set of variables, which emerge as significant and the direction of their influence
suggest that governance changes are significantly influenced by board attributes,
which reflect the power of the incumbent management. Board turnover as reflected by
the annual turnover of all directors and executive directors are consistently a function
of CEO change. The CEO change dummy has a significant and positive influence in
explaining the annual turnover of all directors and executive directors. The other
characteristic reflecting the role of power relations on the board relates to board
duality. In the estimates board duality reduce the possibility for disciplining of top
management. The role of block shareholdings suggests that internal governance
mechanisms are ineffective and not more effective given the restraints on the working
of the market for corporate control. The institutional block shareholdings are in fact
pro management and reduce the likelihood of replacement of the incumbent CEO. A
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possible explanation for this could be the close links between institutional investors
and banks.
,
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) define the governance objective in banks as a choice
between a risky 'continue' and a conservative 'stop' action. When performance is
good control should stay with shareholders. Regulators should stay away from getting
involved in the governance of banks. Shareholders will however have a passive
involvement in the governance of banks. They attribute the passivity of shareholders
to their limited liability. However, the limited liability does not lead to shareholders
being passive in the corporate governance of manufacturing firms. The discussion in
section 2 shows that their passivity can be attributed to the near absence of the market
for corporate control and the opacity of the business decisions in banks. According to
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) the regulators will intervene only when performance is
poor. This is the 'stop' action when the incumbent management will not be allowed to
continue. The threshold for this change in control can be instigated by a minimum
solvency requirement. Our discussion of the regulatory environment shows that this
dichotomy does not mirror practice. The Bank of England has close involvement in
changes in the top management and ownership. Further the bank has extensive and
regular informal consultations with individual banks. However, the primary
motivation of the regulator is the threshold concern of depositor's security and
systemic stability. The empirical analysis presented in this article shows that there is a
poor correspondence between governance change and performance. Internal
governance mechanisms like the institutional bloc shareholders in fact reduce the
likelihood of governance changes.
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Further research is needed to identify measures that will reduce shareholder passivity
in what Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) characterise as the `cOntinue' phase of the
corporate governance of banks. Flannery (1998) in a review of US empirical evidence
on the use of market information in the prudential regulation of banks concludes that
market investors can take on greater responsibility of the corporate governance of
financial services firms. Measures that will ensure a greater role for market forces in
this phase and a reduction in the passivity of shareholders need to be identified.
Further research into the role of non-executive directors and institutional investors is
needed to understand the factors, which affect the effectiveness of internal governance
mechanisms in banks.
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CHAPTER 7
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM: A REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
STUDY
7.1 Introduction
In this Chapter we bring together the major arguments and findings of the thesis to
form a consistent understanding of corporate governance as a process. In section 7.2
we present the principal arguments of the thesis. In section 7.3 we identify the
direction of future work and the operationalisation of the concept of procedural justice
in the context of shareholder management relationship.
7.2 Corporate Governance: A review of the discussion
Chapters 2 and section 4.4 of Chapter 4 present a review of the literature. The interest
in corporate governance has its origins in the separation of ownership from control.
Since the 1980s there has been considerable interest in the link between corporate
governance and the competitiveness of firms. The framework for corporate
governance provides the context in which managerial decisions are taken. Phrases like
short-termism' or managerial proclivity for short-term returns in decision making
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have come to be closely identified with corporate governance in the literature. In the
case of the UK and USA the emphasis on financial information flows in corporate
governance is held as a factor behind the alleged short term 'decision horizons of
managers. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, recent empirical studies have shown
that in the case of Japanese managers financial information flows have similar
relevance. The difficulty with the focus on financial information flows is that the
effects on competitiveness are seen to follow from the signalling mechanism, the
stock market, rather than the institutional structure of corporate governance.
Chapter 3 provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of corporate governance.
Incomplete contracts between shareholders and managers provide the justification for
the use of governance mechanisms. However, the interpretation of incomplete
contracts in corporate governance needs to be extended to incomplete contracts,
which, Schwartz (1992) describes as strongly non-contractible. Contracts between
shareholders and managers are not discrete in time; expectations and obligations are
added in course of the contract. Termination of a contract is in effect a sanction, a
consequence of unfulfilled or changed expectations. There are three possible modes of
strategic co-operation between the shareholders and managers. Co-operation between
shareholders and managers based on a combination of the justice and decentralised
mode of co-operation can provide a basis for the design of a corporate governance
structure. In Chapter 3 we show that the pure procedural justice mode can be the only
feasible mode of co-operation between managers and shareholders. The other possible
basis of strategic co-operation can be the decentralised mode. In the property rights
view of the firm the shareholders are likely to adopt a dominant strategy. This will
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lead to a breakdown in strategic co-operation between shareholders and managers and
an exacerbation of opportunism in shareholder management relationship. Pure
procedural justice as a basis for strategic co-operation requires equality in the
opportunity in the exchange and influence of messages between the contracting
parties. Such an exchange of information can be in terms of structured information
like financial reports or it can be in terms unstructured communication or deliberation
through for a like the company of board.
In Chapter 5 we examine the relevance of unstructured communication for effective
corporate governance in the manufacturing firms in the United Kingdom. Chapter 4
provides the hypotheses, the estimation technique and variable definitions. Relevance
of unstructured communication for effective corporate governance is proxied by the
role of directors' block shareholdings in top management turnover. The estimation
technique also provides an assessment of the role of firm specific factors in top
management turnover. Evidence on the role of firm specific heterogeneity will be
consistent with the need for deliberation for effective corporate governance.
The market for corporate control is relatively more active in the UK than in any other
country. Hostile take-overs are proportionately more frequent in the UK than in the
US, the other comparative corporate governance environment. The discussion in
section 2.4 suggests the preference for dominant strategy by shareholders in corporate
governance in the United Kingdom. This leads us to the second set of empirical issues
examined in the thesis. The preference for a dominant strategy by shareholders will
lead to the exacerbation of opportunism in corporate governance. Power relation will
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be instrumental in top management turnover. Principal agent issues are nested in the
evaluation.
The empirical findings in Chapters 5 provide evidence that support the conceptual
framework proposed in Chapter 3. Greater insight into the relevance and form of
unstructured communication to promote strategic co-operation in the procedural
justice mode can be gained by using the framework as a basis for primary data based
investigation.
Financial performance indicators based on returns on capital employed (ROCE) and
abnormal stock market returns (ABNOR) significantly and negatively influences the
CD and CED variables. The findings are similar to earlier studies on US and Japanese
firms summarised in Table 2.2 in Chapter 2. However, the partial elasticities of these
performance indicators are extremely low and thus have a very small impact on CD
and CED. We are not sure what leads to the replacement of the CEO. Some of the
financial performance indicators have an inverse relationship with CEO replacement.
Further, the analysis suggests that underperformance of CEOs is followed by a
replacement but the succession does not lead to a significantly better performance
even though the stock market welcomes the replacement with higher share prices in a
manner, which resembles the stock market response to hostile takeovers. This is
evidence to support the view that focal points will be significant but will have a very
small influence on the governance change variables. The significance of the
performance indicators for the likelihood of CEO replacement is less clear and the
financial performance indicators do not influence the likelihood of TO. This is
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consistent with previous empirical work on UK firms (Conyon 1998; Franks and
Mayer, 1996). The low elasticity of focal points indicates the limited relevance of
structured information for top management accountability.
Directors' block shareholdings and the percentage of non-executive directors on the
Board have a positive influence on turnovers represented by the CD and CED
variables. Larger director block shareholdings however increase the likelihood of a
CEO replacement. The evidence on directors' block shareholdings needs is consistent
with the view that directors' represent firm specific 'expert knowledge' (Fama and
Jensen1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997).
The empirical analysis of manufacturing firms in Chapter 5 shows that the
conventionally identified variables used to explain corporate governance change do
not explain as much of the turnover of all directors (CD) and executive directors
(CED), as do the group effects. There are important unobservable firm-specific
attributes that explain these turnovers. The size of the firm-specific effects is also
significant for the likelihood of CEO replacement and tender offers (TO). The large
firm fixed effects are consistent with the need for deliberation between shareholders
and board managers will be critical for effective corporate governance as these firm
fixed effects are unobservable and cannot be deciphered on the basis of structured
communication.
Regarding power relations within the Board, the set of variables which emerge as
significant and the direction of their influence suggest that governance changes
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represented by CD and CED are largely explained by the incidence of CEO change.
The CEOCH dummy has a significant and inverse influence in explaining the
behaviour of CD and CED variables. The other characteristic relating to the Chairman
being an executive chairman (SP1) has a similar influence on CD and CED. However,
we do know that large boards and executive chairman reduce the likelihood of a CEO
replacement.
The likelihood of hostile takeovers increases with executive chairman and large
boards and declines with the percentage of non-executive directors on the Boards. In
the independence of means tests we find that larger boards have a significantly higher
percentage of non-executive directors. The literature suggests that large boards will be
less effective in monitoring the incumbent management. The association of larger
boards with a larger percentage of non-executive directors and the inverse association
of NEDTB with the TO variable and a positive association with the CED variable
suggests that the non-executive directors are effective as mechanisms for internal
governance and reduce the likelihood of the use of the external corporate governance
mechanism. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the MCC being the court of last
resort (Jensen, 1988).
The empirical analysis of the banks was undertaken as an evaluation of the effects of
the working of the MCC for corporate governance. However, the absence of an active
MCC is not the only difference between the banks and the manufacturing firms. The
nature of the corporate governance problem in banks is very different from that of the
manufacturing firms. The regulatory authority like the Bank of England and now the
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Financial Services Authority substitute for the role of the MCC in the corporate
governance of banks. However, the goal of the regulatory authority in the AFI sector
is not shareholder wealth maximisation. The objective of the regulatory authority is
the security of the depositors' funds and financial and systemic stability.
Financial performance indicators based on returns on capital employed (ROCE) and
abnormal stock market returns (ABNOR) have no influence on the governance change
variables CD, CED and CEO variables. Further, the analysis suggests that
underperformance of CEOs is followed by a replacement but the succession does not
lead to a significantly better financial performance indicator.
The institutional context of banks, elaborated in Section 6.2 suggests that the
regulatory environment shapes the working of the market for corporate control. The
regulatory structure does not aim for shareholder wealth maximisation but the
minimising the probability of individual bank failure and wider systemic failure of the
financial system.
Analysis of power relations within the board identifies a set of variables which
emerge as significant and the direction of their influence suggest that governance
changes are significantly influenced by board attributes which reflect the power of the
incumbent management. Board turnover as reflected by the CD and CED governance
change variables are consistently a function of CEO change. The CEOCH dummy has
a significant and inverse influence in explaining the behaviour of CD and CED
variables. The other characteristic relating to the Chairman being an executive
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chairman (SP1) has a similar influence on CD and CED. The likelihood of CEO
replacement is less clearly understood. From the estimates we observe significant
variables which reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement Large boards and
chairman who are also CEOs reduce the likelihood of CEO replacement. The role of
block shareholdings suggests that internal governance mechanisms are ineffective and
not more effective given the restraints on the working of the market for corporate
control. Directors block shareholdings are not a significant influence on any of three
measures of internal governance evaluated in the study. The institutional block
shareholdings are in fact pro management and reduce the likelihood of replacement of
the incumbent CEO. At the disaggregated level we find similar evidence on the role of
institutional block shareholdings for the turnover of executive directors. A possible
explanation for this can be the close links between banks and institutional investors.
The percentage of non-executive directors on the Board, however, is a countervailing
influence; it has a positive influence on the turnover of executive directors and
increases the likelihood of CEO change.
7.3 Suggestions for future work
The evidence provides the justification for enquiring into the structure of deliberation
that will conform to the requirements of strategic co-operation in the procedural
justice mode. Similar investigation on procedural justice has been carried out in the
context of entrepreneur-investor interactions, the management of innovation teams
and headquarters-subsidiary relations in strategic decision-making (Kim and
Mauborgne, 1991; Korine, 1997; Sapienza and Korsgaard, 1996). To identify the form
and structure of deliberation that will be the basis of strategic co-operation in the
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procedural justice mode, an evaluation of managerial and shareholder perceptions will
be necessary. This will require identification of what constitutes procedural justice
from the point of view of shareholders and managers. As mentioned earlier Kim and
Mauborgne (1998) list three requirements for procedural justice in strategic decision
procedures, viz., explanation, engagement and clarity of expectations. Primary data
gathered from shareholders or managers could be the basis of identification of
processes that will constitute a procedurally just perceptions in shareholder
management relationships.
Previous research has produced a consistent set of components of procedural justice
(Kim and Mauborgne, 1991; Korine, 1997). However, it has also been noted in the
literature on procedural justice that different emphasises can be placed on the
procedural justice components depending upon the relationship being studied (Tyler
and Lind, 1990). In the specific context of shareholder management relationship
procedural justice has been interpreted as equality in the opportunity and influence of
messages.
To be able to identify the components of procedural justice in corporate governance
we follow the research design of the studies by Kim and Mauborgne (1991); Korine
(1997). In the first stage an open-ended question is posed to shareholders (like
institutions) and managers (executive non-executive directors with and without
shareholding interests). The respondents can be asked to recall one incident in their
interaction, which they recall as particularly fair or unfair. This interaction can be
further specified in the event of top management turnover. They can then be asked to
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specify one factor that made it most unfair or fair. In the research design the responses
are paraphrased and abstracted into simple statements and reworded in the fair
direction by the experimenters. The phrases are then retyped on indexed cards and
given to either top managers or to research colleagues. Each participant is asked to
classify the simple statements into categories using the Q sort technique (Korine
1997). The categories, which have clusters of statements with 75% overlap, are
retained. Thus for a response category to be identified a set of two statements is
grouped by atleast 75% of the subjects. If the number of categories is large then the
process is repeated this time the overlap requirement being close to 100%. The second
list of categories is used to frame a questionnaire, which can then be mailed to a wider
group of shareholders and managers. These questionnaires can be related to
organisation extra-role behaviour, performance of the firm, long term decisions, board
characteristics, board processes. As opposed to strategic decision contexts some of
this information can be obtained from secondary sources.
We can also examine the relationship between the transparency of the board and long-
term decision behaviour like R&D expenditure. Transparency of the board will be an
indication of the equality in the opportunity and influence of messages, a requirement
for procedural justice. The level of disclosure relating to executive remuneration, the
proportion of non-affiliated directors on the board, existence of board committees will
reflect transparency. A positive relationship between transparency and long term
decision behaviour measured by expenditure on R&D will show the value of board
processes that are procedural justice for long- term decisions
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The way forward in corporate governance studies is to identify the structure and basis
for deliberation between shareholders and managers. This will provide insights for a
corporate governance structure that will reduce the scope for attitudinal opportunism
without inducing opportunistic behaviour. Appropriate policy and regulatory response
can then be identified for a corporate governance structure that corrects not only for
the imbalance of power but is also the basis for superior decision-making.
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APPENDIX
Table A.5.1
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (CHANGE OF CEO)
NO CHANGE IN	 CHANGE IN	 INDEPEND
CEO	 CEO	 ENCE OF
MEANS
Variable	 MEAN	 MEAN	 t-value
Annual turnover of executive directors 9.51 20.18 8.97**
Annual turnover of all directors 9.93 17.54 8.07**
Hostile takeover Bid 0.05 0.04 -0.42
Board size 7.40 7.29 -1.871
Non-executive directors (%) 37.10 40.40 2.62*
Directors block shareholdings (%) 11.11 7.03 -3.93**
Directors block shareholdings
	 . 5% 0.59 0.75 5.64**
Directors block shareholdings 15. 15 %> 5 % 0.17 0.08
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.08 0.07 -0.97
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.14 0.09 -2.92*
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 26.20 31.81 5.8*
Institutional block shareholdings  15% 0.29 0.24 -2.31f
Institutional block shareholdings 
 30%> 15 % 0.33 0.24 -3.69**
Institutional block shareholdings  45%> 30% 0.24 0.27 1.12
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.14 0.26 5.73**
Executive chairman 0.67 0.50 -5.91**
Chairman is CEO 0.4502 0.2545 -7.26**
Age of CEO 53.74 52.46 -3.65**
Number of years as CEO 9.69 5.92 -12.75**
Market capitalisation 318.00 202.35 -3.74**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 21.85 16.48 -7.66**
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 2.73 -2.77 2.23f
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 2.50 -2.44 -7.52**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, 2.10 -3.50 -2.27f
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
22.33 16.92 -8.16**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
2.42 -2.58 -8.07**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
2.90 -3.73 -3.76**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
2.96 -3.73 -3.66**
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
-0.98 -0.88 0.18
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.82 -0.73 0.24
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
0.08 1.67 0.46
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.96 -1.06 -0.05
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ;1 . p<0.05 ; I p< 0.10;
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Table A.5.2
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (HOSTILE TAKEOVER BIDS)
NO	 HOSTILE	 INDEPEND
HOSTILE	 ENCE OF
MEANS
Variable
	 SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t-values
MEAN	 MEAN
Change in chief executive 0.09 0.11 0.90
Annual turnover of executive directors 14.36 15.58 0.80
Annual turnover of all directors 13.09 15.72 1.95t
Board size 7.32 7.51 1.16
Non-executive directors (%) 38.96 37.40 -1.22
Directors block shareholdings (%) 8.94 10.26 1.06
Directors block shareholdings	  5% 0.66 0.66 -0.08
Directors block shareholdings  15 % > 5 % 0.12 0.17 1.82
Directors block shareholdings 5. 30%> 15% 0.08 0.05 -1.50
Directors block shareholdings > 30% 0.12 0.09 -1.50
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 28.98 27.96 -0.66
Institutional block shareholdings _. 15% 0.26 0.31 1.49
Institutional block shareholdings  30%> 15 % 0.28 0.30 0.45
Institutional block shareholdings  45% > 30% 0.27 0.19 -2.59*
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.19 0.20 0.08
Executive chairman 0.58 0.64 1.77t
Chairman is CEO 0.37 0.30 -2.2 It
Age of CEO 53.34 52.14 -3.05*
Number of years as CEO 7.80 8.39 1.7
Market capitalisation 270.65 230.22 -1.04
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 19.79 16.97 -2.96*
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 1.98 -8.47 -3.04*
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 0.30 -0.50 -1.10
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag,industry adjusted 1.40 -9.62 -349**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 20.26 17.43 -3.84**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted.
0.19 -0.62 -1.21
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 1.33 -7.55 -3.66**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted
1.17 -6.63 -3.08*
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance
-1.02 -5.33 0.70
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.93 -0.07 1.85
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
performance
1.15 -0.77 -0.43
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.04 -5.99 -2.33*
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; 1 p< 0.10;
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Table A.5.3
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (CEO DUALITY)
NO CEO	 ,	 CEO	 INDEPENDEN
DUALITY	 DUALITY	 CE OF MEANS
Variable
	
MEAN	 MEAN	 T VALUE
Change in chief executive 0.13 0.08 -2.77*
Annual turnover of executive directors 16.33 13.59 -2.16t
Annual turnover of all directors 14.13 13.22 -0.91
Hostile takeover bids 0.04 0.05 0.88
Board size 7.57 7.23 -2.37t
Non-executive directors (%) 44.34 35.50 -10.01**
Directors block shareholdings (%) 5.01 11.51 7•53**
Directors block shareholdings	  5% 0.77 0.60 -6.38**
Directors block shareholdings  15 %> 5 % 0.10 0.14 2.3 It
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.07 0.08 0.48
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.04 0.16 7.32**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 30.88 27.63 -2.84*
Institutional block shareholdings  15% 0.22 0.29 2.89*
Institutional block shareholdings  30%> 15 % 0.27 0.29 0.56
Institutional block shareholdings  45% > 30% 0.28 0.24 -1.55
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.22 0.18 -1.60
Age of CEO 51.63 53.98 6.47**
Number of years as CEO 6.21 8.85 9.89**
Market capitalisation 215.16 290.90 2.28t
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 17.61 20.25 3.33**
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 -1.13 0.87 0.72
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted -1.64 1.18 3.8**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag,industry adjusted -2.15 0.39 0.96
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
18.16 20.67 3.33**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
-1.65 1.01 3.8**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
-1.92 0.73 1.34
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-1.71 0.66 1.14
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance
-0.95 -0.92 0.07
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
adjusted
-0.81 -0.76 0.13
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance
1.12 0.65 -0.13
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
adjusted
-1.64 -0.66 0.48
0.0001 ; * p <0.01 ;1- p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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Table A.5.4
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (DIRECTORS SHAREHOLDINGS)
LESS	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
COMPLETE	 COMPLETE
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 MEANS
Variable
	
MEAN	 MEAN	 t-value
Change in chief executive 0.11 0.07 -2.29t
Annual turnover of executive directors 15.38 12.68 -2.16t
Annual turnover of all directors 13.98 12.53 -1.47
Hostile takeover bid 0.05 0.04 -1.09
Board size 7.82 6.24 -12.11**
Non-executive directors (%) 41.51 31.99 -8.56**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 30.48 24.83 -5.09**
Institutional block shareholdings  15% 0.24 0.32 2.56*
Institutional block shareholdings  30%> 15 % 0.27 0.32 1.9$
Institutional block shareholdings 5. 45%> 30% 0.27 0.23 -1.42
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.22 0.14 -3.48**
Executive chairman 0.53 0.74 7.34**
Chairman is CEO 0.31 0.47 5.18**
Age of CEO 53.34 52.62 -1.88$
Number of years as CEO 7.33 9.25 5.53**
Market capitalisation 347.78 63.93 -10.81**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 19.36 19.16 -0.15
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 -0.09 0.71 0.28
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 0.15 0.19 0.13
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag,industry adjusted -0.59 -0.37 0.09
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
19.77 19.74 0.02
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
-0.01 0.20 0.31
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
-0.57 0.59 0.57
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-0.74 1.11 0.85
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
-0.93 -0.94 -0.02
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.74 -0.88 -0.31
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
1.13 0.08 -0.25
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.77 -1.58 -0.34
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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Table A.5.5
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDINGS)
LESS,	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN
	
ENCE
COMPLETE	 COMPLETE	 OF MEANS
Variable	 SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t value
MEAN	 MEAN
Change in chief executive 0.08 0.11 2.08t
Annual turnover of executive directors 13.53 15.37 1.60
Annual turnover of all directors 12.53 14.32 1.891
Hostile takeover bid 0.06 0.03 -2.24f
Board size 7.94 6.91 -7.45**
Non-executive directors (%) 37.32 39.72 2.44f
Directors block shareholdings (%) 13.65 5.79 -7.81**
Directors block shareholdings	 _ 5% 0.61 0.71 3•53**
Directors block shareholdings  15 %> 5 % 0.09 0.15 3.57**
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.05 0.09 2.36f
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.22 0.05 -8.58**
Executive chairman 0.65 0.55 -3.47**
Chairman is CEO 0.41 0.32 -3.11*
Age of CEO 54.18 52.34
Number of years as CEO 8.25 7.64 -1.881
Market capitalisation 483.00 98.04
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 20.43 18.44 -2.79*
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 -1.61 1.47 1.21
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 1.25 -0.66 -2.81*
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, -1.91 0.52 0.97
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 21.15 18.72 -3.61**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted.
1.35 -0.93 -3.55**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average -1.28 0.57 1.03
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted
-1.55 0.83 1.27
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance
-1.22 -0.72 0.99
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-1.09 -0.55 1.56
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
performance
-0.21 1.59 0.54
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-2.03 -0.24 0.93
p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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Table A.5.6
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS)
LESS ,	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
Variable	 COMPLETE	 COMPLETE	 MEANS
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t - value
Change in chief executive 0.08 0.10 1.12
Annual turnover of executive directors 10.28 15.40 3.63**
Annual turnover of all directors 9.88 14.25 3•5**
Hostile takeover bid 0.04 0.05 0.33
Board size 6.77 7.46 3.87**
Directors block shareholdings (%) 18.47 7.39 -7.38**
Directors block shareholdings  5% 0.44 0.71 7.17**
Directors block shareholdings  15 % > 5 % 0.17 0.12 -1.891
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.08 0.07 -0.51
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.30 0.08 -6.34**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 24.71 29.58 3.42**
Institutional block shareholdings .. 15% 0.39 0.24 -4.12**
Institutional block shareholdings 5_ 30%> 15 % 0.26 0.29 0.84
Institutional block shareholdings  45%> 30% 0.20 0.27 2.25t
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.16 0.20 1.37
Executive chairman 0.84 0.54 -8.08**
Chairman is CEO 0.61 0.31 -7.89**
Age of CEO 53.75 53.01 -1.761
Number of years as CEO 8.51 7.78
Market capitalisation
_
139.47 287.35 5.04**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 20.30 19.10 -1.11
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 1.37 -0.09 -0.37
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 1.52 -0.10 -1.741
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, 1.30 -0.88 -0.57
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 21.40 19.45 -1.791
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted.
2.06 -0.33 -2.33t
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 0.68 -0.40 -0.45
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted
-0.09 -0.21 -0.08
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
-1.84 -0.76 1.53
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-1.81 -0.58 2.54t
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
1.36 0.71 -0.14
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
, years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-1.83 -0.85 0.36
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; 't p<0.05 ; tI)< 0.10;
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Table A.5.7
MANUFACTURING FIRMS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (MARKET CAPITALISATION)
LESS	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
Variable	 COMPLETE	 COMPLETE	 MEANS
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t - value
Change in chief executive 0.10 0.08 -1.26
Annual turnover of executive directors 14.55 14.69 0.11
Annual turnover of all directors 13.60 13.35 -0.25
Hostile takeover Bid 0.05 0.04 -0.25
Board Size 6.79 9.41 15.42**
Non-executive directors (%) 36.99 44.95 7.84**
Directors block shareholdings (%) 11.60 0.18 -19.58**
Directors block shareholdings	 . 5% 0.58 0.98 22.79**
Directors block shareholdings  15 % > 5 % 0.16 0.01 -11.41**
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.09 0.00
Directors block shareholdings >30 % 0.15 0.00 -12.92**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 32.11 16.60 -15.35**
Institutional block shareholdings  15% 0.20 0.51 9.04**
Institutional block shareholdings  30%> 15 % 0.27 0.34 2.2 it
Institutional block shareholdings 
 
45%> 30% 0.29 0.13 -6.53**
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.24 0.02 -13.48**
Executive chairman 0.59 0.58 -0.26
Chairman is CEO 0.37 0.31 -1.95t
Age of CEO 52.42 55.75 8.1**
Number of years as CEO 8.08 7.25 -2.04t
Returns on Capital employed in year t-1 18.90 20.77 2.82*
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 0.02 0.63 0.27
Returns on Capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted -0.29 1.84 3.57**
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, -0.98 1.15 0.96
Returns on Capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
19.39 21.13 2.79*
Returns on Capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
-0.38 1.64 3.64**
Abnormal returns on shares, I yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
-0.53 0.88 0.90
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-0.18 -0.23 -0.03
Returns on Capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
-0.99 -0.70 0.72
Returns on Capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.83 -0.58 0.90
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
1.15 -0.42 -0.53
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.98 -1.13 -0.09
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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Table A.6.1
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (CHANGE OF CEO)
-
NO CHANGE	 CHANGE IN	 INDEPENDEN
IN CEO	 CEO	 CE OF MEANS
Variable	 MEAN	 MEAN	 t-value
Annual turnover of executive directors 8.03 19.40 4.83**
Annual turnover of all directors 7.55 17.60 6.27**
Board size 10.58 12.98 3.17*
Non-executive directors (%) 33.20 48.73 5.96**
Directors block shareholdings (%) 13.93 2.98 -5.65**
Directors block shareholdings	 5. 5% 0.59 0.82 3.78**
Directors block shareholdings  15 %> 5 % 0.08 0.08 -0.22
Directors block shareholdings  30% > 15% 0.07 0.11 1.10
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.25 0.02 -545**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 29.79 23.05 -2.26f
Institutional block shareholdings  15% 0.35 0.44 1.26
Institutional block shareholdings  30%> 15 % 0,21 0.24 0.31
Institutional block shareholdings  45%> 30% 0.17 0.19 0.59
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.27 0.13 -2.46*
Executive chairman 0.63 0.54 -1.35
Chairman is CEO 0.07 0.17 2.65*
Age of CEO 57.42 57.68 0.59
Number of years as CEO 7.66 6.59 -1.94$
Market capitalisation 945.32 1685.91 2.25f
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 11.56 9.53 -0.90
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 2.22 3.09 0.05
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 1.18 0.02 -0.40
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, -0.83 1.23 0.25
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
11.69 9.43 -1.24
Returns on capital employed, I yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
1.12 -0.18 -0.60
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
4.49 -2.54 -1.721
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
2.15 -4.29 -1.55
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance
0.02 0.67 0.37
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
adjusted
-0.81 -0.03 0.83
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance
0.23 9.19 1.11
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
adjusted
-0.74 4.12 1.16
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; I p< 0.10;
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Table A.6.2
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (CEO DUALITY)
NO CEO	 , CEO	 INDEPEND
DUALITY	 DUALITY	 ENCE OF
MEANS
Variable	 MEAN	 MEAN	 T VALUE
Change in chief executive 0.13 0.13 0.16
Annual turnover of executive directors 15.29 13.75 -0.58
Annual turnover of all directors 14.06 12.57 -0.71
Board size 11.22 12.14 1.09
Non-executive directors (%) 48.38 38.92 -3.24**
Directors block shareholdings (%) 6.79 8.48 0.81
Directors block shareholdings	 . 5% 0.71 0.72 0.25
Directors block shareholdings  15 %> 5 % 0.15 0.05 -2.28f
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.03 0.11 2.72*
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.12 0.13 0.16
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 30.57 24.38 -2.10f
Institutional block shareholdings . 15% 0.32 0.43 1.681
Institutional block shareholdings , 30%> 15 % 0.29 0.20 -1.51
Institutional block shareholdings . 45% > 30% 0.13 0.20 1.61
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.26 0.17 -1.66$
Age of CEO 54.98 58.58 3,44**
Number of years as CEO 6.33 7.38 1.831
Market capitalisation 1011.25 1479.65 1.55
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 8.44 11.27 1.50
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 -0.99 4.15 0.96
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted -0.91 1.13 1.21
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag,industry adjusted -1.85 1.13 0.47
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
8.79 11.13 1.51
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
-0.66 0.84 1.10
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
-4.00 2.55 1.47
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-4.69 -0.00 1.03
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance
0.28 0.39 0.05
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
adjusted
0.29 -0.67 -0.90
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance
8.25 3.61 -0.53
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to
previous years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry
, adjusted
3.69 1.07 -0.57
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; $ p< 0.10;
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Table A.6.3
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (DIRECTORS SHAREHOLDINGS)
LESS	 , GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
COMPLETE	 COMPLETE
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 MEANS
Variable
	 MEAN	 MEAN	 t-value
Change in chief executive 0.14 0.11 -0.58
Annual turnover of executive directors 14.68 12.78 -0.59
Annual turnover of all directors 13.7 10.94 -1.15
Board size 12.78 9.28 -4.24**
Non-executive directors (%) 43 37.59 1.45
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 25.93 26.74 0.13
Institutional block shareholdings < 15% 0.39 0.42 0.41
Institutional block shareholdings 
 30%> 15 % 0.21 0.26 0.89
Institutional block shareholdings < 45% >30% 0.22 0.06 -3.71**
_Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.17 0.26 1.23
Executive chairman 0.59 0.57 -0.35
Chairman is CEO 0.11 0.17 1.26
Age of CEO 56.81 59.71 2.65*
Number of years as CEO 7.45 6.02 -3.65**
Market capitalisation 1752.91 170.46 -7.28**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 9.61 12.93 1.35
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 4.09 -1.35 -1.10
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted
	
- -0.23 2.80 1.31
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag,industry adjusted 1.15 -2.22 -0.51
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
9.87 12.18 1.48
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
-0.11 1.92 1.15
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
0.22 2.01 -1.10
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-2.45 1.89 -0.58
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
yeaccs performance
-0.1068 1.73 0.86
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.3231 -0.62 -0.27
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
3.8836 8.05 0.53
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
1.4788 2.82 0.32
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10
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Table A.6.4
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (INSTITUTIONAL SHAREHOLDINGS)
LESS	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE
COMPLETE COMPLETE OF MEANS
Variable	 SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t value
MEAN	 MEAN
Change in chief executive 0.13 0.13 0.08
Annual turnover of executive directors 14.32 13.98 -0.14
Annual turnover of all directors 12.81 13.28 0.52
Board size 13.14 9.89 -4.59**
Non-executive directors (%) 38.65 46.30 2.75*
Directors block shareholdings (%) 9.96 4.91 -3*
Directors block shareholdings  5% 0.70 0.74 -0.72
Directors block shareholdings  15 % > 5 % 0.05 0.13 2.27f
Directors block shareholdings  30%> 15% 0.08 0.09 0.22
Directors block shareholdings > 30% 0.17 0.06 -2.89*
Executive chairman 0.57 0.59 0.28
Chairman is CEO 0.14 0.10 0.79
Age of CEO 58.96 55.34 2.65*
Number of years as CEO 6.86 7.42 1.04
Market capitalisation 2070.82 200.51 -7.34**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 10.79 9.94 0.49
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 6.63 -3.54 -2.06f
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 0.81 0.13 -1.35
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, 3.70 -5.11 -1.49
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 11.04 9.56 -1.03
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted.
0.94 -0.42 -1.07
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average 3.40 -3.62 1.70t
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving average,
industry adjusted
0.83 -4.76 -1.17
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance
-0.05 1.01 0.56
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous years
performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.62 -0.05 0.58
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
performance
6.68 2.18 -0.48
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous years
, performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
2.88 0.14 -0.56
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; t p< 0.10;
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Table A.6.5
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (NON-EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS)
LESS	 ,	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
Variable	 COMPLETE	 COMPLETE	 MEANS
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t - value
Change in chief executive 0.09 0.18 1.93t
Annual turnover of executive directors 11.15 17.96 2.77*
Annual turnover of all directors 1 / .23 15.17 2.38*
Board size 11.22 12.69 1.94f
Directors block shareholdings (%) 9.55 6.08 -1.921-
Directors block shareholdings	 ..0 5% 0.73 0.71 -0.36
Directors block shareholdings 
 15 % > 5% 0.04 0.13 2.71
Directors block shareholdings  30°/o> 15%
_	
0.08 0.10 0.53
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.16 0.08 -1.83
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 20.87 32.67 4•4**
Institutional block shareholdings . 15% 0.47 0.31 -2.66*
Institutional block shareholdings ... 30%> 15% 0.25 0.19 -1.05
Institutional block shareholdings . 45%> 30% 0.17 0.19 0.48
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.11 0.30 3.82**
Executive chairman 0.73 0.40 -5.53**
Chairman is CEO 0.10 0.15 1.22
Age of CEO 57.32 57.85 0.57
Number of years as CEO 7.98 5.97 -3.94**
Market capitalisation 1368.50 1318.91 -0.15
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 12.70 7.70 -2.96*
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 5.24 -0.48 -1.17
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 2.72 -2.15 -3.23*
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, 2.96 -3.04 -1.03
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
avercage
12.99 7.34 4.14**
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
2.76 -2.50
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving 	 -
average
3.70 -3.05 -1.671
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
avercage, industry adjusted
2.04 -5.52 -1.91$
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
-0.22 1.07 0.63
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.80 0.09 0.88
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
2.39 8.09 0.75
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr, moving average, industry adjusted
0.97 2.87 0.48
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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Table A.6.6
AUTHORISED INSTITUTIONS
INDEPENDENCE OF MEANS (MARKET CAPITALISATION)
LESS	 GREATER	 INDEPEND
THAN	 THAN	 ENCE OF
Variable	 COMPLETE	 COMPLETE
	 MEANS
SAMPLE	 SAMPLE	 t - value
Change in chief executive 0.13 0.14 0.25
Annual turnover of executive directors 13.54 16.44 1.18
Annual turnover of all directors 12.60 14.32 1.04
Board size 9.64 19.56 15.03**
Non-executive directors (%) 39.55 48.70 2.89*
Directors block shareholdings (%) 10.25 0.26 -8.48**
Directors block shareholdings 	 5 5% 0.65 0.96 7.52**
Directors block shareholdings 5 15 %> 5 % 0.09 0.04 -1.781.
Directors block shareholdings 5_ 30%> 15% 0.11 0.00 4•97**
Directors block shareholdings > 30 % 0.17 0.00 -6.28**
Institutional block shareholdings (%) 29.83 13.44 -6.42**
Institutional block shareholdings 5 15% 0.33 0.65 4.48**
Institutional block shareholdings 5 30%> 15 % 0.24 0.18 -1.09
Institutional block shareholdings 5_ 45%> 30% 0.19 0.14 -0.98
Institutional block shareholdings >45% 0.24 0.04 -5.32**
Executive chairman 0.63 0.42 -2.81*
Chairman is CEO 0.09 0.23 2.28t
Age of CEO 56.99 59.51 3.13*
Number of years as CEO 7.63 5.20 -4**
Returns on capital employed in year t-1 10.44 10.56 0.09
Abnormal returns on shares in year t-1 1.11 8.12 1.21
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag,industry adjusted 0.34 1.28 0.77
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr.r. lag, industry adjusted, -0.23 2.07 0.46
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
10.38 10.75 0.22
Returns on capital employed, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted.
0.07 1.61 1.48
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average
-0.63 5.21 1.861
Abnormal returns on shares, 1 yr. lag with 2 yr. moving
average, industry adjusted
-1.52 -0.68 0.27
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance
0.60 -0.47 -0.48
Returns on capital employed, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
-0.23 -0.99 -0.67
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance
5.05 4.56 -0.05
Abnormal returns on shares, Change with respect to previous
years performance, 2 yr. moving average, industry adjusted
1.45 3.07 0.33
** p < 0.0001 ; * p < 0.01 ; t p<0.05 ; p< 0.10;
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